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The Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on 17 July 1998 by an 
overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Conference.  Included in that 
body of like-minded nations was a large number of African delegations, and of 54 
African States, 44 have signed and 31 - South Africa amongst them - have ratified the 
Statute.   That is a significant proportion of the 114 states that have to date ratified 
worldwide. 
In this dissertation I provide a critical appraisal of Africa’s response to the 
International Criminal Court. The aims of this dissertation are both to investigate the 
response of African States to this new and rapidly developing field of international 
law and to assess the prospects for international criminal law within the region.  My 
premise is that the African continent ought to view the International Criminal Court 
and its system of complementarity as a primary mechanism in the struggle against 
authoritarian regimes and a key component in the fight for human rights.   As I show 
later in this dissertation, not all African institutions and certainly not all of Africa’s 
leaders are enamoured of the Court.  Accordingly, a large part of the dissertation is 
aimed at describing, understanding, and critiquing the African backlash against the 
ICC, particularly within the African Union.   In the Court’s first years of work it has 
become essential that African civil societies, regionally and locally, take steps to 
impress upon African governments the importance of joining the International 
Criminal Court regime.  And once those governments joined the regime, it has been 
vital for civil society to cajole and encourage those governments to take steps to 
comply with their obligations under the Rome Statute.   Accordingly, in the thesis I 
not only endeavour to analyse the African response to the ICC, but also to recommend 
various proposals by which the current impasse between the Court and the African 
Union might be remedied, or at least ameliorated. 
Over the past years I have been privileged to both research and practise in the 
field of international criminal justice, with a particular focus on Africa. This PhD 
accordingly draws on a number of articles or chapters in books (all peer-reviewed) 
that I have published in the field.  In addition, I have completed a further number of 
articles which are ready for submission for publication and which make up the 
remainder of the dissertation.  In the course of the text I indicate which publications I 
am drawing on, and together with this PhD I will lodge hard copies of the articles and 
chapters that I have relied upon. The articles or chapters draw from my personal 
experience either as an advocate involved in African international criminal justice 
cases, or as a senior research associate at the Institute for Security Studies working on 
the International Crime in Africa Programme – and always with an academic 
inclination based on my associate professorship at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Currently all the Court’s first cases are in respect of African situations. Three 
countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa (the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda) were the first to refer “situations” in 
their respective territories to the ICC Prosecutor for investigations and possible 
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prosecutions.1 Cote d’Ivoire, in West Africa, subsequently made history by becoming 
the first non-party to lodge a declaration accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction.2 Most 
recently, another East African nation, Kenya, indicated that it too wished to refer a 
situation to the Court (although, as I describe later, the ICC Prosecutor instead chose 
to seek authorization from the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for his first proprio motu (of 
his own accord) investigation of a situation).3   Before Kenya, Sudan was the last and 
most controversial African situation to come within the Prosecutor’s sights. Unlike 
the other African situations which had come to the Court by way of so-called “self-
referrals”, it was the UN Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII authority of 
the UN Charter, that referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC. 
 Africa is thus where international criminal justice is taking shape.  The field 
of international criminal law is rapidly evolving on the African continent.  While 
there is ample international literature on the International Criminal Court as an 
institution, there is a paucity of African-based scholarship on the work of the Court in 
this region.  The scholarship that does exist is referred to by me in the various 
chapters that follow (in footnotes), but I humbly stress that many of the articles that I 
have published or are ready for submission by me (and which form the basis of the 
PhD) are in material respects the first additions to the literature.  In that respect the 
dissertation draws on material that is “original” in both senses of the word.   
The framework for how the various chapters contribute to the overall 
argument of the thesis is as follows.   
After this introductory chapter (chapter 1) I begin in chapter 2 with a 
discussion of the rise of the International Criminal Court, including a discussion of 
the core crimes under international criminal law, and I situate the Court within an 
African context by reference to the Court’s jurisdiction and the question of 
immunities and amnesties before the ICC.     I draw in this regard on my chapter 
published in South Africa’s leading international law textbook, Dugard, International 
Law: A South African Perspective, 3rd edition, 2008. 
In chapter 3 I focus on a core concept of the International Criminal Court: 
complementarity. Complementarity is perhaps the key feature of the ICC regime.  It is 
thus vitally important to appreciate its significance, and in so doing, to understand 
both the promises and problems of international criminal justice for Africa as 
exemplified by the International Criminal Court.  
The International Criminal Court is expected to act in what is described as a 
“complementary” relationship with domestic states that are party to the Rome Statute.  
The Preamble to the Rome Statute says that the Court’s jurisdiction will be 
complementary to that of national jurisdiction, and Article 17 of the Statute embodies 
the complementarity principle. At the heart of the complementarity principle is the 
                                                 
1 Payam Akhavan, “Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or 
the Victims of Atrocities?” (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 1046; Mohamed M. El Zeidy, “Critical 
Thoughts on Article 59(2) of the ICC Statute” (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 448; 
Claus Kress, “‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and 
Policy” (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944. 
2 Press Release, ICC, Registrar confirms that the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire has accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court (15 February 2005). 
3 Press Release, ICC OTP, Kenyan High-Level Delegation meets ICC Prosecutor (3 July 2009); 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 
March 2010).  
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ability to prosecute international criminals in one’s national courts, on behalf of the 
international community, or to have in place mechanisms to arrest and surrender to 
the ICC persons that the ICC seeks to prosecute and who happen to be in one’s 
jurisdiction.  As I point out in later chapters, a central concern for African states has 
been the ICC’s request for cooperation by African states parties to the Court to arrest 
President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan – wanted by the Court for genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.  The complementarity principle has resonated in this 
respect for South Africa – which was requested to arrest al-Bashir when news broke 
that he would attend Jacob Zuma’s inauguration as president in Pretoria in 2008. 
To understand South Africa’s legal position (and to make sense of its political 
prevarication on the al-Bashir saga), it is necessary to have a proper appreciation of 
South Africa’s domestic legislation that has implemented the Rome Statute into South 
African law.  I discuss this legislation and its implications in detail in chapter 4 of the 
dissertation. 
South Africa’s progressive legislation aside, our country quickly found itself 
mired in the African Union’s politics around the work of the ICC on the continent.  
After the Court’s African focus became clear there was (in hindsight) a predictable 
backlash against the Court. That backlash is captured in statements to the effect that 
the ICC is a Western, or imperialistic initiative; that it is some form of colonial 
throwback; or the imposition of a developed world’s form of justice on an 
unsuspecting and servile African people; and that the Court is unhealthily preoccupied 
with the African continent. It is of obvious concern then that the ICC has come under 
such vitriolic attack from within Africa and by scholars associated with Africa.  What 
chapter 5 proceeds to do is to consider the criticisms in turn.  How valid are the 
attacks on the ICC?  And what lessons (if any) might be drawn from the fact that 
these attacks have been made? 
Part of the backlash described in chapter 5 includes a decision by the African 
Union (at a meeting to which South Africa was a party) that the members of the 
African Union be called upon not to cooperate with the ICC in respect of the arrest 
and surrender of President al-Bashir.  There has also been a call by the African Union 
that the Security Council of the United Nations use its power under article 16 of the 
Rome Statute to defer the proceedings in respect of al-Bashir before the ICC 
(proceedings that arose from a prior decision by the Security Council to refer the 
Sudan crisis to the ICC). In light of the defiant response of the Sudanese government 
to the ICC and the ICC’s action against Sudanese suspects, including President al-
Bashir, these developments raise several questions regarding the Court’s ability to 
enforce the referral. And given the African Union’s strident criticism of the Security 
Council for failing to defer the case – an option under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
which allows for investigations and prosecutions to be suspended for 12-month 
periods – there is increasing attention being given to the question of the deferral 
power built into the Rome Statute. Accordingly, the issue of the Sudan referral and 
deferral is arguably one of the most significant events since the Court’s inception and 
worthy of close analysis.  I perform that analysis in chapter 6. 
In the background in the preceding chapters (and increasingly now in the 
forefront of international political discourse around the ICC, certainly within the AU), 
is the fact that international criminal justice is subject to the uneven and imbalanced 
landscape of global politics. For Africa, a key concern in this regard is the 
relationship between the UN Security Council and the ICC, specifically the Council’s 
powers of referral and deferral under the Rome Statute (Articles 13 and 16). The 
skewed institutional power of the Security Council creates an environment in which it 
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is more likely that action will be taken against accused from weaker states than those 
from powerful states, or those protected by powerful states. Thus the perception is 
that by referring the Darfur situation to the ICC but not acting in relation to, for 
instance, Israel, the Council, through certain influential members, is guilty of double-
standards.   The difficulty for the ICC – and in particular its efforts on the African 
continent – is that its work is increasingly criticised as an example of a Western 
institution unhealthily preoccupied with Africa. The power of the Council to refer 
matters to the Court with the concomitant power to decide on deferral of matters 
under article 16 of the Rome Statute remains a real issue.  The controversial nature of 
the Council’s relationship with the ICC arises as we have seen from the inherent 
defects within the Council, defects which for a long time African and other states 
have complained about.  But the controversy is heightened in respect of the ICC and 
Sudan, since Sudan is not a state party to the Court, yet non-state parties on the 
Council voted for the referral (and have the power to refuse deferral).   
I consider these issues in the final chapter – chapter 7 – and provide some 
recommendations going forward, and draw various conclusions for Africa and the 
African Union.  I conclude the thesis by considering in detail the vital role that South 
Africa has to play in respect of the ongoing work of the Court to ensure that the Court 
– while criticised constructively when that is required – is championed as a vital 
component for the delivery of justice to African victims of mass atrocities.   
 I confirm that the thesis is comprised of a minimum of five inter-related 
articles.  In total the thesis is now 74,000 words, including this introduction.  At least 
three of those articles are already published under my name (“Complementarity and 
Africa: the promises and problems of international criminal justice” African Security 
Review, vol 17 part 4 2008; “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute – An 
African Example”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2007, vol 5, 460; 
“International Criminal Law”, in SACJ, 2010, Issue 2; “The Future of International 
Criminal Justice – Civil Society, Complementarity and the Case of South Africa”, 
African Security Review, vol 19, no 4, (2010)), and I have also included book chapters 
published in my name (“International Criminal Law, the International Criminal Court, 
and South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act”, in John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, 3rd 
Edition, 2008, Juta Publishers; and “Confronting Myths about the International 
Criminal Court and its Work in Africa” in Chile Eboe-Osuji (ed) Protecting 
Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay, 
2010, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).  
In addition to those chapters (or portions of chapters) that are already 
published, I have included a final chapter (“The Law and Politics of Referrals and 
Deferrals under Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court”) which is ready to be submitted for publication to an international journal.  I 
also point out for the sake of completeness that after this thesis had been finalised, I 
completed updates of the book chapter “International Criminal Law, the International 
Criminal Court, and South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act” for the forthcoming edition of John Dugard, 





CHAPTER 2: THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA4 
 
The idea of an international criminal court 
 
The idea of a permanent international criminal court was on the international agenda 
for much of the last century.5  After World War I unsuccessful attempts were made to 
bring the German Emperor to trial before an international tribunal6 and, later, to try 
Turks responsible for the genocide of Armenians before a tribunal designated by the 
Allied Powers.7  In 1937, following the assassination in 1934 of King Alexander of 
Yugoslavia by Croatian nationalists in Marseilles, treaties were drafted to outlaw 
international terrorism and to provide for the trial of terrorists before an international 
tribunal,8 but states lost interest in this venture as war approached and no state ratified 
the treaty for an international criminal court and only one ratified the treaty outlawing 
international terrorism.  The aggressive war conducted by Germany and the atrocities 
committed by its officials and soldiers during World War II provided the requisite 
impetus for the creation by Allied powers of an ad hoc international military tribunal 
at Nuremberg9 (a similar tribunal was constituted in Tokyo10 in respect of crimes 
committed by Japan’s leaders).  The establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
international military tribunals, which tried the principal leaders of the Nazi and 
Japanese regimes after World War II for crimes against the peace, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity was a natural culmination of the pre-war debate over an 
international criminal court.  Inevitably, however, there was criticism of the fact that 
                                                 
4 Portions of this chapter were originally published as chapter 10, “International Criminal Courts, the 
International Criminal Court, and South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute” (2007) in John 
Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective. 
5 For an account of this history see B Ferencz An International Criminal Court.  A Step towards World 
Peace – A Documentary History and Analysis (1980). 
6 Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles (UK Treaty Series No 1 (1919)) provided for the trial of the 
Emperor for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” before a 
special tribunal composed of five judges appointed by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, 
Italy and Japan.  The attempt to bring the Emperor to trial was thwarted when he was granted asylum 
by the Netherlands. 
7 The unratified Treaty of Sevres of 1920 (UK Treaty Series No 11 (1920) provided for the surrender 
by Turkey of persons “responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of 
war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire” (article 230) but in 1923 the Treaty of 
Lausanne (UK Treaty Series No 16 (1923), Part VIII) granted amnesty to these persons.  See V N 
Adrian “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case 
and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications” (1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 221. 
8 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court in M O Hudson International 
Legislation vol 7, no 500 (1941). 
9 See Telford Taylor The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992).  The judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal is published in (1947) 41 AJIL 172. 
10 A C Brackman The Other Nuremberg. The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1989). 
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these tribunals were established by the victors to try the vanquished.11  The United 
Nations was nonetheless energised by the work of these tribunals to adopt, on 9 
December 1948, a resolution mandating the International Law Commission to begin 
work on the draft statute of an international criminal court.12 The enthusiasm 
generated by Nuremberg and Tokyo for a permanent court in the immediate post war 
period was, however, abandoned during the Cold War.  Even the consensus between 
East and West over apartheid failed to produce the court proposed to try apartheid’s 
criminals in the late 1970s.13        
 By the 1980s a wide range of factors combined to strengthen the case for an 
international criminal court.  These included the increase in the number of 
international crimes in treaties outlawing hijacking, hostage-taking, torture, seizure of 
ships on the high seas and attacks on diplomats; the emergence of powerful drug 
cartels capable of subverting the judicial systems of weak states; and above all, the 
conviction that international law had progressed sufficiently to enable it to condemn 
individuals before an international criminal court for violating international norms.  
The final contributing factor was the end of the Cold War – it was thereafter possible 
for a more unified United Nations to renew its interest in a permanent international 
criminal court. 
The idea of a permanent criminal court for the world was placed back on the 
international agenda through a proposal by Latin American States who envisaged 
such a court as their last resort to prosecute international drug-traffickers.14 Thereafter 
the International Law Commission was directed by the UN General Assembly to 
consider the drafting of a statute of an international criminal court.  The early 1990s 
saw the Commission prepare a draft statute for such a court and by 1994 a formal 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal was adopted by the ILC and 
forwarded to the General Assembly for consideration.15  During the time that the 
Commission was preparing the Draft Statute, events compelled the creation of a court 
on an ad hoc basis to respond to the atrocities that were being committed in the 
former Yugoslavia.  That tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, was established by the Security Council in 1993 and mandated to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.16  Then, in November 
                                                 
11 For an insightful overview of the criticisms of the Nuremberg trials, see R Overy, “The Nuremberg 
trials: international law in the making” (2003) in P Sands (ed), From Nuremberg to The Hague – the 
Future of International Criminal Justice 1.  
12 See W A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 8. 
13 In 1979 the United Nations Human Rights Commission instructed Professor M Cherif Bassiouni to 
draft a statute for an international court to try offenders under the 1973 International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.  A statute was drafted but no action was taken 
on the project: see M Cherif Bassiouni A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Tribunal (1987) 10-11. 
14 See K Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) 27. 
15 See J Crawford “The ILC’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal” (1994) 88 AJIL 
140; J Crawford “The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court” (1995) 89 AJIL 404. 
16 SC Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 and SC Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993.  For detailed 
accounts of the creation of the ICTY see M Cherif Bassiouni and P Manikas The Law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1996) Chapters I-III.  See too V Morris 
and M Scharf An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A 
Documentary History and Analysis (1995). 
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1994, and acting on a request from Rwanda, the Security Council voted to create a 
second ad hoc tribunal, charged with the prosecution of genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and in 
neighbouring countries during the year 1994.17  These two tribunals are still in 
operation (although they are both aiming to wind down operations in the foreseeable 
future). They are close relatives, sharing virtually identical statutes, as well as the 
same Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber.  The first prosecutor, from 1994 to 1996, was 
Richard Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court.  The President of the 
Appeals Chamber for the Rwanda Tribunal, prior to her appointment as a judge of the 
International Criminal Court, was Judge Navi Pillay, another South African. 
The Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals fuelled the widespread belief that a 
permanent international criminal court was desirable and practical.  When delegates 
convened in Rome in 1998 to draft a statute for a permanent international criminal 
court, the Tribunals could provide a reassuring model of how such a court might 
function. In addition to the example which the Tribunals provided of working 
criminal justice, the innovative international criminal law jurisprudence that they had 
produced – such as the progressive view that crimes against humanity could be 
committed in peacetime,18 and the finding that war crimes could be committed during 
an internal armed conflict19 – fed into the debates at Rome and eventually came to be 
reflected in the Rome Statute.20 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on 17 July 1998 
by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Conference.  The 
conference was specifically organized to secure agreement on a treaty for the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal. After five weeks of 
intense negotiations, 120 countries voted to adopt the treaty. Only seven countries 
voted against it (including China, Israel, Iraq, and the United States) and twenty-one 
abstained. 139 states signed the treaty by the 31 December 2000 deadline. The treaty 
would come into force upon sixty ratifications.  Sixty-six countries - six more than the 
threshold needed to establish the court - ratified the treaty on 11 April 2002.  To date, 
the Rome Statute has been signed by 139 States and 98 States have ratified it.21 Of 
those 98 States a very significant proportion – twenty-seven – are African.22  South 
                                                 
17 SC Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.  For detail see C Scheltema and W van der Wolf (eds) The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda: Facts, Cases, Documents (1999). 
18 At Nuremberg “crimes against humanity” were prosecuted as crimes associated with one of the other 
crimes within the Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction, namely, war crimes and crimes against peace.  
Since Nuremberg several variants of crimes against humanity developed, not all with a nexus with 
armed conflict (the most prominent example is genocide – the most egregious form of crime against 
humanity – which the Genocide Convention of 1948 defines as an offence which can be committed in 
times of peace and war).  The requirement of a nexus with armed conflict was firmly done away with 
by the Yugoslavia Tribunal in its celebrated decision in Prosecutor v Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-AR72), 
2 October, 1995, (1997) 35 ILM 32.  Article 7 of the Rome Statute codifies this evolution of crimes 
against humanity as being crimes committed either in times of peace or war.   
19 See Tadic above n 18.  Interesting developments have also come out of the Rwanda Tribunal’s 
decisions.  For instance, in the Akayesu matter (Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber (2 September 1998), 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), the Rwanda Tribunal came to the enlightened conclusion that rape could 
constitute an act of genocide.  
20 W A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 12. 
21 For latest ratification status see www.iccnow.org. 
22 For status of African ratification see 
www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/RATIFICATIONSbyUNGroups.pdf . 
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Africa is a party to the Statute and has been a vocal endorser of the International 
Criminal Court. One significant absentee as a ratifier is the United States.23  It is 
notable that within just four years the treaty achieved the 60 required ratifications, far 
sooner than was generally expected. 
Along with the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, together with the more recently established Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,24 the International Criminal Court stands as a working model of international 
criminal justice in terms of which an international criminal forum applies rules of 
international law, is staffed by independent prosecutors and judges, and holds persons 
individually responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes, after allowing 
them a fair trial. 
 
The International Criminal Court 
 
The International Criminal Court is situated in The Hague, the capital of the 
Netherlands.  The judges for the Court were sworn in on 11 March 2003 at the 
Court’s inaugural session.  Of the eighteen judges, three of the original set of judges 
were from Africa,25 including Judge Navi Pillay who is South African.   
Africa is high on the Court’s agenda.  As we shall see later, its first cases are 
all on the African continent.  
The International Criminal Court is divided into an Appeals Division, a Trial 
Division and a Pre-Trial Chamber Division.26  The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is 
responsible for receiving and examining referrals and substantiated information on 
alleged crimes, conducting investigations and conducting prosecutions before the 
Court.27 The OTP is headed by the Prosecutor, who has full authority over the 
management and administration of the OTP.28 In the interests of efficiency and 
consistency, the Prosecutor relies extensively on the Registry for administrative 
services. The Registry is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration 
and servicing of the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the 
Prosecutor. The Registry is headed by the Registrar, who is elected by the judges and 
                                                 
23 There is a vast literature critiquing the failure by the United States to join the Court.  For selected 
reading, see M P Scharf “The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states: a critique of the US position” (2001) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 64; M du Plessis, “Seeking an International International Criminal Court – 
Some Reflections on the United States opposition to the ICC” (2002) 15 3 SACJ 301; W A Schabas, 
“United States hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the Security Council” (2004) 
15 4 EJIL 710. 
24 On 2 November 2002 the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1315. This tribunal is the result of an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone 
to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for crimes against humanity and disrupting the peace 
process. The Court is a hybrid, staffed by local and international personnel, and has an international 
prosecutor. Its temporal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes under its Statute stretches back to 
crimes committed from 30 November 1996. 
25 Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana), Fatoumata Dembele Diarra (Mali). 
26 Articles 34 and 39 of the Rome Statute. 
27 Article 42(1). 
28 Article 42(2). 
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who exercises his functions under the authority of the President of the Court.29 The 
work of the Court is overseen by an Assembly of States Parties, which provides 
management oversight, considers and decides the budget for the Court, conducts 
elections and performs other functions. The Assembly meets at least once a year.30   
     
ICC Crimes 
 
The Court can take up only the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole – genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes – all of which are defined in the Statute.31  Aggression also falls within the 
competence of the ICC but an acceptable definition of this crime has still to be added 
to the Statute.32 Treaty crimes (such as terrorism, or drug trafficking) do not fall 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction but may be added later after consideration by a review 
conference.33  For the purposes of interpreting and applying the definitions of crimes 
found in the Rome Statute, reference must also be made to the Elements of Crimes, a 
fifty-page document adopted in June 2000 by the Preparatory Commission for the 




Genocide involves the intentional mass destruction of entire groups, or 
members of a group.35  The first criminal prosecution of “genocide” took place at the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, although strictly speaking, the Germans 
were being tried for “crimes against humanity” under the Nuremberg Charter.36  It 
took almost half a century with the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR before 
genocide came again to be prosecuted at the international level.37  
                                                 
29 Article 43. 
30 Article 112. 
31 Articles 5-8. 
32 Article 5(2).  See further W A Schabas “The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many 
Times Must The Cannonballs Fly, Before They are Forever Banned” in D McGoldrick, P Rowe and E 
Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court – Legal and Policy Issues (2004) 123.  
The definition has most recently been agreed upon at the First Review Conference of the International 
Criminal Court held in late May/early June 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. 
33 Article 123(1). 
34 See the Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes (PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2).   
35 The crime of genocide has been committed throughout history, the pre-eminent example being the 
mass killing of Jews by the Nazis during World War II, and more recently the slaughter of Tutsis by 
Hutus in Rwanda.  The term “genocide” is a combination of the Latin words genus (kind, type, race) 
and cide (to kill), and was coined first by Raphael Lemkin writing in response to the events of the 
Second World War.  See R Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944) 79-95; R Lemkin, 
“Genocide as a Crime Under International Law” (1947) 41 AJIL 145. 
36 There was no reference to the crime of genocide in the Charter or the judgment of the tribunal, even 
though it did appear in the indictment and was referred to by the Prosecution from time to time. 
37 See K Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) 67.  There was at least one national 
prosecution of genocide prior to the ICTY and ICTR’s existence; namely, the prosecution of Eichmann 
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Article 6 of the Rome Statute, following Article IV of the Genocide 
Convention, defines the various classes of action that constitute the crime of 
genocide:  
 
(i) killing members of a national or ethnic, racial, or religious group (meaning their 
“murder”, i.e., intentional, voluntary killing);38 
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (these terms “do 
not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent or irremediable”);39 
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction (including, inter alia, “subjecting a group of people to a 
subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential 
medical services below minimum requirement[s]”);40 
(iv) imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group (such measures 
would consist of “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control 
[and the] separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriage”);41 or 
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
The victim of the crime of genocide is the group itself and not the individual.42 
The definition of genocide in the Rome Statute provides that genocide is any one of 
the enumerated acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.  The common criterion in the four types of 
groups protected under the Genocide Convention (national, ethnic, racial or religious) 
is that “membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by 
its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner”.43  The “victim” group therefore does not extend to what might 
be called “political” and “social” groups.  In respect of the Rome Statute, the drafters 
have evinced a clear intention to limit the groups to the four identified by the 
Genocide Convention.  The idea of including a “cultural group” in the ICC Statute 
was rejected at the Rome Conference.  The drafters were quick to point out that the 
Genocide Convention was aimed at preventing physical destruction of a group, not 
cultural destruction.44 
                                                                                                                                            
before the District Court of Jerusalem (1968).  Eichmann was tried for crimes against the Jewish 
people, an offence under Israeli law which incorporated all the elements of the definition of genocide 
(see Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 97). 
38 Akayesu ICTR, Trial Chamber, judgment of 2 Sept. 1998, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T  paras. 500-501. 
39 Akayesu n 38 paras. 502-504. 
40 Akayesu n 38 paras. 505-506. 
41 Akayesu n 38 para. 507. 
42 K Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) at 69. 
43 Akayesu n 38 para. 511. 
44 The same view has been expressed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in its ruling in Prosecutor v. 
Radislav Krsti (ICTY Trial Chamber, decision of 2 August 2001, case no. IT-98-33-T).  There it 
confirmed that “customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the 
physical or biological destruction of all or part of a group”, with the result that an “enterprise attacking 
only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements 
which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under 
the definition of genocide” (para.  580). Genocide appears therefore to be limited to material 
destruction of a group, rather than the destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other 
identity of that group.  It is for this reason that the Australian courts have held that degradation of 
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Genocide is the most serious crime against humanity, as evidenced in the high 
threshold set for the mental element required for proof of genocide. In the Jelisic case 
the ICTY explained that “it is in fact the mens rea which gives genocide its speciality 
and distinguishes it from an ordinary crime and other crimes against international 
humanitarian law”.45 Both customary and conventional definitions of genocide 
require a prosecutor to establish a form of aggravated criminal intention, or specific 
intent (dolus specialis), in addition to the criminal intent accompanying the 
underlying offence.  The accused must commit the underlying offence with the intent 
to produce the result charged; that is, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.  Genocide is therefore a crime 
perpetrated against a “depersonalised” victim, and carried out for no other reason than 
that he or she is a member of a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group.46 
The intention must be to destroy a group “in whole or in part”. Genocide can 
thus be committed through the destruction of a large number of the group (a 
quantitative attempt at destruction) or the destruction of a limited number of the group 
who are targeted because of the potential impact of their destruction on the survival of 
the group as a whole (a qualitative attempt at destruction). An example of the latter 
would be the act of destroying young fertile women in a group who are of 
childbearing age. The element of specific intent in the context of genocide “may, in 
the absence of direct explicit evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and 
circumstances, such as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against the same group, the scale of the atrocities committed, 
the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular 
group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”.47  In Akayesu for 
example, the ICTR Trial Chamber found that the accused had the requisite mens rea 
to commit genocide, and had exhibited that aggravated criminal intention through, 
inter alia, the systematic rape of Tutsi women.  According to the ICTR, the 
systematic rape of Tutsi women was part of the campaign to mobilise the Hutus 
against the Hutu, and the sexual violence was aimed at destroying the spirit, will to 
live, or will to procreate, of the Tutsi group.48  
 
(b) Crimes against humanity 
 
The term “crime against humanity” was first used in its contemporary sense to 
condemn the atrocities committed by the Turkish forces against their own Greek and 
                                                                                                                                            
Aboriginal people through confiscation of traditional lands cannot amount to genocide by the 
responsible ministers, since the confiscation was not aimed at material destruction of the group as such 
(see G Robertson Crimes Against Humanity (2000) at 230. 
45 Jelisic (Appeal), ICTY Appeals Chamber, judgment of 5 July 2001, case no. IT-95-10-A para. 66. 
46  The specific intention of destroying all or part of the group must have been formed by the accused 
prior to the commission of the genocidal act.  Put differently, the underlying genocidal act (killing, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm etc.) should be done to further the genocidal goal of ensuring the 
group’s destruction (see Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR Trial Chamber, Case No. 96-1-T, judgment 
of 21 May 1999, para. 91). 
47 Jelisic (Appeal), ICTY Appeals Chamber, judgment of 5 July 2001, case no. IT-95-10-A, para. 47. 
See also the decision of the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana Case No ICTR 95-1-
A, Judgment (ICTR) Appeals Chamber 1 June 2001. 
48 Akayesu n 38 para. 732. 
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Armenian subjects during World War I in 1915.  Although no prosecutions ultimately 
took place, the immediate response of the Allied powers to the massacres was for 
France, UK and Russia to proclaim enthusiastically that all members of the Turkish 
government would be held responsible together with its agents for the “crimes against 
humanity and civilization”.49  At Nuremberg, the idea of a crime against humanity 
arose again. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals utilised the technical term “crime 
against humanity” to secure, for the first time, the prosecution of individuals for 
crimes that, by their nature, offended “humaneness”, and thereby became the concern 
of the international community.50  
At Nuremberg the notion of crimes against humanity was limited to those acts 
that occurred only during an international armed conflict.51 Today in international 
criminal law the nexus between crimes against humanity and war has disappeared, 
and customary international law prohibits crimes against humanity whether they are 
committed in time of war or peace.52   
Crimes against humanity are prohibited under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
The term “crimes against humanity” under the Statute covers actions that have a 
common set of features:53 
 
1) The offences are particularly egregious in that they constitute a serious attack 
on human dignity or a grave degradation or humiliation of one or more human 
beings; 
2) They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are acts that form part of 
governmental policy, or of a widespread or systematic practice of atrocities 
tolerated, condoned or acquiesced in by a government or de facto authority; 
3) Their prohibition extends regardless of whether they are perpetrated in times 
of war or peace; 
4) Under the Rome Statute (and the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR) the 
victims of the crimes are civilians or, in the case of crimes committed during 
                                                 
49 See above n 7. 
50 This use of the idea of crimes against humanity – to initiate prosecutions against individuals for 
atrocities committed within their own territories – led to a measure of discomfort for the Allied powers, 
who were concerned about the ramifications for their treatment of minorities within their own countries 
and colonies.  As a result, the Nuremberg notion of “crime against humanity” had an important rider 
attached to it: a crime against humanity was committed if it was associated or linked with one of the 
other crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, being war crimes and crimes against the peace 
(aggression).  What this meant is that there had to be a link between crimes against humanity and 
international armed conflict.  In part that is why the Nuremberg trials are spoken of as “war crimes 
trials” – since the crimes against humanity there could only be tried if they were attendant to either a 
crime against peace or war crimes (see W A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court (2004) 42.   
51 However, within weeks of the Nuremberg judgment the United Nations expressed its dissatisfaction 
with this limited scope of crimes against humanity when the General Assembly asserting in the 
Genocide Convention of 1948 that genocide (the most egregious form of crimes against humanity) 
could be committed during times of war and peace.  On that and other developments that gradually led 
to the link between crimes against humanity and war being dropped, see A. Cassese “Crimes against 
Humanity” in A Cassese et al (eds) The International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol I, (2002) 73.  
52 Cassese ibid.  The most recent developments relate to the ICTR and ICTY.  The establishment of the 
ICTR – to punish those guilty of crimes committed in an internal conflict – in itself reiterates the point 
that crimes against humanity do not have to be attendant to an international armed conflict.  See too the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in its decision in Prosecutor v Tadic (1997) 105 ILR 453 at para. 141. 
53 Cassese supra note 51 64. 
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armed conflict, persons who do not take part (or no longer take part) in armed 
hostilities. 
 
The specific acts or classes of offences that make up crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute are those commonly associated with egregious abuses of 
human rights and include: murder;54 extermination55 (involving mass or large-scale 
killing56, or intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia, the deprivation of 
food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population57); 
enslavement;58 deportation or forcible transfer of population59 (being the “forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the 
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international 
law”60); imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;61 torture62 (being “the intentional infliction of 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or 
under the control of the accused”63); sexual violence (which includes “rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”64); persecution65 (being “the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”.66); enforced disappearance67 
(being “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or 
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”68); the crime of apartheid69 
(which includes “inhumane acts of a character similar to [other crimes against 
humanity], committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic 
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups 
                                                 
54 Article 7(1)(a). 
55 Article 7(1)(b). 
56 In Vasiljevic, ICTY Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002, the Tribunal held that for criminal 
responsibility to attach for extermination the accused must have been responsible for a “large number 
of deaths”.  See also D Mundis “Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals” 
(2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 521.  
57 Article 7(2)(b). 
58 Article 7(1)(c). 
59 Article 7(1)(d). 
60 Article 7(2)(d) 
61 Article 7(1)(e). 
62 Article 7(1)(f). 
63 Article 7(2)(e). 
64 Article 7(1)(g). 
65 Article 7(1)(h). 
66 Article 7(2)(g). 
67 Article 7(1)(i). 
68 Article 7(2)(i). 
69 Article 7(1)(j). 
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and committed with the intention of maintaining the regime”;70 and other inhumane 
acts,71 which are acts “of a similar character to [other crimes against humanity] 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health”.72  
The Rome Statute sets various thresholds that elevate these classes of offences 
to the level of crimes against humanity.  The first requirement is that the act 
complained of must be part of a widespread or systematic attack.  Article 7(2) 
provides elucidation when it says that an attack is “a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in [Article 7(1)] against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack.” The second requirement is that the attack must be directed against a 
civilian population. This distinguishes it from many war crimes which may be 
targeted at both civilians and combatants, and the requirement also distinguishes the 
Rome Statute from customary international law which allows that a crime against 
humanity may be committed against civilians and military personnel.  Lastly, a crime 
against humanity cannot be committed unless a specific form of intention is present.  
Article 7(1) provides that a “crime against humanity” means any of the enumerated 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, “with knowledge of the attack”.  This requirement amounts to a 
form of specific intent which sets another threshold that must be crossed before a 
particular offence can be regarded as a crime against humanity.73  
 
(c) War crimes 
 
War crimes have an ancient lineage and historically belligerent States took it 
upon themselves to determine those acts committed in time of war for which they 
would try the combatants or civilians belonging to the enemy.  Of the core crimes in 
the Rome Statute, “war crimes” were the first to have been prosecuted at international 
law.  German soldiers were convicted of “acts in violation of the laws and customs of 
war” at Leipzig in the early 1920s, pursuant to Articles 228 and 230 of the Treaty of 
Versailles.74  
Generally speaking, war crimes are crimes committed in violation of 
international humanitarian law applicable during armed conflicts.  The sources of 
                                                 
70 Article 7(2)(h). 
71 Article 7(1)(k). 
72 Article 7(1)(k). 
73 W A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 45. Clearly each of the 
underlying acts committed (in terms of the greater event: the attack) require their own form of intent.  
However, overall, these acts must be committed with a specific intention that is associated with the 
main event - the attack that gives the individual acts their “crime against humanity” character.   
74 In Articles 228 to 230 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany recognised the jurisdiction of the Allied 
Powers to try persons accused of violating the laws and customs of war as well as the obligation to 
hand over such accused persons to the Allies for that purpose.  None of these provisions was 
implemented due to later German pressure.  Instead, Germany proposed to try its own nationals 
accused of war crimes before the Supreme Court of Leipzig, a proposal which produced mock trials 
which resulted in only 13 convictions out of 901 cases, and with insignificant sentences which 
ultimately were not executed.  See G Abi-Saab “The concept of ‘war crimes’”, 102-103, in S Yee and 
W Tieya (eds) International Law in the Post-Cold War Area (2001) 102-103.  
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international humanitarian law are vast, and are broadly divided into two categories of 
substantive rules – “the law of The Hague”75 and “the law of Geneva”76 – and which 
constitute the rules concerning behaviour which is prohibited in the case of an armed 
conflict.   
Drawing extensively from these existing sources of humanitarian law the 
drafters of the Rome Statute in Article 8 have set out an elaborate “codification” of 
the rules concerning behaviour which is prohibited in situations of armed conflict.  
Various preconditions for a war crimes prosecution are built into the Statute.  First, in 
order to constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Rome Statute there must be a nexus 
between the criminal conduct and the armed conflict. War crimes may be committed 
during either international or internal armed conflicts77 with States Parties to the 
Rome Statute having accepted that war crimes’ responsibility can be founded during 
times of civil war.  Secondly, the Rome Statute directs the Court’s attention “in 
particular” to those war crimes that are “committed as part of a plan or policy or as 
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”.78  This so-called “non-threshold 
threshold” built into Article 8 ensures that two jurisdictional triggers (1: that the war 
crime is committed as part of a plan or policy; and 2: that the war crime is committed 
alongside other war crimes on a large scale) should ordinarily be met before the ICC 
will be seized with the case. Thirdly, Article 30 of the Statute provides that criminal 
responsibility for a war crime requires intent and knowledge:  intent in relation to the 
conduct, namely, that the person means to engage in the conduct, and knowledge in 
relation to the consequence, namely, that the person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.   
Drawing on the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, the 
Statute adopts a four-part division to its elucidation of “war crimes” – the first two 
                                                 
75 The “law of The Hague” is made up of the Hague Conventions of 1868, 1899 and 1907 which 
generally speaking set out rules regarding the various categories of lawful combatants, and which 
regulate the means and methods of warfare in respect of those combatants.  The Hague rules also deal 
with the treatment of persons who do not take part in armed hostilities or who no longer take part in 
them, but in this respect The Hague rules have been supplanted by the Geneva rules which cover this 
aspect of humanitarian law in more detail.   
76 The “law of Geneva”, so called because it comprises the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 plus the 
two Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, regulates the treatment of persons who do not take part in the 
armed hostilities (such as the civilians, the wounded, the sick) and those who used to take part, but no 
longer do (such as prisoners of war).  An exception here is the Third Geneva Convention which, in 
addition to the focus on treatment of persons no longer involved in the conflict, also regulates the 
various classes of lawful combatants, and thereby updates The Hague rules.  The Hague rules have 
been further updated by the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1977 which deals 
with the means and methods of combat with a particular emphasis on sparing civilians as far as is 
possible in an armed conflict.  
77 Tadic (Appeal) (Decision on the defence motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, decision of 2 October 1995, (case no. IT-94-1-AR72), paras. 96-136. Up until this 
decision the scope of international responsibility for war crimes was the subject of much confusion.  
The two major sources of humanitarian law – war crimes codified in the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols, and which addressed the protection of the victims of armed conflict from “grave breaches”, 
and war crimes as understood under The Hague Convention, which focused on the methods and 
materials of warfare – did not appear to extend international criminal responsibility to those who 
committed the prohibited acts during times of internal armed conflicts. In Tadic the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber stated that international criminal responsibility for war crimes included acts committed 
during internal armed conflict, that is, during times of civil war. 
78 Article 8(1). 
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divisions cover war crimes committed during an international armed conflict; the last 
two divisions cover war crimes committed during an internal armed conflict. 
 
(i) War crimes in times of international armed conflict 
 
Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Article 8 (2)(a)) 
 
The Rome Statute provides in Article 8(2)(a) that any of the following acts 
(“grave breaches”) committed during an international armed conflict against persons 
or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention will 
amount to a war crime: wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments; wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health; extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or 
other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; wilfully depriving a 
prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trials; 
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; taking of hostages. 
The persons protected by Article 8(2)(a) are combatants who are considered hors 
de combat because of injury, shipwreck or illness, or because they have been taken as 
prisoners of war, and civilians.  The notion of ’protected property’ is not defined in 
any of the Geneva Conventions but is generally regarded as property found in 
territories occupied by foreign forces.  Such property, which would include medical 
units and establishments, medical transports, and hospital ships, amongst others, may 
not be destroyed except in cases of military necessity.79 
 
Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in International Armed 
Conflict, Within the Established Framework of International Law (Article 8 (2)(b)) 
 
Article 8(2)(b) sets out the second category of war crimes and which are 
limited to international armed conflict. The “serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflict” are generally drawn from the law 
of The Hague.  Unlike the focus of the grave breaches crimes under Article 8(2)(a), 
which aim to protect the innocent victims of war or those who are hors de combat, the 
focus of the crimes under Article 8(2)(b) is on the combatants themselves.   These 
crimes are a continuation of ancient rules of chivalry reflecting a code of conduct 
amongst warriors.80  As a general overview, article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute 
includes prohibitions on attacks against the civilian population,81 attacks against 
civilian objects,82 as well as attacks that violate the principle of proportionality83 and 
attacks against undefended places.84  Civilians are also protected against “misuse”, for 
                                                 
79 K Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) 41. 
80 W A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 60. 
81 Article 8(2)(b)(i). 
82 Article 8(2)(b)(ii). 
83 Article 8(2)(b)(iii), which prohibits an attack which is intentionally launched in the knowledge that it 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 
84 Article 8(2)(b)(v), such undefended places being defined as towns, villages, dwellings or building 
which are undefended and which are not military objectives. 
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instance, the use of civilians or protected persons as a means to render certain points 
or areas immune from military operations,85 and the starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare is prohibited, as is any attack against objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population.86  The “destruction of property” is outlawed in that 
the destruction or seizing of the enemy’s property is considered a war crime unless 
such destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.87  The 
improper use of signs and perfidy is rendered a war crime,88 and there is a prohibition 
on killing or wounding persons who are hors de combat.89  Lastly, there is a 
prohibition placed on declaring that no quarter will be given; that is ordering that 
there shall be no survivors, threatening an adversary therewith, or conducting 
hostilities on this basis.90 
Several of the provisions of Article 8(2)(b) deal with prohibited weapons (for 
example, poison or poisoned weapons,91 poisonous gases and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices,92 and dumb-dumb bullets93) and render their use a war crime.   
In addition to the provisions reflecting The Hague rules, there are some “new 
crimes” under paragraph (b) and which have now been codified by the drafters at 
Rome.  They cover, for instance, the protection of humanitarian and peacekeeping 
missions94 and prohibit environmental damage.95  Another new war crime under the 
Statute is the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen into the 
national armed forces or to use them to participate actively in hostilities.96  Another 
development relates to sexual crimes.  In terms of Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) it is a war 
crime to commit rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,97 
enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave 
                                                 
85 Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) which prohibits utilising the presence of a civilian or other protected person to 
render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations. 
86 Article 8(2)(b)(xxv): Intentionally starving civilians “as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for 
under the Geneva Conventions”. 
87 Article 8(2)(b)(xiii). 
88 Article 8(2)(b)(vii) “Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and 
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury”. 
89 Article 8(2)(b)(vi). 
90 Article 8(2)(b)(xii), as read with Article 40 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
91 Article 8(2)(b)(xvii). 
92 Article 8(2)(b)(xviii). 
93 Article 8(2)(b)(xix). 
94 See Article 8(2)(b)(iii) which prohibits intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict. 
95 Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 
96 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
97 Which is defined in Article 7, paragraph 2(f) as “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly 
made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out 
other grave violations of international law”. 
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breach of the Geneva Conventions.98  While the terms “rape” and “enforced 
prostitution” already appear in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I of 1977, 
the outlawing of “sexual slavery”, “forced pregnancy”, and “enforced sterilization” 
are essentially new crimes.   
 
(ii) War Crimes in Times of Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (Rome Statute Article 
8(2)(c) and (d)) 
 
The criminal acts proscribed by this section are the Common Article 399 
crimes of violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; taking of hostages; and the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are generally 
recognized as indispensable. The prohibited acts listed under article 8(2)(c) of the 
Rome Statute, like the “grave breaches” in article 8(2)(a), are acts which are 
committed against “protected persons”.  Such “protected persons” are described in 
article 8(2)(c) as “persons taking no active part in the hostilities [civilians], including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause”.     
These standards represent a “common denominator of core human rights”100 
that must be respected by those engaged in hostilities, whether they are engaged in an 
international or non-international armed conflict. While the prohibitions apply to 
armed conflicts “not of an international character” the ICC Statute provides that these 
protections do not extend “to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature”.101  
Internal disturbances and acts of terrorism which do not amount to an armed conflict 
are therefore not subject to the laws of armed conflict at all, although the State (but 
not the rebels) will be subject to the provisions of any human rights treaties to which 
the State is a party.102 
 
Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts Not 
of an International Nature (Rome Statute Article 8(2)(e)) 
 
                                                 
98 Article 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
99 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 proscribes the following acts, even when 
committed during non-international armed conflicts: 
“(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”.    
100 W A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 65. 
101 Article 8(2)(d). 
102 See C Greenwood “International Humanitarian Law: 2 The Conduct of Hostilities” 19-20, paper 
presented at the European Training in Higher International Criminal Science Lectures held at the 
European University Institute, Florence, from 16 to 27 February 2004. 
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Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions largely serves as the inspiration for 
the prohibitions contained in Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute. The article prohibits 
attacks against the civilian population,103 the “killing or wounding treacherously a 
combatant adversary”,104 declaring that no quarter will be given,105 or destroying or 
seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure is imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of the conflict,106 and “pillaging a town or place, even 
when taken by assault”.107  
The following special protections are included under Article 8(2)(e): intentional 
attacks directed against buildings, materials, medical units and transport, and 
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity 
with international law, are prohibited;108 intentional attacks directed against 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian 
assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations is prohibited so long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or 
civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;109 and intentional 
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected are prohibited, provided they are not military objectives. 
In addition, the following provisions serve to protect against violations of human 
rights more generally.  Article 8(2)(e)(xi) makes it a war crime to subject persons who 
are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or 
scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or 
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and 
which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons. 
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) prohibits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, while 
Article 8(2)(e)(vii) outlaws conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 
Article 8(2)(e)(viii) makes it a war crime to order the displacement of the civilian 
population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand. 
The prohibitions contained in Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute apply to armed 
conflicts not of an international character, but not “to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other 
acts of a similar nature.”110   
 
                                                 
103 Article 8(2)(e)(i). 
104 Article 8(2)(e)(ix). 
105 Article 8(2)(e)(x). 
106 Article 8(2)(e)(xii). 
107 Article 8(2)(e)(v). 
108 Article 8(2)(e)(ii). 
109 Article 8(2)(e)(iii). 




The Rome Statute strictly defines the jurisdiction of the Court. Aside from 
only have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community, the temporal jurisdiction of the Court is limited to crimes occurring after 
the entry into force of the Statute, namely 1 July 2002.111  For those States that 
become party to the Statute after 1 July 2001, the ICC has jurisdiction only over 
crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute with respect to that State.112  
Thus the Court is not a remedy for crimes of the past, which must be addressed by 
national, or other international or hybrid initiatives.   
The jurisdictional triggers for the Court to exercise its competence are set out 
in Article 12 of the Statute. The Article provides that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction if: a) the state where the alleged crime was committed is a party to the 
Statute (territoriality); or, b) the state of which the accused is a national is a party to 
the Statute (nationality). In terms of Article 14 of the Statute any State Party may 
refer to the Court a “situation” in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court appear to have been committed, so long as the preconditions to the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction have been met, namely, that the alleged perpetrators of the 
crimes are nationals of a State Party or the crimes are committed on the territory of a 
State Party.113  The ICC Prosecutor is also authorised by the Rome Statute in Article 
15 to initiate independent investigations on the basis of information received from any 
reliable source. The granting to the Prosecutor of a proprio motu power to initiate 
investigations was one of the most debated issues during the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute. In the end, the drafters of the Statute determined that in order for the 
Prosecutor to exercise this power, the alleged crimes must have been committed by 
nationals of a State Party or have taken place in the territory of a State Party – the 
preconditions set out in terms of Article 12.114  
Proposals that the principle of universal jurisdiction should apply in respect of 
State referrals were rejected at the Rome Conference.  That being said, under the 
Statute the UN Security Council is empowered to refer to the Court “situations” in 
which crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed.115  
The referral power is a mechanism by which the Court is accorded jurisdiction over 
an offender, regardless of where the offence took place and by whom it was 
committed, and regardless of whether the State concerned has ratified the Statute or 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.116  The Statute provides that the Council may only 
make such a referral by acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
which is to say that it must regard the events in a particular country as a threat to the 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.  In determining whether a “threat 
                                                 
111 Article 11. 
112 Article 11(2). 
113 See Press Release of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, No.: pids.008.2003-EN, 15 
July 2003, available at http://www.icc.int. See also P Kirsch & D Robinson “Trigger mechanisms” 
(2002) in A Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary 1 623-625. 
114 See Press Release of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, No.: pids.008.2003-EN, 15 
July 2003, available at http://www.icc.int. See also P Kirsch & D Robinson supra note 113 661–663.  
115 Article 1, 13(b). 
116 See P Kirsch & D Robinson supra note 113 634.  
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to the peace” exists the Council will be guided by the gravity of the crimes 
committed, the impunity enjoyed by the crimes’ perpetrators and the effectiveness or 
otherwise of the national jurisdiction in the prosecution of such crimes.117 Having had 
regard to these factors, the Security Council in March 2005 referred the atrocities 





The International Criminal Court is not expected to supersede national 
prosecutions of persons guilty of international crimes.  Investigations and 
prosecutions under the Rome Statute are premised on the principle of 
’complementarity’ whereby the Court is required to rule a case inadmissible when it is 
being appropriately dealt with by a national justice system.119 States Parties to the 
Court therefore retain their right and responsibility to investigate offences committed 
on their territory, or where their nationals stand accused of committing ICC crimes 
anywhere else in the world.  The ICC will be able to step in only where a national 
judicial system is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate.120  The principle of 
complementarity ensures that the ICC operates as a system of international criminal 
justice which buttresses the national justice systems of States Parties.  That principle 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
What about amnesties that are accorded by a national state in lieu of 
prosecution?  For centuries successor regimes have sought to secure peace through 
the pardoning of their enemies, and modern history is replete with examples where a 
regime has granted amnesty to officials of the previous regime who were guilty of 
torture and crimes against humanity, rather than prosecute them (e.g. Uruguay, 
Argentina and El Salvador).  So too, there are examples of outgoing regimes which 
use their last days of political power to ensure that their members are granted an 
official “pardon” from prosecution before the new regime takes office (e.g. Chile). 
With the advent of truth commissions it has become possible to channel the grant of 
amnesty through the commission.  So far only the South African TRC and the recent 
truth commission in East Timor have been accorded the power to grant amnesty.121 
As the South African experience demonstrates, the prospect of amnesty in exchange 
for truth is a good incentive to the guilty to provide detailed accounts of the acts they 
have committed.122 In any event, the political reality for many transitional 
                                                 
117 See in general P Kirsch P & D Robinson supra note 113 630–631.  
118 See further below for a detailed discussion of the referral. 
119 Preamble, para. 10; art 17. 
120 See Article 117 of the Rome Statute. 
121 On the South African TRC’s amnesty process, see A McDonald “A right to truth, justice and a 
remedy for African victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law” (1999) 2 Law, 
Democracy and Development 139 164–170; P Hayner Unspeakable Truths (2002) 98 et seq. On the 
amnesty process in East Timor, see C Stahn, “Accommodating individual criminal responsibility 
and national reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor” (2001) 95 AJIL  952 962–
965.  
122  On the importance of the TRC as truth-finder, see Azapo v President of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 681-685.  
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governments is that giving a truth commission the power of amnesty rather than 
criminally prosecuting past offenders is the only realistic and peaceful way in which 
an existing regime will be persuaded to relinquish power.  Whatever the form of 
amnesty (whether it be granted by a truth commission or by the outgoing or ingoing 
government as a political act of reprieve), the question to be confronted is how such 
trumps to prosecution are to be dealt with by the ICC.  
The Rome Statute is silent on amnesty, and commentators argue that this is 
because the Rome Statute was never drafted with the intention of allowing amnesty to 
trump the Court’s jurisdiction.123 Assuming therefore that the relevant jurisdictional 
requirements for an ICC prosecution are met, national amnesties granted by a truth 
commission or by governmental sleight of hand would not per se prevent action by 
the ICC.124  
While amnesties do not in principle bar the ICC from exercising criminal 
jurisdiction over an individual who has been granted amnesty, the political reality is 
that in some instances it might be expedient or a requirement of justice not to push 
ahead with the prosecution of such a person.  Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute 
therefore provides the Prosecutor with a discretion to refuse prosecution at the 
instance of a State or the Security Council where, after investigation, he concludes 
that “a prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all 
circumstances”.  Of course, the type of amnesty at issue will play an important role in 
the Prosecutor’s decision.  No clear rules can be enunciated to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible amnesties under international law, but it has been 
suggested that  
 
“international recognition might be accorded where amnesty has been granted 
as part of a truth and reconciliation inquiry and each person granted amnesty 
has been obliged to make full disclosure of his or her criminal acts as a 
precondition of amnesty and the acts were politically motivated”.125  
 
The blanket amnesty in Chile passed by the Pinochet regime would thus not meet the 
required standard (in the Pinochet case126 before the House of Lords it was not even 
argued by Pinochet’s lawyers that his amnesty in Chile could constitute a bar to his 
extradition from Britain to Spain127), while the South African amnesties granted by a 
quasi-judicial amnesty committee functioning as part of a TRC process established by 
a democratically elected government, may well do so.128  It is also important to note 
that the nature of certain offences precludes the grant of amnesty to their 
                                                 
123  J Dugard “Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions” in A Cassese et al (eds) The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 1 (2002) 700-701. 
124 And where a criminal prosecution is instituted by a State under its domestic incorporating 
legislation, amnesty does not have an extraterritorial effect and the prosecuting State is not required 
to recognize the amnesty granted to human rights offenders by another State. See J Dugard (note 
123). 699. 
125 J Dugard supra note 123 700.  
126 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (1999) 2 All 
ER 97 (HL). 
127 J Dugard (n 123) 699. 
128 Ibid. See too Rama Mani Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (2002) 112–
113. 
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perpetrators.129 It is still open to States to grant amnesty for international crimes 
without violating a rule of international law, but international lawyers are largely in 
agreement that States are not permitted to grant amnesty for the crimes of genocide, 
torture, and “grave breaches” under the Geneva Convention.130 The Preamble of the 
Statute of the ICC, while binding only in respect of parties to it, confirms this trend 
when it declares that “it is the duty of every State to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes”.131 
As a result, whatever form of amnesty the Prosecutor is forced to consider, it 
is clear that he will be more disposed towards those amnesties that have been limited 
in terms of the nature of the offence (at the very least it appears that amnesty afforded 
for the international crimes of torture and genocide will be disregarded), and which 
have been granted as part of a truth and reconciliation inquiry, in which amnesty 
recipients have been obliged to make full disclosure of their criminal acts as a 
precondition of amnesty and to prove that their acts were politically motivated. 
   
 
 
                                                 
129 There is a vast body of literature on the debate as to whether there is an international legal 
obligation (whether founded in customary or conventional law) obliging states to punish past 
crimes. See for example D Orentlicher “Settling accounts: The duty to prosecute human rights 
violations of a prior regime” (1991) 2537 Yale Law Journal 100; N Roht-Arriaza “State 
responsibility to investigate and prosecute grave human rights violations in international law” 
(1990) 78 2 California Law Review 449.  
130 Dugard supra note 123 699. 
131 It is noteworthy that this trend has been reflected in the mandate of East Timor’s recently created 
truth commission. While the mandate is clearly supportive of individualized amnesty in exchange 
for truth, the commission may grant “no immunity” to persons who have committed a “serious 
criminal offence”, which includes the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, torture as well as the domestic crimes of murder and sexual offences, as defined by the 
Indonesian Criminal Code.  In 1999 pro-Indonesian militia, supported by Indonesian security forces, 
used violence, threats and intimidation in an attempt to coerce the East Timorese population to 
support continued integration in Indonesia in the UN-organised 1999 referendum on independence 
of the island. In apparent revenge for the overwhelming vote in favour of independence, an 
estimated one thousand supporters of independence were killed and hundreds of thousands fled their 
homes or were forcibly expelled to Indonesia. After these events the United Nations took control of 
East Timor and through its United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor established the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor. See C Stahn op cit 952–953.  
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CHAPTER 3:  COMPLEMENTARITY AND AFRICA: THE 




The idea of an international criminal court has captured the legal imagination for well 
over a century.  It became a reality on 18 July 1998 with the adoption of the Rome 
Statute.  After attracting the necessary ratifications the Statute entered force on 1 July 
2002.  And in just over a year of its existence, by November 2003, the Court, through 
the Prosecutor, had received over 650 complaints.  It is important to consider these 
complaints.  As you will see they reveal a disturbing lack of understanding about the 
Court and the Court’s functioning.  Fifty of the complaints contained allegations of 
acts committed before 1 July 2002.  This is problematic. As one commentator has 
noted: the Court is not the means to scrutinize acts committed during the Vietnam 
war, or in Cambodia, or to settle scores with Napoleon.  That is because the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is forward looking, and it does not have retrospective jurisdiction over 
acts committed prior to 1 July 2002.  A number of communications alleged acts which 
fall outside the subject matter of the Court’s jurisdiction, and complained about 
environmental damage, drug trafficking, judicial corruption, tax evasion and less 
serious human rights violations that do not fall within the Court’s remit.  Thirty-eight 
complaints alleged – no doubt correctly – that an act of aggression had taken place in 
the context of the war in Iraq in 2003.  The problem here is that the US is not a party 
to the Statute, and in any event, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over alleged 
crimes of aggression until the crime is properly defined – something which the 
drafters of the Statute expressly left until a future date, most probably some time after 
2009.  Two communications referred to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The difficulty 
here is that Israel is not a party to the statute, and the Palestinian authority is not yet a 
state and so cannot be a party.  By early 2006 the Prosecutor’s office recorded that it 
had received 1732 communications from over 103 countries, and that a staggering 
80% of those communications were found to be “manifestly outside [the Court’s] 
jurisdiction after initial review”.133 
 
I could go on.  The point is that a range of organisations and individuals that 
submitted the first complaints to the Prosecutor seem to have fundamentally 
misunderstood the ICC; to have placed a false hope in the Court as a means to provide 
them justice.  The truth is that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited temporally in that it 
can only exercise jurisdiction post 1 July 2002, and its jurisdiction is limited 
substantively in that it can only consider the most serious crimes of international 
concern, being genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and until a proper 
definition of aggression is agreed upon by States parties, it cannot consider 
                                                 
132 This chapter was previously published as “Complementarity and Africa: the promises and problems 
of international criminal justice” (2008) 17(4) African Security Review pages 154 to 170. 




complaints about the crime of aggression.  Furthermore, the Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited geographically. For state parties, the Court can exercise jurisdiction over their 
nationals wherever they may be in the world. But for non-states parties – like the US 
– the Court can only exercise jurisdiction if the guilty American commits his or her 
crime on the territory of a state party.  The much publicised abuse at Abu Ghraib 
prison by US Private Lynddie England and her cohorts – which undoubtedly 
constitute war crimes and torture – is not something that Iraq or others can refer to the 
Court, since Iraq – on whose territory the crimes have been committed – is not a party 
to the Statute. In a similar vein, the crimes committed in Zimbabwe cannot fall within 
the purview of the Court so long as Zimbabwe remains a non-member of the ICC 
regime.  However, and here’s a twist, if a case is referred to the Court by the Security 
Council – as was done in respect of the atrocities in Sudan – then the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction even though Sudan is not a party.  That is because the referral 
bears the imprimatur of the UN Security Council whose resolutions are binding on all 





That brings me to the topic that is at issue in this paper: complementarity.  
Complementarity is perhaps the key feature of the ICC regime.  It is thus vitally 
important to appreciate its significance, and in so doing, to understand both the 
promises and problems of international criminal justice as exemplified by the 
International Criminal Court.  
 
The International Criminal Court is expected to act in what is described as a 
“complementary” relationship with domestic states that are party to the Rome Statute.  
The Preamble to the Rome Statute says that the Court’s jurisdiction will be 
complementary to that of national jurisdiction, and Article 17 of the Statute embodies 
the complementarity principle. At the heart of complementarity principle is the ability 
to prosecute international criminals in one’s national courts, on behalf of the 
international community, or to have in place mechanisms to arrest and surrender to 
the ICC persons that the ICC seeks to prosecute and who happen to be in one’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
The general nature of national implementation obligations assumed by States which 
elect to become party to the Rome Statute are wide-ranging.134 The Rome Statute 
notes that effective prosecution is that which is ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by international cooperation.  Because of its special nature, States 
Party to the Rome Statute are expected to assume a level of responsibility and 
capability the realisation of which will entail taking a number of important legal and 
practical measures.  
 
As we have already seen, the ICC does not exercise universal jurisdiction. The ICC’s 
jurisdiction is only triggered where the crime occurred on the territory of a State 
                                                 
134 See generally William Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001); see also 
Ben Brandon & Max du Plessis (eds.) The Prosecution of International Crimes: A Practical Guide to 
Prosecuting ICC Crimes in Commonwealth States (2005). 
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accepting the Court’s jurisdiction (territorial jurisdiction) or the accused is a national 
of such a State (active nationality principle), or the matter is referred to the Court by 
the UN Security Council exercising its Chapter VII powers. By article 12, a State 
accepts jurisdiction by becoming a State Party, or can do so by declaration where it is 
a non-party State. The consequence is that many States which become party to the 
Rome Statute might not have previously provided for criminal jurisdiction on the 
active national principle: such States will normally require special legislation as the 
domestic legal basis enabling them to bring a prosecution at home of a national 
accused of international crimes committed elsewhere.  
 
It is thus clear that the State Party assumes a significant role in the regime for the 
prosecution of international crimes, and certain particular features need to be present 
in the State’s legal and justice system in order for this complementary system of 
justice to function effectively.  
 
The ICC has jurisdiction over those crimes regarded with the highest degree of 
concern by the international community: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. These are thoroughly defined in articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute, with 
further elaboration and definition given in the “Elements of Crimes” guidelines 
agreed to by States Parties. 
 
In addition to their duty to take steps to be able to surrender to the ICC persons for 
whom an arrest warrant is issued, States Party to the Rome Statute may take steps to 
prohibit, as a matter of national or domestic law, the crimes or conduct described in 
the Statute. This is to enable them to conduct a prosecution of such crimes 
domestically should they elect to do so (and to remove any question of the crimes for 
which surrender is sought not being found in national law). Article 70(4) meanwhile 
requires States to extend the operation and substance of their national criminal laws 
dealing with offences against the administration of justice, so as to criminalise in 
addition conduct that would constitute an offence against the ICC’s administration of 
justice. 
 
Aside from enabling its own justice officials to prosecute international crimes before 
its domestic Courts, a State Party is furthermore obliged to cooperate with the ICC in 
relation to an investigation and/or prosecution which the Court might be seized with.  
The prosecution of a matter before the ICC (and the process leading to the decision to 
prosecute) will normally require very considerable investigation, information-
gathering, and inter-agency cooperation, often with high levels of confidentiality and 
information or witness protection required. Contact between the ICC (in particular the 
Office of the Prosecutor) and the national authorities will likely become extensive 
during the course of an investigation and any request for arrest and surrender or any 
prosecution. Indeed in many cases there is likely to be a fairly complex and 
substantial process of information gathering, analysis and consideration that must be 
undertaken before the decision to formally investigate can even be taken. The ICC 
lacks many of the institutional features necessary for a comprehensive handling of a 
criminal matter: for ordinary policing and other functions, it will rely heavily on the 
assistance and cooperation of States’ national mechanisms, procedures and agencies.  
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In order to be able to cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) during the 
investigation or prosecution period135 (or otherwise with the Pre-Trial Chamber or the 
Court once a matter is properly before these, for example in relation to witnesses), a 
State Party is obliged to have a range of powers, facilities and procedures in place, 
including by promulgation of laws and regulations. The legal framework for requests 
for arrest and surrender (on the one hand) and all other forms of cooperation (on the 
other) is mostly set out in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Article 86 describes the general 
duty on States to cooperate fully with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes. Article 87 sets out general provisions for requests for cooperation, giving the 
ICC authority (under article 87(1)(a)) to make requests of the State for cooperation. 
Failure to cooperate can, amongst other things, lead to a referral of the State to the 
Security Council (article 87(7)). Article 88 is a significant provision, obliging States 
to ensure that there are in place nationally the procedures and powers to enable all 
forms of cooperation contemplated in the Statute. Unlike inter-State legal assistance 
and cooperation, the Rome Statute makes clear that by ratifying States accept that 
there are no grounds for refusing ICC requests for arrest and surrender.136 States are 
therefore obliged, under the relevant arrest and surrender processes provided in their 
own national laws, to follow up arrest warrants or summons issued by the ICC, and to 
surrender persons in due course.  
 
While the Rome Statute envisages a duty to cooperate with the Court in relation to 
investigation and prosecution, it should be remembered that the principle of 
complementarity is premised on the expectation that domestic states that are willing 
and able should be prosecuting these crimes themselves.  The principle of 
“complementarity” ensures that the International Criminal Court operates as a buttress 
in support of the criminal justice systems of states parties at a national level, and as 
part of a broader system of international criminal justice. The principle proceeds from 
the belief that national courts should be the first to act.  It is only if a State party is 
“unwilling or unable” to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed by 
its nationals or on its territory that the International Criminal Court is then seized with 
jurisdiction.137  To enforce this principle of complementarity, Article 18 of the Rome 
Statute requires that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must notify all 
states parties and states with jurisdiction over a particular case – in other words non-
states parties – before beginning an investigation by the International Criminal 
Court,138 and cannot begin an investigation on his own initiative without first 
receiving the approval of a Chamber of three judges.139 At this stage of the 
proceedings, it is open to both states parties and non-states parties to insist that they 
will investigate allegations against their own nationals themselves: the International 
Criminal Court would then be obliged to suspend its investigation.140 If the alleged 
                                                 
135 The extent of cooperation required of States Party is evident from the fact that the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) has a very wide mandate to “extend the investigation to cover all facts” and 
investigate circumstances generally “in order to discover the truth”: article 54(1)(a) of the Rome 
Statute.  
136 See article 89 – although article 97 provides for consultation where there are certain practical 
difficulties. 
137 Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute. 
138 Article 18(1) of the Rome Statute. 
139 Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
140 Article 18(2) of the Rome Statute. 
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perpetrator’s state investigates the matter and then refuses to initiate a prosecution, the 
International Criminal Court may only proceed if it concludes that that decision of the 
state not to prosecute was motivated purely by a desire to shield the individual 
concerned.141  The thrust of the principle of complementarity is that the system 




Complementarity is therefore an essential component of the International Criminal 
Court’s structure and a means by which national justice systems are accorded an 
opportunity to prosecute international crimes domestically.  Indeed, taken to its full 
extent, complementarity has the potential to signal the beginning of the end of the 
International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court is one component of a 
regime – a network of states that have undertaken to the do the ICC’s work for it; to 
act, if you will, as domestic international criminal courts in respect of ICC crimes.  It 
was written in relation to the experience at Nuremberg that,  
 
“[t]he purpose was not to punish all cases of criminal guilt … . The exemplary 
punishments served the purpose of restoring the legal order; that is, of 
reassuring the whole community that what they had witnessed for so many 
years was criminal behaviour.”142   
 
Because of the ICC’s system of complementarity we can therefore expect national 
criminal justice to play an important role of doing the ICC’s work by providing 
“exemplary punishments” which will serve to restore the international legal order.  In 
this respect, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs at Princeton, has pointed out that: 
 
“One of the most powerful arguments for the International Criminal Court is 
not that it will be a global instrument of justice itself – arresting and trying 
tyrants and torturers worldwide – but that it will be a backstop and trigger for 
domestic forces for justice and democracy.  By posing a choice – either a 
nation tries its own or they will be tried in The Hague – it strengthens the hand 
of domestic parties seeking such trials, allowing them to wrap themselves in a 
nationalist mantle.”143 
 
The ICC Prosecutor put it as follows on taking up his post, explaining that:  
 
“As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the 
Court should not be a measure of its efficiency.  On the contrary, the absence 
of trials before this Court, as a consequence of regular functioning of national 
institutions, would be a major success”.144   
                                                 
141 Article 17(2)(a) of the Rome Statute 
142 Bert Roling “Aspects of Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Laws of War” in Antonio 
Cassesse (ed) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) 206. 
143 “Not the Court of First Resort”, December 21, 2003, The Washington Post. 
144 Quoted in McGoldrick et al The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues 
(2004) 477. 
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This is the promise of international criminal justice as exemplified in the ICC’s 
complementarity regime.  One way in which we will come to regard the ICC as 
effective – as having achieved its promise – will be when its very existence operates 
to encourage domestic institutions to comply with their responsibilities under 







The reality is that while a “zero case” scenario is something to aim for, cases have 
found their way to the ICC in The Hague.  Already the ICC Prosecutor has the crimes 
committed in three states parties – the DRC, Uganda and Central African Republic – 
in his sights, and the Security Council referred the Sudan crisis to the ICC even 
though Sudan is not a party to the ICC. In respect of Uganda, four arrest warrants 
have been issued by the Court, on 8 July 2005, for leaders of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army; in relation to Sudan, arrest warrants have been issued, on 27 April 2007, for 
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior and currently 
Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in the Government of the Sudan, and Ali 
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), a leader of the Militia/Janjaweed.  In 
relation to the Central African Republic, investigations are ongoing.   
 
It is in respect of the situation in the DRC that the Court has made the most progress. 
The Prosecutor of the Court initiated investigations in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in June 2004 after the Congolese Government referred the situation in the 
country to the Court.  Three persons are already in the custody of the ICC. On 17 
March 2006, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese national and alleged founder and 
leader of the Union des patriotes Congolais [Union of Congolese Patriots], was 
transferred to the ICC. On 17 October 2007, the Congolese authorities surrendered 
and transferred Germain Katanga, a Congolese national and alleged commander of 
the FRPI, to the International Criminal Court. He is currently charged as a co-
perpetrator of the crimes committed allegedly during the joint FNI and FRPI attack on 
the village of Bogoro on or around 24 February 2003. And most recently, Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui became the third person in the custody of the ICC. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, a Congolese national and alleged former leader of the National integrationist 
Front  and currently a Colonel in the National Army of the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo [Forces armées de la RDC/ Armed Forces of the 
DRC], was arrested on 6 February 2008 by the Congolese authorities and transferred 
to the International Criminal Court. Chui is alleged to have committed crimes against 
humanity and war crimes as set out in articles 7 and 8 of the Statute, committed in the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since July 2002. 
 
Arrest warrants without arrests: the problem of unwilling states 
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The small number of persons in custody hints at the difficulties that present 
themselves to the Prosecutor and the Court when investigating and prosecuting a case 
against the backdrop of complementarity.   
 
The first point is to confront a contradiction.  We have seen that the Court will have 
jurisdiction only when a state party is unwilling or unable to do the job itself.  So, 
let’s assume that the Prosecutor has decided that State X is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute, such that the ICC might now be seized with jurisdiction in terms of the 
complementarity scheme.  In order for the Court to be seized with jurisdiction – as 
with a criminal court in a domestic context – there needs to be an arrest.  But unlike in 
a domestic context where the prosecution has a police force ready to assist in arresting 
accused who can then be brought to Court, the ICC prosecutor is a Stateless actor, 
with no international police force to assist him in effecting arrests.  He is at the mercy, 
if you will, of the state that is implicated in the international crimes he wishes to 
investigate.  To get his hands on an accused he needs State X to be his eyes and ears 
on the ground and to arrest when possible.  Yet State X is the very state that is unable 
or unwilling to assist him in the first place!   
 
This is a hard reality that the Prosecutor is currently experiencing. Take the Sudan 
referral.  The Darfur Commission appointed by the UN to investigate the crimes 
committed in Northern Sudan found that as far as mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability for the atrocities committed in Sudan are concerned, the “Sudanese 
courts are unable and unwilling to prosecute and try the alleged offenders… Other 
mechanisms are needed to do justice”. This is an important finding.  As one will 
appreciate, the complementarity principle built into the ICC Statute might be relied on 
by the Sudanense government (even as a non-party State) to argue that it is willing 
and able to prosecute the offenders.  Should it in fact be willing and able, then the 
ICC may have to acquiesce in the prosecution of offenders so as to allow the 
Sudanese authorities to do the job.  It is apparently for this reason that the 
Commission saw fit to stress that the Sudanese courts are unable and unwilling to 
prosecute and try the alleged offenders, thereby clearing the way for a “clean” referral 
of the matter by the Security Council to the ICC. Certainly the caustic response of the 
Sudanese government to the Security Council resolution referring the matter to the 
ICC suggests that the prosecutor will not be able to rely on Sudan’s Government for 
cooperation in investigating and punishing persons responsible for gross human rights 
violations. Khartoum has called resolution 1593 a violation of its sovereignty145 and 
President El-Bashir reportedly swore “thrice in the name of Almighty Allah that [he] 
shall never hand any Sudanese national to a foreign court.”146 Similarly, Sudan’s UN 
ambassador, Elfatih Mohammed Erwa, said: “Justice here is a great good used in the 
service of evil”.147 The Sudanese Government insisted it would not allow any 
Sudanese national to be tried before a foreign court.148 Khartoum went so far as to 
                                                 
145 “Sudan says UN Darfur move ‘violation” of sovereignty” (2005) 3 April  Agence France Presse. 
146 “Sudan stages “million-man” march against UN war crimes trial” (2005) 5 April Agence France 
Presse. 
147 “UN backs Darfur war crimes move” BBC News, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4399487.stm  (accessed 5 April 2005). 
148 See further Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur Region of 
the Sudan to the African Union Peace and Security Council (2005) PSC/PR/2(XXVIII) at para.  87 and 
Seth Appiah-Mensah “AU’s critical assignment in Darfur” (2005) 14(2) African Security Review 10. 
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instigate public demonstrations objecting to the referral, and the International 
Criminal Court was denounced, somewhat ironically, as an “American Court”.149 So, 
clean as the Security Council referral may have been in a technical sense, the 
prosecutor has anything but a clean or easy complementarity job on his hands. 
 
As pointed out earlier, the Prosecutor has through the Court issued arrest warrants, on 
27 April 2007, for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the 
Interior and currently Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in the Government 
of the Sudan, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), a leader of the 
Militia/Janjaweed.  But the Court’s website speaks volumes when it records that in 
relation to these two individuals: “No hearings scheduled at this time”.150 
 
Thus, although the Security Council referral is a significant step in the in history of 
the Court, the road that lies ahead is by no means easy. The challenge for the Court is 
immense.  It has had the Security Council refer a matter to it (an incredibly high-
profile situation which even the US – through Colin Powell – has described as 
“genocide”), yet it has no means of truly enforcing the mandate of the referral and has 
to rely on the Sudanese government’s cooperation to properly investigate and 
prosecute the offences.  
 
The Court has thus found itself faced with the very difficult task of trying to enforce 
its decisions against a recalcitrant state.151 This task is complicated and aggravated by 
the fact that Sudan is not a state party to the ICC and as such owes no treaty 
obligations to the Court. This is an inevitable problem with the referral of situations 
involving non-party states to the ICC as the referral extends the Court’s jurisdiction 
beyond the parameters of the Rome Treaty but does not concomitantly extend the 
Court’s power to enforce that jurisdiction.   This problem is one that was foreseen by 
the drafters of the ICC Statute, but which was never satisfactorily attended to. 
 
One thing is abundantly clear:  active Security Council involvement will prove vital 
for the effective functioning of the ICC.  As one noted author points out: 
 
“[T]he Security Council could decide that compliance by all UN Member States 
with a particular ICC decision is a measure necessary for the maintenance of 
peace and security pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter, and, as such, bind all 
UN Member States under Article 25 of the Charter to comply with specific ICC 
decisions”.152 
  
                                                 
149 “Sudanese students demonstrate against UN Darfur resolution” (2005) 2 April Agence France 
Presse and “Sudanese march against UN war crimes resolution” (2005) 5 April Reuters. 
150 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur.html (accessed 12 February 2008). 
151 The most recent (symbolic) example of this recalcitrance is the Sudanese government’s decision to 
appoint Musa Hilal, a leader of the janjaweed, to a central government position.  See the human rights 
outcry occasioned thereby and full story by Reuters “Sudan gives adviser role to militia leader” via the 
International Herald Tribune, January 21, 2008, cited in War Crimes Prosecution Watch 3(12) 
February 4, 2008.  
152 See Dan Sarooshi “The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN 
Security Council” in Dominic McGoldrick et al (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: 
Legal and Policy Issues (2004) 104. 
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Indeed, the Prosecutor of the Court has in a report delivered to the Security Council in 
early December 2007 made it clear that without the Security Council’s assistance the 
Court will not be able to prosecute the persons in respect of which it has issued 
warrants of arrest.  He put it bluntly when he told the Council that although “Sudan 
has known the nature of the case against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb for 10 
months, they have done nothing. They have taken no steps to prosecute them 
domestically, or to arrest and transfer them to The Hague”.   The answer, in his view, 
lies with the Security Council, and he called on the Council to send “a strong and 
unanimous message” to Khartoum to arrest and surrender the two men accused of 
committing war crimes during the conflict in Darfur.153  This is obviously correct, and 
demonstrates the precariousness of the Prosecutor’s position.  It is ultimately up to the 
members of the United Nations Security Council to live up to their responsibility and 
ensure that the Government of Sudan respects its obligations under Resolution 1593 
and cooperates with the ICC, in particular through the arrest and surrender of Harun 
and Kushayb. 
 
Unable to be willing or willingly unable?: the problem of capacity and priority 
 
But it is not only outright recalcitrance that will emasculate the International Criminal 
Court.  As a recent study by the Institute for Security Studies demonstrates,154 there 
are a myriad of issues that undermine the promise of international criminal justice 
through the ICC’s complementarity regime. 
 
The creation, through widespread adoption of the Rome Statute, of a permanent 
International Criminal Court has been of enormous practical and symbolic 
significance. The ideals underlying the ICC require practical instrumentalities and 
processes. The ISS monograph was concerned with the significance of national-level 
measures to the effectiveness of the scheme of international criminal justice. It 
consists of a compilation of reports by independent experts on the extent of legislative 
and other measures taken by five selected African States (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda – all party to the Rome Statute), to implement the Statute’s 
obligations into their national laws and procedures. It comprises, too, a comparative 
overview of the themes emerging from the various country reports. As such, it is an 
assessment of the degree of capacity of these States (and similarly situated States), to 
respond to international crimes by workable, acceptable and lawful processes and 
within the parameters set by international law, in particular international human rights 
law. As the Preamble to the Rome Statute emphasises, “effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by international cooperation.” 
We have already seen that at the heart of the complementarity regime are the 
measures that must be taken by individual States in their own legal systems to ensure 
no safe harbour exists for the worst international criminals, to ensure that there are no 
barriers to smooth cooperation and assistance between States and with the ICC, and to 
ensure that national procedures and mechanisms are of sufficient quality from a Rule 
                                                 
153 See “Sudan has failed to cooperate with International Criminal Court, prosecutor says” UN News 
Centre, December 5, 2007. 
154 Max du Plessis and Jolyon Ford (eds) Unable or Unwilling? Case Studies on Domestic 
Implementation of the ICC Statute in Selected African Countries (ISS Monograph Series, Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria 2008) 95. 
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of Law perspective and adequately accommodate human rights safeguards, so that 
principles are upheld and prosecutions are not jeopardised by deficient investigations. 
 
The monograph was concerned to answer questions such as: how relevant to Africa is 
the priority of implementing measures consistent with the ICC Statute which enable 
the effective prosecution of international crimes? How does it sit relative to the other 
priorities of government and government departments, human rights defenders, civil 
society?  
 
The findings of the monograph illustrate the remaining and apparently enduring 
problems of giving effect to complementarity within Africa.  The reports indicate that 
one perception is that having in place national ICC response measures is not 
particularly relevant or urgent from an African perspective. As the country reports 
reveal quite clearly, all five countries sampled had ratified the Rome Statute but 
thereafter failed to put in place national-level measures to implement Rome Statute 
obligations. 
 
The reasons for delay in implementation were in large measure shared amongst the 
five states studied. Not only did the study reveal the status and peculiarities of 
individual countries’ responses to ratification of the Rome Statute, it also allowed for 
the drawing of certain comparative insights.155 
 
The consultations revealed the following features, misconceptions, misgivings or 
concerns as common barriers to implementation or common reasons for delay in the 
process of implementation of the Rome Statute in some African countries (as will be 
readily appreciated, these factors and difficulties can operate so as to compound one 
other).  First, there was a genuine lack of awareness about the need for and 
significance of implementation at the highest level, among many officials, civil 
society, the legal profession and judiciary, and the wider community. This manifests 
either as a lack of awareness altogether (so that there is no local pressure on 
government for implementation), or “awareness” in the sense that the issue simply has 
not come up in official or other circles.  
 
Second, there was a discernible capacity shortfall in some of the countries studied: 
an over-stretched and thinly-staffed justice system, and a lack of sufficient numbers of 
                                                 
155 In deciding whether the results of the study are relevant to an Africa-wide assessment of attitudes 
and responses to the ICC and the Rome Statute, it is worth bearing in mind that all of the countries 
studied can be considered, at least in their respective regions, to be relatively advanced at least in a 
number of respects relevant to this topic. So, Botswana is (with South Africa) seen as a leading 
example of good governance in Southern Africa and continentally; Ghana, whose leader has the status 
of an elder statesman in at least West Africa, has come to be considered the most stable and well-
governed of the major West African countries; although it has suffered recent instability, Kenya is a 
leading African state with a complex and evolving democracy, and some strong institutions (although 
instability has set in following the contested election results in late 2007 and current reports of violent 
demonstrations are of obvious concern); Tanzania, while poor, is stable, growing, and respected for its 
pedigree of pan-Africanism and its regional peacemaking; Uganda recently hosted the Commonwealth 
summit and some of the processes it has followed towards multiparty democracy, economic growth, 
women’s empowerment, HIV prevention, etc, have been described as a model for other African 
countries. In considering the problems and possibilities of implementation in other African countries, 
then, it is worth remembering that the sample is of countries that could reasonably be expected to have 
made progress or be capable of making progress on implementation. 
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officials with expertise in drafting or in international criminal cooperation. How this 
can manifest is that concept papers and other initiatives moving the issue up to a 
political level are unlikely to be undertaken, or approved, where capacity is thin. 
Parliaments also appear to lack some capacity to review these issues at a committee 
level in an informed way. This of course means that only a few issues can have 
priority. At present, if any capacity is devoted to international criminal issues it is to 
terrorism and international organised crime.   
 
That then highlights a third, and related finding, namely the clear indication in most 
of the reports that these countries have entertained other priorities, and having 
national laws to implement the Statute was simply not considered relevant enough to 
be accorded any or sufficient priority. This came through strongly in most of the 
reports. Many of the countries have had significant elections, or constitutional reform 
processes, which appear to have absorbed a good deal of political energy. This need 
not have prevented implementation, but has certainly not aided it.   
 
A fourth difficulty revealed by the reports is a number of political misgivings 
apparently held about implementation, and a sense that the local political risk of 
implementation (or the regional criticism that might come from some future 
surrendering a leading figure to an international court) outweighs the risk of any 
international criticism for lack of implementation.  Some of the sense of political 
misgiving can only be inferred from the fact that implementation has not received 
political momentum (in Uganda, the reasons for political uncertainty about 
proceeding are more obvious, given the peace process ongoing there). But there is 
also in the reports a trace of a sentiment that having national laws in place will cause 
more problems and embarrassments than it will solve, or that it would be preferable 
that these issues be dealt with in some other way, or that international prosecutions 
are seen as a “Western preoccupation”.   
 
There is a fifth and commonly expressed reason for delay in implementation which is 
political or constitutional concerns with the immunity regime of the Rome Statute 
(that article 27 brooks no immunity even for serving Heads of State). This has 
typically arisen at a late stage in the drafting process, in those countries which have a 
draft in place. It is rather a significant barrier, particularly where there has been 
political violence in the country, and given the reportedly high degree of sensitivity 
resulting from what might be described as the ‘Charles Taylor phenomenon’ (the 
perception that immunities are never water-tight and that prosecution may follow at 
some point in the future).   
 
Sixth, there is some concern in these countries about the perceived cost of 
implementation measures. Some of these perceptions are based on misunderstandings, 
for example the mistaken belief in one country that cooperation with the ICC meant 
undertaking the cost of building new, high quality prison cells without which criminal 
suspects would be able to claim that their trial was unfair or their rights abused. Some 
of the concerns are perhaps more understandable, such as the cost of training 
prosecutors and judges. This factor is not as significant as others, and seems not to 
underlie the principle reasons for delay in implementation.     
 
A seventh and final reason is what appears to be the absence of domestic pressure 
groups either within or outside of government in any of the five countries studied, 
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regularly giving the issue of ICC implementation profile or publicity or forward 
momentum. There have been some NGO-organised seminars and programmes, but 
not on the scale that took place during the campaign for ratification. The issue lacks 
the international partner backing, political convenience, and perceived relevance that 
sees counter-terrorism and organised crime measures moved forward. Unlike the 
Geneva Conventions the Statute lacks the support of a single institution such as the 
military. 
 
These findings are dealt with comprehensively in the monograph.  What does appear 
from them is that the primary barrier to implementation in the countries studied 
appears to be that the issue (cooperation in preventing impunity for international 
crimes) is not considered, at the higher political levels in these countries, as having 
sufficient importance, relevance and priority. Viewed in this way, capacity or 
expertise and cost are in a sense “secondary” factors that can be addressed once the 
sense of priority is accorded to them, by direction from the executive or by political 
leadership or consensus: for example, acquiring the services of local or international 
legal drafting experts, or asking the ICC itself for assistance.  
 
Thus while real capacity constraints do hamper the justice systems of these countries, 
the real explanation would appear to be that once the international credit has been 
obtained by ratification, actual implementation of the Rome Statute is simply not 
considered politically significant enough to be accorded priority.  
 
The lack of appeal to the political decision-makers appears to be both relative and 
absolute. Relative to other priorities for these countries, it is evident from the studies 
that ICC implementation legislation simply does not feature highly; any post-
ratification momentum has been lost. Moreover there is no discernible constituency at 
home or abroad calling for action to be taken, and indeed some voices that suggest it 
would be a distraction towards a Western preoccupation. Added to this “relative 
irrelevance” issue are factors that, even if the issue gets to be before the political 
decision-maker and so receive attention, would tend to positively militate against 
implementation: these are perceptions or concerns about constitutional immunities, or 
the misunderstandings about the reach of ICC crimes that might preclude discussing 
“international crimes” for reasons of local politics (e.g. Kenya), or real concerns about 
the impact on local peace processes of taking forward legislation (e.g. Uganda).156 
 
Conclusions and suggestions 
 
Africa has already demonstrated a clear commitment to the ideals and objectives of 
the ICC: more than half of all African states (33) have ratified the Rome Statute, and 
many have taken proactive steps to ensure effective implementation of its provisions.  
                                                 
156 It is worth noting that many of the problems with implementation noted by the consultants can be 
seen as generic problems with treaty implementation, ones that have been encountered in many 
countries in terms of following up the ratification of human rights instruments, for example. It is not 
necessary to explore the literature on this issue, except to note firstly that the Rome Statute is not the 
only instrument of great aspirational and practical utility that countries are quite prepared to ratify, but 
which they have failed over many years to take steps to implement or compile reports upon; and 
secondly, that many of the reasons for lack of implementation of human rights instruments apply 
equally to the Statute: political misgivings, capacity, and so on. 
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These efforts must continue.  The lesson we learn from the Sudan referral is that 
complementarity must work if the international criminal justice project is to succeed 
on the whole.  Perhaps the greatest problem that faces the ICC in future cases is an 
unwillingness or inability on the part of States Parties to properly investigate and 
prosecute international crimes, a problem obviously compounded where – as in the 
case of Sudan – the state is not party to the Court’s statute.  While such scenarios will 
entitle the ICC to then assume jurisdiction over the case under the complementarity 
scheme, we have already seen all too painfully how the Court will struggle to ensure 
assistance and cooperation from states that are unwilling or unable to do the job 
themselves. 
 
In my view, the existence of these problems points us back to the promise of 
complementarity.  The more we are able faithfully to fulfil the promise of the ICC 
regime – of ensuring that there is meaningful domestic prosecution of the world’s 
most serious crimes – the more the ICC can avoid these problems altogether, or at 
least diminish their impact.   
 
It is thus important to note that the Institute for Security Studies has moved towards 
capacity-building at a senior level as an increasing component of its engagement on 
security issues. The monograph assessment of responses to ratification of the Rome 
Statute by some African States comprises one element of the ISS Project devoted to 
examining measures for strengthening the Rule of Law in Africa by developing 
national capacity for responding, lawfully and within the context of international law 
and human rights, to international crimes and criminals (“the International Criminal 
Justice Project”). This International Criminal Justice Project is one component of the 
ISS’s recently inaugurated ICAP project – International Crimes in Africa Programme. 
 
An underlying premise of the ICAP programme and the International Criminal Justice 
Project in particular is that a key element of long-term post-conflict peacebuilding is 
strengthening the rule of law and access to justice. Equally important is developing 
mechanisms to manage and prevent conflict, and creating accountability in 
government. In Africa, post-conflict peacebuilding is threatened by the widespread 
lack of accountability among those responsible for the continent’s many violent 
conflicts that are characterised by torture, rape, murder, and other atrocities. The 
pervasive culture of impunity threatens newly established peace processes – not only 
because those responsible for atrocities remain free to commit further acts, but also 
because impunity fuels a desire for revenge which can lead to further violence. 
Moreover, public confidence in attempts to establish the rule of law is undermined, as 
are the chances of establishing meaningful forms of accountable governance. 
 
However, for most African countries, the national judicial systems are often too weak 
to cope with the burden of rendering justice for these crimes. “International crimes” 
including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are characterised by 
large numbers of victims and perpetrators, and are often committed with the 
complicity if not the active participation of state structures or political leaders. This 
means that the political pressure may be too great for national justice systems to cope 
with. Successful domestic prosecutions are further limited by resource and skills 
shortages, together with the strain of establishing functional criminal justice systems 
in countries with little tradition of democracy and the rule of law.   
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In circumstances such as these, when the national justice system is unable or 
unwilling to investigate or prosecute those responsible, the international community 
can and should assist with these processes. This, the international community has 
already begun to do in Africa, through the creation of first the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and thereafter, with its assistance in creating the hybrid Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.  Most recently, the European Union has sent a delegation to 
assist Senegal in preparing the trial of Hissène Habré, the former Chadian dictator.  
Habré, who ruled Chad from 1982 to 1990, when he fled to Senegal, is accused of 
thousands of political killings, systematic torture and waves of “ethnic cleansing” 
during his rule. In July 2006, Senegal agreed to an African Union request to prosecute 
Habré “on behalf of Africa.”  The EU delegation, headed by Bruno Cathala, the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court, is in response to a request by 
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade for international assistance in preparing the 
trial. The EU experts will evaluate Senegal’s needs and propose technical and 
financial help.157   
 
Of significance is that the African Union has named Robert Dossou, Benin’s former 
foreign minister and justice minister, as an envoy to the trial.   This is a promising 
development, and one that hopefully signals broader AU support for initiatives aimed 
at combating impunity for international crimes.  Naturally, one of the most important 
initiatives in this regard is the creation of the International Criminal Court.  One can 
hardly overestimate the importance of Africa to the Court: the ICC’s first 'situations' 
are all on the continent (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan, the 
Central African Republic). Africa is thus currently a high priority for the ICC, and 
will remain so for the foreseeable future. It is the most represented region in the ICC’s 
Assembly of States Parties with 29 countries having ratified the Rome Statute (which 
gives effect to the ICC), and is a continent where international justice is in the 
making.  
 
Ensuring the success of the ICC is important for peacebuilding efforts on the 
continent. However, the task of reversing the culture of impunity for international 
crimes and thereby strengthening the rule of law cannot simply be devolved to the 
ICC. In reality, the Court will be able to tackle a selection of only the most serious 
cases. And even if it did have the capacity to handle higher volumes of cases, this 
would be limited in Africa by the fact that the ICC is, by design, a “court of last 
resort” – with the main responsibility for dealing with alleged offenders resting with 
domestic justice systems. Governed by the principle of complementarity, this means 
that the ICC can only act in support of domestic criminal justice systems. National 
courts should be the first to act, and only when they are “unwilling or unable” to do 
so, can the ICC take up the matter. This implies a certain level of technical 
competency among domestic criminal justice officials.  But technical competency is 
only part of the problem. A related (and oftentimes prior) issue is political support for 
the idea of international criminal justice and for the International Criminal Court’s 
complementarity scheme.  In that regard, it is vital that African states ratify the Rome 
                                                 
157 Senegal has said that the investigation and trial will cost 28 million euros, and last week said that it 
would spend over 1.5 million euros (1 billion francs CFA) on the trial. In addition to the EU, a number 
of individual countries including France and Switzerland have publicly committed to helping Senegal.  
See further “EU to Aid Senegal in Preparing Hissène Habré’s Trial”, Human Rights First, 19 January  
2008. 
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Statute. The ICC cannot, of its own accord, initiate investigations into crimes 
committed in a state, or by a national of a State that has not ratified or acceded to the 
statute establishing the ICC.  Considering that 29 of Africa’s 53 states have ratified, a 
large portion of the continent still falls outside the ICC’s mandate.  And even for 
those that have ratified, there is the further and essential requirement of implementing 
effectively and comprehensively the obligations contained in the ICC Statute.  
 
Due to a need in Africa for greater public and official awareness about the work of the 
International Criminal Court, and a need for enhanced political support for the work 
of the Court and for international criminal justice more generally, the fulfilment of the 
aims and objectives of the ICC on the African continent – in particular through the 
complementarity regime – are dependent on the support of African States and 
administrations, the AU and relevant regional organisations, the legal profession, and 
civil society. Meeting this need requires commitment to a collaborative relationship 
between these stakeholders and the ICC. It is also important to remember that 
questions of responsibility for the prosecution of core international crimes in Africa 
(and for raising awareness of these issues) are broader than the ICC alone.  Other 
structures such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and other pan-African institutions can 
play a meaningful role in this regard which should be encouraged.  An example in this 
respect is the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its 
2005 Resolution on ending impunity in Africa and on the domestication and 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in which the Commission called on 
civil society organisations in Africa to work collaboratively to develop partnerships to 
further respect for the rule of law internationally and strengthen the Rome Statute. 
That these African structures and organisations should be at the forefront of 
awareness raising is important not least of all because of the perception present within 
certain African states that international criminal justice and the ICC is an “outside” or 
“Western” priority and relatively less important than other political, social and 
developmental goals.  The leading regional organisation – the African Union – should 
thus play a more significant role in building understanding and support among its 
member States about the importance of practical measures aimed at ending impunity 
for serious international crimes. In doing so it should make explicit the principled and 
practical reasons for building capacity to respond to international crimes, including 
viewing this capacity as inherent to a developed notion of “security” and as a key 
component of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and stability. This will enhance the 
role and work of the ICC in Africa and encourage states to comply with their 
complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute.  Ultimately, there is both scope 
and need for African states, regional organizations and civil society to draw on 
African experience to ensure an African-based and -focused initiative for contributing 
towards peacebuilding and stamping out impunity. After all, it should not be forgotten 
that it is not the UN, the ICC, or Western States that drafted the aims of the African 
Union. Under articles 4(m), 3(h) and 4(o) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, it is African 
States that reiterate that the AU is committed to ensuring respect for the rule of law 









On 17 July 1998 South Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”), thereby becoming the 23rd State Party. 
To domesticate the obligations in the Rome Statute, South Africa passed the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002 (“ICC Act”).159  The passing of the Act was momentous:  prior to the ICC Act, 
South Africa had no municipal legislation on the subject of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, and no domestic prosecutions of international crimes had taken 
place in South Africa.160  It is also significant because it is the first implementation 
legislation by an African State Party. 
That South Africa is in a relationship with the ICC is a result of the particular 
“complementarity” scheme set in place under the Rome Statute (discussed in the 
previous chapter). While the ICC is the world’s first permanent international criminal 
                                                 
158 This chapter was previously published as Max du Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation of the 
ICC Statute – An African Example” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 460.  I have 
also drawn from an occasional paper published for the Institute for Security Studies which is cited as 
Max du Plessis,”South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act: countering genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity”, Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, November 2008.   
159 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002.  The 
full text of the Act is available at http://www.info.gov.za/acts/2002/a27-02/. The ICC Act came into 
force on 16 August 2002. For further information on the Act see M du Plessis “Bringing the 
International Criminal Court Home: The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act” (2003) 16 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 1. 
160 Although customary international law forms part of South African law, a South African court 
confronted with the prosecution of a person accused of an international crime would have been hard-
pressed to convict, since the principle of nullum crimen sine lege would probably have constituted a 
bar to any such prosecution (see John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, 2nd ed 
(2000) 142). The same principle would most likely have also put paid to prosecutions under the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.  South Africa has not incorporated the Geneva Conventions into 
municipal law nor, prior to the ICC Act, enacted legislation to punish grave breaches.  It would 
therefore have been unlikely for a South African court to try a person for a grave breach of the 
Conventions in the absence of domestic legislation penalising such conduct (ibid).  This proposition 
was recently challenged before the South African Constitutional Court in the matter of S v Basson CCT 
30/03 decided on 9 September 2005 (dealing, inter alia, with whether Wouter Basson, an apartheid 
agent, had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity against apartheid opponents in the 1980s 
in South West Africa (now Namibia)).  The difficulty in the case was that while South Africa was a 
party to the Geneva Conventions at the time the offences were allegedly committed, the Conventions 
had not been incorporated into domestic law, hence giving rise to a possible retrospectivity problem in 
respect of a prosecution of Basson by the State.  The Constitutional Court chose not to deal with the 
question, holding that (at fn 147): “For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to enter into 
controversies surrounding the existence of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and a concomitant duty to prosecute.  We have not found it necessary to consider whether 
customary international law could be used either as the basis in itself for a prosecution under the 
common law, or, alternatively, as an aid to the interpretation of section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous 
Assemblies Act.” 
 46 
tribunal, it is not expected to be the primary means by which jurisdiction is asserted 
over international crimes. Indeed, the Court is designed to be a backstop; to act in 
what its Statute’s preamble describes as a “complementary” relationship with 
domestic states that are party to the Rome Statute.  The principle of 
“complementarity” ensures that the ICC operates as a buttress in support of the 
criminal justice systems of states parties at a national level, and as part of a broader 
system of international criminal justice. The principle proceeds from the belief that 
national courts should be the first to act.  It is only if a State party is “unwilling or 
unable” to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed by its nationals 
or on its territory that the International Criminal Court is then seized with jurisdiction. 
 
To date there are only three African states parties to the Rome Statute that have taken 
steps to domesticate the Rome Statute’s obligations: South Africa, Senegal and 
Kenya.  This chapter focuses on South Africa’s efforts.  South Africa was the first 
State in Africa to incorporate the ICC Statute into its domestic law, and the ICC Act is 
a very progressive example of implementing legislation – allowing for the potential 
prosecution of international crimes, wherever and by whomsoever they may be 
committed (see section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act which extends jurisdiction to a person 
who, “after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic” 
and which thus provides South African courts with universal jurisdiction).   
 
International criminal law is no longer something “out there”.  It has been brought 
home by the ICC Act, and has the potential (as we shall see later) to come to be 
increasingly used before South Africa’s courts. 
 
Under the ICC Act, a structure is created for national prosecution of crimes in the 
Rome Statute. The Act takes seriously the “complementary” obligation on South 
African courts to domestically investigate and prosecute the ICC offences of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide.  The preamble, for instance, speaks of 
South Africa’s commitment to bring “…persons who commit such atrocities to justice 
… in a court of law of the Republic in terms of its domestic law where possible”.  
And section 3 of the Act defines as one of its objects the enabling,  
 
“as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of complementarity…, 
the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to adjudicate in cases 
brought against any person accused of having committed a crime in the 
Republic and beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances”.  
 
The Preamble provides the context to the enactment of the ICC Act: 
  
“MINDFUL that-  
 * throughout the history of human-kind, millions of 
children, women and men have suffered as a result of atrocities which 
constitute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression in terms of international law;  
 * the Republic of South Africa, with its own history of 
atrocities, has, since 1994, become an integral and accepted member of 
the community of nations;  
 * the Republic of South Africa is committed to-  
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  * bringing persons who commit such atrocities to 
justice, either in a court of law of the Republic in terms of its domestic 
laws where possible, pursuant to its international obligations to do so 
when the Republic became party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, or in the event of the national 
prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do 
so, in line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in the 
Statute, in the International Criminal Court, created by and functioning 
in terms of the said Statute; and  
  * carrying out its other obligations in terms of the 
said Statute…” 
 
The preamble records that South Africa has an international obligation under the 
Rome Statute, to bring the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice, in a 
South African court under our domestic law where possible.  
 
The Act makes it clear that it favours the prosecution of international crimes, if needs 




•  The first object of the Act recorded in section 3(a) is to create a framework 
to ensure that the Rome Statute is effectively implemented in South 
Africa; 
 
•  The second object of the Act recorded in section 3(b), is to ensure that 
anything done in terms of the ICC Act, conforms with South Africa’s 
obligations under the Rome Statute, including its obligation to prosecute 
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity referred to above; 
 
•  Another object of the Act recorded in s 3(d), is to enable South Africa’s 
National Prosecuting Authority to prosecute and the High Courts to 
adjudicate in cases against people accused of having committed crimes 
against humanity, both inside South Africa and beyond its borders. 
 
Although any prosecution under the ICC Act may only be brought with the consent of 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), he is obliged in terms of section 
5(3), when he considers whether to institute such a prosecution, to: 
 
“give recognition to the obligation that the Republic, in the first instance and 
in line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in article 1 of 
the Statute, has jurisdiction and the responsibility to prosecute persons accused 
of having committed a crime”. 
 
Like the Rome Statute, the ICC Act does not reach back into the past.  The Act 
provides expressly that “[n]o prosecution may be instituted against a person accused 
of having committed a crime if the crime in question is alleged to have been 
committed before the commencement of the Statute”.161  In addition to ensuring that 
                                                 
161 Section 5(2) of the ICC Act. 
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South Africa is now well placed to conduct its own domestic prosecutions, the Act 
provides for a comprehensive scheme of cooperation between South African 






The ICC Act puts in place a variety of jurisdictional bases by which a South African 
Court might be seized with the prosecution of a person alleged to be guilty of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Section 4(1) of the ICC Act 
creates jurisdiction for a South African court over ICC crimes by providing that 
“[d]espite anything to the contrary in any other law of the Republic, any person who 
commits [an ICC] crime, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or 
imprisonment”.  Section 4(3) of the Act goes further and provides for extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.  In terms of that section the jurisdiction of a South African court will be 
triggered when a person commits an ICC crime outside the territory of the Republic 
and: 
 
(a) that person is a South African citizen; or 
(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic; or 
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of 
the Republic; or 
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or 
against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic. 
 
When a person commits a core crime outside the territory of the Republic in 
one of these four circumstances, then section 4(3) deems that crime to have been 
committed in the territory of the Republic.   
Worthy of comment is trigger (c) of the ICC Act which extends jurisdiction to 
a person who, “after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the 
Republic”.  There is no mention here of the person’s nationality or residency, and one 
must assume, given that trigger (a) and (b) already provide jurisdiction in respect of 
crimes committed abroad by South African nationals and residents, that trigger (c) is 
referring to individuals who commit a core crime and who do not have a close and 
substantial connection with South Africa at the time of offence.162 
The jurisdiction in trigger (c) is thus grounded in the idea of universal 
jurisdiction; that is, jurisdiction which exists for all states in respect of certain crimes 
which attract universal jurisdiction by their egregious nature, and consequently over 
the perpetrators of such crimes on the basis that they are common enemies of 
                                                 
162 The UK’s implementing legislation, for example, provides more clearly that, aside from the 
traditional bases of jurisdiction (territoriality and nationality), the UK courts will have jurisdiction over 
a person who “commits acts outside the United Kingdom at a time when he is not a United Kingdom 
national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to UK service jurisdiction and who 
subsequently becomes resident in the United Kingdom” (see section 68(1) of the United Kingdom’s 
International Criminal Court Act 2001). 
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mankind.  This basis of jurisdiction is a progressive and potentially far-reaching 
aspect of South Africa’s ICC Act, but one which is not without precedent in 
international law: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, and as such, are 
often regarded as giving rise to “universal jurisdiction”.163  It is also worth stressing 
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction per trigger (c) is dependent on the person 
being “present in the territory of the Republic” after the commission of the crime.   
 
The ICC Act as an example of conditional universal jurisdiction  
 
Domestic crimes, as is the tradition, are largely the responsibility and concern of 
domestic legal systems.  However, certain crimes, through their egregiousness, take 
on a characteristic which “internationalises” them.  
 
The internationalisation of certain crimes provides the potential to all States of the 
world (in addition to the State on whose territory the crime was committed) to 
investigate and prosecute the offender under their domestic legal systems and before 
their domestic courts.164  This entitlement goes under the heading of what 
international lawyers understand as the principle of “universal jurisdiction”: the 
competency to act against the offender, regardless of where the crime was committed 
and regardless of the nationality of the criminal.  While there is ongoing debate about 
the scope and limits of the potential exercise of universal jurisdiction under 
international law, Professor Cassese – previously President of the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – provides an 
authoritative view in holding that universal jurisdiction cannot sensibly be an absolute 
right of jurisdictional competence (such that any and every State is empowered to 
investigate and prosecute the occurrence of an international crime). Rather, while all 
States are potentially empowered to act against international criminals, under the 
current state of international law “universality may be asserted subject to the 
condition that the alleged offender be on the territory of the prosecuting State”.165 
 
What the ICC Act does is to provide South Africa an opportunity – on the established 
basis of universal jurisdiction – to prosecute ICC crimes by its courts acting as an 
international surrogate for the International Criminal Court.  It will be recalled that 
the ICC Act secures for a South African court jurisdiction over ICC crimes committed 
by a person outside South Africa where, in the wording of the section, “that person, 
                                                 
163 See for example A Cassese et al (eds) “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary” (2002) vol II, 1862.  Of importance in this respect is that the ICC Act in criminalising 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under South African law has adopted word for word 
the text of the Rome Statute in articles 6, 7 and 8.  Arguably this mirroring of the Rome Statute will 
serve to justify South Africa’s extension of universal jurisdiction over offenders that commit their 
crimes outside South Africa on the basis that the Rome Statute is itself reflective of broad international 
consensus on the most egregious crimes of concern to all humanity and which by their egregiousness 
attract universal jurisdiction.  
164 The State concerned must of course have taken steps under its domestic law to empower its officials 
and Courts to act upon this potential. 
165 A Cassese “Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?  A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction” (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 592. 
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after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic” [my 
emphasis] (section 4(3)(c)). 
 
The phrase “present in the territory of the Republic” is intended to denote a limitation 
on what international lawyers describe as “absolute universal jurisdiction”; that is, 
jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by foreigners, the exercise of which is 
not made subordinate to the presence of the suspect or accused on the territory.  
Accordingly, the ICC Act adopts a form of “conditional universal jurisdiction” (which 
is instead contingent upon the presence of the suspect in the forum state), and which 
is consistent with the view expressed above by Antonio Cassese. 
 
Preliminary steps initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing 
an indictment or requesting extradition, when the accused is not present  
 
The classic formulation of universal jurisdiction is well described by Abi-Saab 
(2003), a respected international lawyer, who explains the origins of the concept in 
relation to the international crime of piracy.     
 
“Piracy is a criminal act that takes place in a space where there is no overall 
territorial sovereign.  A state captures the pirate on the high sesas or in its 
national waters.  It may have no other connecting factor with the acts of piracy 
or the pirate (not being the state of nationality of the pirate or of the flag of 
attacked ships or of the victims) expect for being the place of capture, the 
forum deprehensionis.  But the criminal acts are considered as injurious to the 
community at large, in view of the paramountcy of the perceived common 
interest in the security of maritime communications since the age of 
discoveries.  In these circumstances, the state of capture is authorized, in spite 
of the absence of any of the traditional connecting factors, to prosecute the 
pirate, because it would not be acting in its own name uti singulus (which 
requires a special interest), but in the name of the community”.166  
 
It is thus the act of capture, in the forum deprehensionis, that provides the state with 
the competence under international criminal law to prosecute the offender.  The ICC 
Act in section 4(3)(c) reflects this position under international law when it provides 
that a South African court will have jurisdiction over a crime against humanity 
committed by a person outside South Africa where “that person, after the commission 
of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic”. 
 
The question that remains is this: what about the steps anterior to prosecution, which 
occur in the investigation phase?  International law does not require states to ensure 
that the accused is present in order to initiate universal jurisdiction proceedings. As 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal stated in their joint separate opinion in 
                                                 
166 G. Abi-Saab “The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction” (2003) 1(3) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 599-600.  
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the International Court of Justice decision in Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Belgium (2002):167 
 
“[i]f the underlying purpose of designating certain acts as international 
crimes is to authorize a wide jurisdiction to be asserted over persons 
committing them, there is no rule of international law…which makes 
illegal co-operative overt acts designed to secure their presence within a 
State wishing to exercise jurisdiction” (par 58). 
 
The due process right to be present during trial is distinct from the law defining the 
legitimate exercise of jurisdiction, which does not require presence when proceedings 
first commence. 
 
In this regard the Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction state that a judicial 
body may try accused persons on the basis of universal jurisdiction, “provided the 
person is present before such judicial body”.168 That language “does not prevent a 
state from initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing an 
indictment or requesting extradition, when the accused is not present”.169 
 
There are reasons of practice and logic which affirm that a suspect does not have to be 
physically present in the forum deprehensionis for an investigation to be initiated and 
for an arrest warrant to issue in anticipation of his or her physical arrival. 
 
First: if the entire investigation is subject to having established the presence of the 
accused, then logically there is a great risk that no prosecution would ever be 
undertaken.  As one commentator points out: 
 
“Whether or not expressed, the condition of presence must be presumed 
for the purposes of the “search”, during the course of which it will be 
verified.  Otherwise it is a vicious circle:  in order to know whether X is 
in hiding on our territory, it is necessary to search for him; but in order 
to search for him, it is necessary to have already discovered (by 
enlightenment or intuition) that he is present”.170  
 
Second: because it is based on the location of the suspect and not on other 
circumstances of the case, a strict presence requirement is a “blunt instrument”, 
imposing an imperfect limit on the exercise of universal jurisdiction and creating 
practical disadvantages by restricting the power to open an investigation to the point 
at which it can be proven that a suspect is within the territory of the state exercising 
                                                 
167 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium [2002]. Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 
2000 [online]. I.C.J. Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgens, Kooijmans and Buergenthal. Available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (accessed 7 October 2008). 
168 Program in Law and Public Affairs Princeton University 2001, The Princeton Principles on 
universal jurisdiction, page 32. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/lapa/unive_jur.pdf (accessed 13 
October 2008). 
169 Ibid. 
170 Lambois, cited at page 8 in FIDH Report of March 2006, “Implementing the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction in France”. Available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/universal_juris.pdf (accessed 14 
October 2008). 
 52 
universal jurisdiction. Human Rights Watch in its 2006 Report Universal Jurisdiction 
in Europe: The State of the Art, provides the following illustrative example of the 
negative effects of a strict presence requirement as precursor to investigation: 
 
“[I]n October 2005, Danish authorities received a complaint concerning 
a Chinese official who was scheduled to attend a conference in 
Copenhagen.  The complaint was received in advance of the suspect’s 
entry into Denmark, but the strict presence requirement in Danish 
legislation meant that Danish authorities could not legally open an 
investigation into the complaint before the suspect arrived. In effect, 
Danish investigators had only five days—the duration of the 
conference—to investigate the complaint and apply for an arrest 
warrant.  When the Chinese official left Denmark after five days, the 
investigation had to be discontinued”.171 
 
For these reasons, it is open to and preferable for the NPA under the ICC Act to 
commence proceedings and issue warrants of arrest prior to the presence of the 
accused in South African territory.    
 
The United Kingdom experience is of particular importance in this regard since it too 
has adopted a policy of “anticipated presence” as the prerequisite to initiating an 
investigation against individuals suspected of international crimes.  For instance, 
Major-General (retired) Doron Almog refused to disembark from his flight at 
Heathrow airport after he had learned that he was facing arrest by British police after 
a decision on 10 September 2005 by Chief London Magistrate Timothy Workman to 
issue a warrant for his arrest on suspicion of committing a grave breach of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 which is a criminal offence in the UK under the Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957. (The alleged offence was committed as part of Israel’s 
occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory). 
 
This unprecedented arrest warrant against a senior Israeli soldier was issued after 
years of failed efforts to obtain justice through the Israeli judicial system.  Because of 
the failure of the Israeli judiciary to combat impunity, an NGO acting for victims in 
Gaza, built a file of evidence with the help of Hickman & Rose Solicitors to pursue a 
case against him (and others) in the UK in accordance with the legal principle of 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes.  
 
The Court decision legally obliged the Anti-Terrorist and War Crimes Unit of the 
Metropolitan Police to arrest Doron Almog, which they tried to do.172 The arrest 
warrant was made subject to stringent bail conditions.  
 
The decision to apply to the court for an arrest warrant was taken against the 
background of a series of meetings with the War Crimes Unit of the Metropolitan 
Police. Hickman & Rose, on behalf of the NGO and the clients in these cases, 
provided the police with a considerable volume of evidence in relation to this suspect. 
The police were unable to take a decision about the arrest or prosecution of the 
                                                 
171 Human Rights Watch 2006, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Human Rights 
Watch Report, 18(5D) at 28. 
172 They were unsuccessful: he caught the next flight back to Israel and evaded capture. 
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suspect before his planned visit to Birmingham on Sunday, 11 September. 
Consequently, acting on behalf of the victims, Hickman & Rose and the NGO 
pursued the suspect through the judicial system, in the hope that he could be arrested 
before fleeing the UK.  It was on the strength of their efforts that the arrest warrant 
was issued by the Chief London Magistrate Timothy Workman. 
 
A legal threshold of “anticipated presence” as the precondition for opening an 
investigation would be a means by which South Africa would avoid the logical and 
practical difficulties identified above.173  And, more vitally, an “anticipated presence” 
precondition would facilitate the use of the ICC Act in the manner that Parliament 
intended, and would ensure compliance by South Africa with its obligations under the 
Rome Statute.  
 
For States like South Africa that are party to the Rome Statute, the concept of 
universal jurisdiction is given added specificity within the context of the 
complementarity obligation assumed under the provisions of the Statute. The ICC Act 
is the means by which South Africa gives effect to its international obligations as a 
party to the Rome Statute.  In that respect, the preamble of the Rome Statute (1998) 
stipulates that “… it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes” (Preamble). An “anticipated presence” 
threshold as a prelude to investigation would facilitate the exercise by South Africa of 
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, whereas – for 
the logical and practical reasons set out above – a strict threshold requirement would 
hamper such action.  
 
In terms of section 233 of the Constitution, when interpreting the ICC Act a court 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law. Given that under international law there is no requirement that 
states ensure that the suspect is present in order to initiate universal jurisdiction 
proceedings, a reasonable interpretation of the ICC Act is one which adopts an 
“anticipated presence” requirement as a precursor to the initiation of an investigation.   
 
An unreasonable interpretation would be one that puts in place hurdles to the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction which are not required under international law.  
 
The adoption of the “anticipated presence” requirement would accordingly 
facilitate South Africa’s compliance with its obligations under the Rome Statute to act 
against international criminals. It would also give effect to the intention of Parliament 
as reflected in the ICC Act; that is, to ensure that domestic prosecutions of 
international criminals take place within South Africa. 
 
                                                 
173 This threshold is incorporated in a new provision of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, para. 
153f  (cited in G Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (2005)), which makes obligatory an 
investigation into a suspected perpetrator of international crimes where the suspect is present in 
Germany or the suspect’s presence is anticipated (see also “Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State 
of the Art”, Human Rights Watch Report, 18(5D)).  So too, the United Kingdom Police may open an 
investigation regardless of the whereabouts of the accused. However, for an arrest warrant to be issued 
and for the suspect to be charged, the accused must either be present or his or her presence anticipated 
(Human Rights Watch 2006). 
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The ICC Act gives effect to the complementarity scheme by creating the structure 
necessary for national prosecutions under the ICC Statute. The procedure for the 
institution of prosecutions in South African courts is set out in section 5 of the Act.  
As we shall see this procedure involves different governmental departments and 
officials. 
 
Applicable Substantive Law 
 
One of the advantages of the Rome Statute is that it brings together in one place a 
codified statement of the elements which make up the crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.  The drafters of the ICC Act, aware of this benefit of 
codification, incorporated the Rome Statute’s definitions of the core crimes directly 
into South African law through a schedule appended to the Act.174  In this regard Part 
1 of Schedule 1 to the ICC Act follows the wording of article 6 of the Rome Statute in 
relation to genocide, Part 2 of the Schedule mirrors article 7 of the Statute in respect 
of crimes against humanity, and Part 3 does the same for war crimes as set out in 
article 8 of the Rome Statute.  It is clear that these crimes now form part of South 
African law through the Act.  One of the objects of the Act is “to provide for the 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,”175 and s 4(1) of the Act 
provides that “[d]espite anything to the contrary in any other law in the Republic, any 
person who commits a crime [defined as genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes], is guilty of an offence”.176   
 
While the Act usefully incorporates the definitions of these crimes into South African 
domestic law, neither the ICC Act nor Schedule 1 refers specifically to article 9 of the 
Rome Statute on Elements of Crimes.177  There is nothing, however, which prevents a 
                                                 
174 What facilitated this decision was the fact that South Africa did not have existing statutory law 
defining and proscribing the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
175 See section 3(c) of the ICC Act. 
176 Note also in regard to assistance in the prosecution of offences against the administration of justice, 
the ICC Act in section 36 provides that any person who contravenes a provision of Article 70 of the 
Statute: 
“(a) in the Republic; (b) outside the territory of the Republic and who – (i) is a South African 
citizen; (ii) is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the Republic; (iii) after 
the commission of the offence, is present in the territory of the Republic, is guilty of an 
offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both a 
fine and such imprisonment”. 
177 For the purposes of interpreting and applying the definitions of crimes found in articles 6, 7 and 8 of 
the Rome Statute, article 9 of the statute provides that reference must also be made to the Elements of 
Crimes, a fifty-page document adopted in June 2000 by the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court. See the Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes 
(PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2).  
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South African court from having regard to the Elements of Crimes were it to be 
involved in the domestic prosecution of an ICC offence.  However, in the interests of 
clarity and completeness it would serve South Africa to follow the example of other 
States Parties178 and incorporate by regulation the Elements of Crimes.179 
 
The drafters of the ICC Act have also not seen fit to replicate the general principles of 
criminal law set out in articles 22-33 of the Rome Statute.  That said, it is clear that 
these general principles will find application in any domestic trial under the ICC Act.  
For one thing, an accused will be entitled to the ordinary defences and protections that 
are guaranteed under South Africa’s progressive Constitution.180  The ICC Act 
provides that a South African Court, charged with the prosecution of a person 
allegedly responsible for a core crime, shall apply “the Constitution and the law”.181  
The South African Bill of Rights in section 35 sets out a range of rights for arrested, 
detained and accused persons.  These protections will obviously need to be afforded 
to any person who is being tried under the ICC Act.  And while the drafters of the 
ICC Act have not chosen to expressly adopt Part 3 of the Rome Statute on general 
principles of liability and defences, section 2 of the ICC Act provides that applicable 
law for any South African court hearing any matter arising under the Act includes 
“conventional international law, and in particular the [Rome] Statute”.182  
Accordingly, the general principles of international criminal law applicable to the 
prosecution of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (including the 
available defences contained in the Rome Statute such as superior orders) ought to 
find application before a South African court. 
 
The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit 
 
In order that South Africa’s obligations under the ICC Act may be fulfilled, a Priority 
Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) has been established within the NPA, and which is 
headed by a Special Director of Public Prosecutions appointed in terms of section 
13(1)(c) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.  Section 13(1)(c) provides that the 
President “may appoint one or more Directors of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter 
referred to as Special Directors) to exercise certain powers, carry out certain duties 
and perform certain functions conferred or imposed on or assigned to him or her by 
the President by proclamation in the Gazette”. 
 
                                                 
178 For example, the Secretary of State in England has by regulation made the Elements of Crimes 
applicable to proceedings in a service court within the United Kingdom.  See The International 
Criminal Court Act 2001 (Elements of Crimes) Regulations 2001, available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20012505.htm. 
179 In terms of section 38 of the ICC Act, the Minister of Justice may make regulations regarding the 
ICC Act.  In terms of section 1(xx) of the Act such regulations would be included as part of the Act. 
180 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter “the Constitution”).  
Chapter II of the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights. 
181 Section 2, ICC Act. 
182 See section 2(a). 
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The Special Director’s appointment was confirmed in terms of Government Gazette 
No 24876 of 23 May 2003.183  The Special Director was given two powers:  First: to 
“head the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit”; and Second: to “manage and direct the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes contemplated in the Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Act No. 27 of 2002) …”. 
 
The Unit is thus specifically tasked with dealing with the ICC crimes set out in the 
ICC Act, and the Special Director that heads the PCLU is empowered to “manage and 
direct the investigation” of such crimes.  In practice this means that requests by 
individuals or civil society groups for investigation and prosecution under the ICC 
Act should be directed to the PCLU.    
 
The NDDP’s involvement 
 
On the assumption that the PCLU takes up the investigation and issues a warrant of 
arrest (in camera or otherwise) and the suspect or suspects are arrested, the matter 
will then move to the prosecution stage.  
 
The ICC Act stipulates that “[n]o prosecution may be instituted against a person 
accused of having committed a [core] crime without the consent of the National 
Director [of Public Prosecutions]”.184 
   
The National Director must, when reaching a decision about a prosecution, recognise 
South Africa’s obligation in the first instance, under the principle of complementarity 
in the Rome Statute, to exercise jurisdiction over and to prosecute persons accused of 
having committed an ICC crime.185 The ICC Act requires the NDPP’s consent before 
a “prosecution may be instituted against a person accused of having committed a 
crime” (emphasis added).  
 
However, no such consent is required under the Act before a person is charged or 
arrested for such an offence, or an investigation opened.186  Had such consent been 
                                                 
183 Proclamation No 43 of 2003.  
184 Section 5(1). 
185 Section 5(3). 
186 An analogous situation prevails in other Commonwealth countries that have implemented the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court into their domestic law.  In New Zealand, for instance, a 
person may be charged and arrested without the consent of the Attorney-General to a prosecution, but 
the consent of the Attorney-General is required for a prosecution. Section 13 (Attorney-General’s 
consent to prosecutions required) states: 
“(1) Proceedings for an offence against section 9 or section 10 or section 11 may not be 
instituted in any New Zealand court without the consent of the Attorney-General. 
(2) Despite subsection (1), a person charged with an offence against section 9 or section 10 or 
section 11 may be arrested, or a warrant for his or her arrest may be issued and executed, and 
the person may be remanded in custody or on bail, even though the consent of the Attorney-
General to the institution of a prosecution for the offence has not been obtained, but no further 
proceedings can be taken until that consent has been obtained.” 
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required the drafters of the ICC Act could just as well have stipulated that no 
“proceedings” may be instituted without the NDPP’s consent.  They chose not to, and 
instead have limited the requirement of consent to the “[i]nstitution of prosecutions in 
South African courts”.  The preliminary decision of the NPA to investigate and/or 
issue a warrant of arrest would not be subject to the consent of the NDPP, although 
the eventual decision to initiate a prosecution of the arrested individual under the ICC 
Act would require his consent. 
 
The expectation under the Act, flowing from South Africa’s obligations under the 
complementarity scheme, is that a prosecution will take place within the Republic.  
Accordingly, if the National Director declines to prosecute a person under the Act, the 
Director-General for Justice and Constitutional Development must be provided with 
the full reasons for that decision.187  It is difficult to predict what reasons might be 
relied on by the National Director to decline a prosecution.  The most the ICC Act 
does is to say in section 5(2) that “[n]o prosecution may be instituted against a person 
accused of having committed a crime if the crime in question is alleged to have been 
committed before the commencement of the Statute”.  In addition to this ground, it is 
unclear whether the drafters of the Act had in mind the types of reasons set out in the 
Rome Statute by which a State might refuse to assist the ICC with an investigation or 
prosecution, namely, the interests of national security, or conflict with a pre-existing 
international law obligation.  One thing is clear however.  That is that any decision by 
the National Director to refuse to institute a prosecution before a South African court 
is one that will have to be carefully considered, not least of all since an unjustified 
refusal will lead to international responsibility for South Africa for its failure to 
comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute.  In this connection, it is 
noteworthy that the ICC Act reminds the National Director that, “when reaching a 
decision on whether to institute a prosecution contemplated in this section”, he or she 
must “give recognition to the obligation that the Republic, in the first instance and in 
line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in Article 1 of the [Rome] 
Statute, has jurisdiction and responsibility to prosecute persons accused of having 
committed a crime”. If the National Director refuses to institute a prosecution, he or 
she is then obliged to forward the decision, together with reasons, to the Registrar of 
the International Criminal Court in The Hague.188 
 
Factors to be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the ICC Act 
 
As we have seen under the ICC Act the PCLU and NDPP exercise prosecutorial 
discretion in relation to ICC crimes. Aside from the question of evidence that has 
been presented to the PCLU and NDPP, there are important factors which play (or 
ought to play) a role in the process by which the PCLU and the NDPP decide on 
whether to institute an investigation or prosecution under the ICC Act and which 
significantly curtail the discretion of the PCLU and NDPP to refuse to initiate an 
investigation and/or prosecution. 
 
                                                 
187 Section 5(5). 
188 Ibid. 
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First: the decision to investigate/prosecute must take account of the aims of the ICC 
Act.  The primary aim of the Act is to secure prosecution of individuals alleged to be 
guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The Preamble to the ICC 
Act records that the obligation imposed on South Africa authorities under the Act is to  
 
“[bring] persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law 
of the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its 
international obligations to do so when the Republic became party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court”. 
 
Section 3 (Objects of the Act) stipulates that one of the Act’s objects is  
 
“to enable, as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity … the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to 
prosecute and the High Courts of the Republic to adjudicate in cases brought 
against any person accused of having committed a crime in the Republic and 
beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances”.189 
 
Second: a decision by the National Director must take account of the fact that  
 
“[i]f the National Director, for any reason, declines to prosecute a person under 
this section, he or she must provide the Central Authority [the Director-General: 
Justice and Constitutional Development] with the full reasons for his or her 
decision and the Central Authority must forward that decision, together with the 
reasons, to the Registrar of the Court”. 
 
Third: the decision must comply with the NPA Prosecution Policy (as amended on 1 
December 2005).  The Preamble to the Policy states that “[p]rosecutors are the 
gatekeepers of the criminal law.  They represent the public interest in the criminal 
justice process”.  The Policy then provides as follows in salient part: 
 
“The Prosecuting Authority has the power and responsibility to institute and 
conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the State and to carry out any 
necessary functions incidental thereto.”190 
 
“The Prosecution Policy must be tabled in Parliament and is binding on the 
Prosecution Authority.  The National Prosecuting Authority Act also requires191 
that the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors should be 
observed”.192 
                                                 
189 Section 3(d). 
190 Paragraph 1, NPA Prosecution Policy. 
191 See National Prosecuting Authority Act s 22(4)(f). 
192 Ibid. The UN Guidelines (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990) stipulates that 
“[t]he Guidelines set forth below, which have been formulated to assist Member States in their tasks of 
securing and promoting the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of prosecutors in criminal 
proceedings, should be respected and taken into account by Governments within the framework of their 
national legislation and practice, and should be brought to the attention of prosecutors, as well as other 
persons, such as judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in 
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The UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors193 provide as follows in paragraph 15: 
 
“15. Prosecutors shall give due attention to the prosecution of crimes committed 
by public officials, particularly … grave violations of human rights and other 
crimes recognized by international law and, where authorized by law or 
consistent with local practice, the investigation of such offences.” 
 
Of obvious importance in this regard is that the State has chosen to create a Priority 
Crimes Litigation Unit in order that the crimes under the ICC Act are prioritised and 
prosecuted by a specialist and dedicated body of prosecutors and investigators. 
 
The Prosecution Policy furthermore provides that prosecutions should ordinarily 
follow unless “public interest demands otherwise”.194 
 
In terms of the Policy, when considering whether or not it will be in the public interest 
to prosecute, prosecutors should consider all relevant factors, including: 
 
“The nature and seriousness of the offence 
• The seriousness of the offence, taking into account the effect of the crime on 
the victim, the manner in which it was committed, the motivation for the act and 
the relationship between the accused and the victim. 
• The nature of the offence, its prevalence and recurrence, and its effect on 
public order and morale. 
• The economic impact of the offence on the community, its threat to people or 
damage to public property, and its effect on the peace of mind and sense of 
security of the public.”195 
 
The fact that ICC crimes are by definition the most serious of all crimes, and given 
their effect on peace and security, it seems that an investigation or prosecution of ICC 
crimes under the ICC Act should ordinarily follow and that there must be compelling 
reasons of public interest to forestall or prevent such action by the prosecuting arm of 
government.    
 
In deciding on what is in the public interest an overriding consideration ought to be 
the gravity of crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, their 
universal condemnation and the international community’s commitment to repressing 
them.   
 
In this respect it is useful to recall what the Constitutional Court said in S v Basson 
2005 (12) BCLR 1192 (CC): 
 
                                                                                                                                            
general. The present Guidelines have been formulated principally with public prosecutors in mind, but 
they apply equally, as appropriate, to prosecutors appointed on an ad hoc basis”. 
193 Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. 
194 Paragraph 4(c), NPA Prosecution Policy. 
195 Parapraph 4(c), NPA Prosecution Policy. 
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“[184] As was pointed out at Nuremburg, crimes against international law are 
committed by people, not by abstract entities, so that only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.   Given the nature of the charges, the SCA should have given 
appropriate weight and attention to these considerations, even in the absence of 
any argument on these issues by the state.  Given the extreme gravity of the 
charges and the powerful national and international need to have these issues 
properly adjudicated, particularly in the light of the international consensus on 
the normative desirability of prosecuting war criminals, only the most 
compelling reasons would have justified the SCA in exercising its discretion to 
refuse to rule on the charges.” [my emphasis] 
 
Similarly, South Africa’s interest in not becoming a “safe haven” for perpetrators of 
such crimes should form part of the overall “public interest” in prosecuting such 
crimes. 
 
Once consent has been given 
As mentioned earlier, the ICC Act stipulates that “[n]o prosecution may be instituted 
against a person accused of having committed a [core] crime without the consent of 
the National Director [of Public Prosecutions]”.  On the assumption that such consent 
is provided, the matter will proceed to Court and the PCLU will adopt responsibility 
for the prosecution of the matter. 
 
Given the importance of a prosecution involving allegations against an accused of 
having perpetrated genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, it is clear that a 
specialized Court would need to be designated.  The Act provides that after the 
National Director has consented to a prosecution, an appropriate High Court must be 
designated for that purpose. Such designation must be provided in writing by the 
“Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice … in consultation with 
the Chief Justice of South Africa and after consultation with the National Director”.196 
The ICC Act does not provide any specific trial procedure or punishment regime for 
domestic courts.  All that the ICC Act provides is for the designation of “an 
appropriate High Court in which to conduct a prosecution against any person accused 
of having committed [an ICC] crime”.197  Presumably the usual trial procedure for a 
criminal trial in the High Court will be followed and the High Court will be 
empowered to issue any of the sentences which it would ordinarily be entitled to 
impose in terms of its domestic criminal sentencing jurisdiction.  Such punishments 
would include life imprisonment, imprisonment, a fine, and correctional supervision. 
The death penalty is not an option: capital punishment was declared unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court in 1995 in S v Makwanyane.198      
 
 
                                                 
196 Section 5(4). 
197 Section 5(5). 
198 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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Cooperation with the ICC  
 
Beyond empowering South African officials to domestically engage in the 
prosecution of ICC crimes, the ICC Act sets in place a comprehensive cooperative 
scheme for South Africa vis-à-vis the ICC.     
 
Arrest and Surrender 
 
In respect of surrender and provisional arrest, the ICC Act is premised on the 
understanding that the International Criminal Court will in most circumstances have 
to rely on the intercession of national jurisdictions to gain custody of suspects.  As a 
result the ICC Act envisages two types of arrest: one in terms of an existing warrant 
issued by the ICC, and another in terms of a warrant issued by South Africa’s 
National Director of Prosecutions (NDPP).  In both scenarios the warrant (whether 
endorsed or issued) must be in the form and executed in a manner as near as possible 
to that which exists in respect of warrants of arrest under existing South African 
law.199  
 
Dealing with the first scenario (an arrest in terms of an existing warrant issued by the 
ICC), in terms of section 8 of the ICC Act, when South Africa receives a request from 
the ICC for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom the ICC has issued a 
warrant of arrest, it must refer the request to the Director-General of Justice and 
Constitutional Development with the necessary documentation to satisfy a local court 
that there are sufficient grounds for the surrender of the person to The Hague.200  The 
Director-General must then forward the request (along with the necessary 
documentation) to a magistrate who must endorse the ICC’s warrant of arrest for 
execution in any part of the Republic.201  
 
Section 9 details the second scenario (an arrest in terms of a warrant issued by the 
National Director of Prosecutions).  In this situation the Director-General of Justice 
and Constitutional Development is mandated to receive a request from the ICC for the 
provisional arrest of a person who is suspected or accused of having committed a core 
crime, or has been convicted by the ICC.  The Director-General is then obliged under 
the ICC Act to immediately forward the request to the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, who must then apply for the warrant before a magistrate.202  
 
After being arrested pursuant to a warrant (whether that warrant was issued by the 
ICC or by the NDPP), the arrestee is to be brought “before a magistrate in whose area 
of jurisdiction he or she has been arrested or detained”, “within 48 hours after that 
person’s arrest or on the date specified in the warrant for his or her further 
                                                 
199 Section  9(3).   
200 Section 8(1). 
201 Section 8(2). 
202 Section 9(1). 
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detention.”203 The person is to be brought before a magistrate so that the presiding 
magistrate may establish in terms of section 10(1)(a) to (c) of the ICC Act whether: 
 
(a) the warrant applies to the person in question; 
(b) the person has been arrested in accordance with the procedures laid down 
by the ICC Act; 
(c) the rights of the person have been respected. 
 
Having laid their hands on the arrestee, the South African authorities then become 
engaged in the “surrender” of an arrestee to the International Criminal Court – his or 
her “delivery” to The Hague. To make a committal order, with a view to the surrender 
of an arrestee to the International Criminal Court, the magistrate has to be satisfied of 
three things only.  First, the magistrate must be satisfied that the person before court is 
the individual named in the warrant.204  Second, that the person has been arrested in 
accordance with the procedures set down by domestic law.205  And third, that the 
arrestee’s rights, as contemplated in the Bill of Rights, have been respected, if, and to 
the extent to which, they are or may be applicable.206  The nature of these three 
requirements makes it clear that surrender to the ICC is different to extradition in 
international law. There is no mention of the double criminality rule which has 
become so central to extradition proceedings.  And unlike many extradition 
proceedings, there is no requirement in the ICC Act that a prima facie case be shown 
against the suspect.  Section 10(5) of the ICC Act provides as the primary test that, if, 
after considering the evidence adduced at the inquiry the magistrate is satisfied that 
the three requirements outlined above are met, then the magistrate “must issue an 
order committing that person to prison pending his or her surrender to the Court.”  Of 
course, the magistrate also has to be satisfied that the International Criminal Court has 
a genuine interest in the surrender of the arrestee, and to this end section 10(5)) 
stipulates that in addition to the three requirements being met, the magistrate must be 
content that the person concerned may be surrendered to the Court: (a) for prosecution 
for the alleged crime; (b) for the imposition of a sentence by the Court for the crime in 
respect of which the person has been convicted, or (c) to serve a sentence already 
imposed by the Court.207 There is little indication in the Act what level of proof must 
be proffered by the prosecution in respect of these additional requirements, such as, 
whether the court must inquire whether there is evidence to justify his trial for the 
offence he is alleged to have committed.208  Presumably any of these three factual 
                                                 
203 Section 10(1). 
204 Section 10(1)(a). 
205 Section 10(1)(b). 
206 Section 10(1)(c).       
207 One must assume that the listing of these conditions is in the disjunctive. 
208 By contrast the United Kingdom’s ICC Act, for example, makes it clear that a court, when making 
an order for surrender, “is not concerned to enquire” whether the warrant was duly issued by the ICC 
or, where the person to be surrendered is “alleged to have committed an ICC crime, whether there is 
evidence to justify his trial for the offence he is alleged to have committed” (see s 5(5) of the 
International Criminal Court Act 2001; see too the commentary on the Act by Robert Cryer 
“Implementation of the International Criminal Court Statute in England and Wales” (2002) 51 ICLQ  
733 at 736).  A further problem is that s 10(5) of the ICC Act speaks of the magistrate’s power to issue 
an order of committal to prison, but does not refer to “an order to be surrendered”.  No other section of 
the Act refers to an order to be surrendered to the ICC.  This may give rise to problems, since 
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conditions will have been proved by the terms of the International Criminal Court’s 
request, either for the endorsement of its own warrant of arrest within South Africa (in 
terms of s 8 of the ICC Act), or for South Africa to issue a provisional warrant of 
arrest pursuant to the Court’s request (in terms of s 9 of the ICC Act) such that these 
additional requirements may be regarded as being satisfied on the strength of the 
“material supporting the request” for surrender provided by the International Criminal 
Court.209   
 
Any person against whom an order of committal to prison has been made under 
section 10(5) of the ICC Act has a right of appeal to a High Court which right must be 
exercised within seven days after the date of the order.210  The appeal will focus on 
“whether one or more of the requirements referred to in [section 10(1)(a) to (c)] have 
been complied with”; that is, whether the warrant applies to the person in question; 
the person has been arrested in accordance with the procedures laid down by the ICC 
Act, and; the rights of the person have been respected. 
 
Should a conflict arise between South Africa and the ICC regarding arrest and 
surrender, then in terms of section 10(2) of the ICC Act the magistrate may at any 
time during the inquiry “postpone that inquiry for purposes of consultation between 
the relevant authorities of the Republic and the Court as contemplated in Article 97 of 
the Statute.”  
 
Cooperation Regarding ICC-initiated Investigations and Prosecutions 
 
Article 93 of the Rome Statute requires States Parties to assist the ICC by cooperating 
in relation to investigations and prosecutions. By way of response, Part 2 of the ICC 
Act sets out a variety of circumstances in which the “relevant competent authorities in 
the Republic” must “cooperate with, and render assistance to, the Court in relation to 
investigations and prosecutions”.  There are many areas of co-operation (detailed in 
section 14 of the Act), such as the questioning of suspects, the identification and 
whereabouts of persons or items, the taking of evidence (including expert opinions), 
inspections in loco (including the exhumation and examination of grave sites) and 
execution of searches and seizures, to name but a few.211  The areas of co-operation 
must be undertaken in terms of the relevant law applicable to investigations in South 
                                                                                                                                            
technically the ICC Act does not contain a provision for any competent authority, whether a court or 
the executive branch of government, to issue an order of surrender.  The problem needs to be addressed 
as soon as possible.  See further Anton Katz “An Act of Transformation – The incorporation of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC into national law in South Africa” (2003) 12 African Security Review 25. 
209 Article 89 of the Rome Statute, which deals with surrender of persons to the Court, provides that the 
“Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material 
supporting the request” to a State Party, so this material would be before the magistrate.  Prior to this, 
to obtain a warrant of arrest from the ICC the Prosecutor would have had to convince a Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the Court (consisting of three judges) that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” the 
suspect had committed an ICC offence.   
210 Section 10(8)(b). 
211 The full list of areas of cooperation is set out in section 14 (a)-(l), and is modelled on article 93 of 
the Rome Statute. 
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Africa, as well as the applicable rules in the ICC Statute,212 and with the ultimate aim 
of assisting the ICC.   
 
Certain acts of co-operation are subject to comprehensive regulation in the ICC Act, 
and others are not.  Particularly in those cases where the ICC Act provides no 
guidance, the relevant South African law and the provisions of the ICC Statute will 
need to be consulted.  For example in the context of questioning suspects, the ICC Act 
stipulates in section 14 (c) no more than that the competent South African authorities 
must assist with “the questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted”.  
South African authorities will therefore have to turn to the ICC Statute and South 
African law for guidance.  In this context there is little difference between the 
domestic law and the treaty’s provisions, both of which take their cue from 
international human rights law.  Equally, the Constitution in section 35 and the Rome 
Statute in article 55 guarantee certain rights to a person under investigation, such as 
the right against self-incrimination, the right to remain silent, and the right to legal 
assistance.   
 
Those means of co-operation that are subject to detailed regulation under the ICC Act 
include the examination of witnesses,213 the transfer of a prisoner to the ICC for the 
purposes of giving evidence or to assist in an investigation,214 the service of process 
and documents,215 and acts of entry, search and seizure.216   
 
Particularly interesting are the provisions relating to forfeiture or confiscation orders.  
The Director General of Justice and Constitutional Development may receive a 
request from the ICC for assistance in enforcing “restraint orders” as well as 
“confiscation orders” in the Republic.  A “restraint order” is defined in the ICC Act as 
an “order by the ICC in respect of a crime or an offence within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, aimed at restraining any person from dealing with any property.”  This term – 
“restraint order” – is not found in the Rome Statute, but presumably refers to the 
provisional measure of assistance which the South African authorities are to provide 
to the Court under section 14 (k) of the ICC Act.  Section 14 (k) is expressly modelled 
on article 93 of the Rome Statute, as article 93 (1)(k) provides for the “identification, 
                                                 
212 Section 14 reads that the “relevant competent authorities in the Republic must, subject to the 
domestic law of the Republic and the Statute, cooperate with, and render assistance to, the Court…”. 
(Emphasis added).  The Constitution, where applicable, will no doubt provide the background 
standards against which the relevant “cooperation” is undertaken.  So, for example, when it comes to 
searches and seizures in terms of section 14 (h), read with section 30 of the ICC Act, the relevant 
provisions of the Act will need to be read in conjunction with sections 10, 12(1)(a)-(d), 12(2)(b), 14, 
21, 35(5) and 36(1) of the Constitution. 
213 See sections 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the ICC Act.  The sections outline the procedure for the 
examination of witnesses before a magistrate, the rights and privileges of the witness, the offences 
which a witness might commit, and the procedure by which the attendance of a witness might be 
secured in proceedings before the International Criminal Court. 
214 See section 20 of the ICC Act. 
215 See section 21 of the ICC Act. 
216 See section 30 of the ICC Act.  This section is in many respects similar to those provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in relation to search and seizure (sections 19 to 36), but with 
modifications to reflect the fact that the request for co-operation has been made by the ICC for the 
purposes of its investigation, and not to assist South Africa in criminal investigations unrelated to the 
ICC. 
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tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property … [etc] for the purposes of 
eventual forfeiture”.  As such, a restraint order would seem to cover the scenario 
under the Rome Statute where the Court orders provisional measures with the aim of 
securing eventual forfeiture.  A “confiscation order” – defined in the ICC Act as an 
“order issued by the Court aimed at recovering the proceeds of any crime or an 
offence within the jurisdiction of the Court or the value of such proceeds” – appears, 
by contrast, to relate to a final measure of punishment.   In terms of article 77 of the 
Rome Statute, one of the penalties that the ICC may impose, in addition to 
imprisonment, is the “forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.”  
Article 109(1) of the Rome Statute in turn imposes obligations upon States Parties to 
enforce such forfeiture orders.   
 
Under the ICC Act, when the Director-General of Justice and Constitutional 
Development receives a request from the ICC for assistance in enforcing one of these 
“orders” in the Republic, he is expected to lodge with the Registrar of the High Court 
in whose jurisdiction the property is situated or present a certified copy of that 
order.217  Once a restraint order has been “registered” by the relevant Registrar, the 
ICC Act provides that the order has the effect of a restraint order made by that High 
Court under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act.218  Where a confiscation order 
has been “registered”, the order has the effect of a civil judgment of the court at which 
it has been registered.219 
 
Cooperating to Impose ICC Sentences 
 
The Rome Statute stresses that “States Parties should share the responsibility for 
enforcing sentences of imprisonment, in accordance with principles of equitable 
distribution”.220  The International Criminal Court will have no prison, and states are 
therefore expected to volunteer their services, indicating their willingness to allow 
convicted prisoners to serve the sentence within their domestic penal institutions.221   
 
After sentencing an offender, the ICC will, in terms of article 103(1)(a) of the Rome 
Statute, designate the state where the term is to be served.  In so doing the Court must 
                                                 
217 See section 22(1) for “restraint orders” and section 27(1) for “confiscation orders”.  In the case of 
“confiscation orders”, however, the request from the ICC for assistance in executing a confiscation 
order must first be submitted to the Minister of Justice for approval before the request may be lodged 
with the clerk or the Registrar, as the case may be, of a court in the Republic having jurisdiction (see 
section 27(1) for detail).   
In both cases, the Director-General of Justice must be satisfied of certain requirements, such 
as that the order is not subject to review or appeal.   
218 Act 121 of 1998.  See section 23 of the ICC Act. 
219 See section 28(1) of the ICC Act. 
220 See article 103(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as well as Rule 201 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. 
221 See further W A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2004) 170.  If no 
State offers its prison services, the host State of the ICC – the Netherlands – will perform the task (see 
article 103(4) of the Rome Statute). 
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take into account the views of the sentenced prisoner, his or her nationality, and 
“widely accepted international treaty standards governing the treatment of 
prisoners”.222  In addition, conditions of detention must be neither more nor less 
favourable than those available to prisoners convicted of similar offences in the state 
where the sentence is to be enforced.223 
 
In order to give effect to this enforcement scheme, the ICC Act provides that the 
Minister of Correctional Services must consult with the Cabinet and seek the approval 
of Parliament with the aim of informing the ICC whether South Africa can be placed 
on the list of states willing to accept sentenced persons.224  If the Republic is placed 
on the list of states and is designated as a state in which an offender is to serve a 
prison sentence, then such person must be committed to prison in South Africa.225  
The provisions of the Correctional Services Act 1998226 and South African domestic 
law then apply to that individual.  However, the sentence of imprisonment may only 
be modified at the request of the International Criminal Court, after an appeal by the 
prisoner to, or review by, the Court in terms of the Rome Statute.227   
 
It is commendable that the ICC Act requires the government to indicate its availability 
to assist in enforcing the ICC sentences.  It is not clear however that South Africa will 
be placed on the list of states available for enforcement duty.  The Rome Statute 
makes it clear that there can be “no question of sending a prisoner to a State with 
prison conditions that do not meet international standards.”228  This is a particular 
problem for South Africa, given the poor state of its prisons.229  
 
“In addition to imprisonment” the Rome Statute enables the ICC to impose a fine.230  
On top of this, the ICC is empowered to address the issue of reparations to victims, 
and may “make an order directly against any convicted person” specifying 
reparation.231  Such an order will no doubt often take the form of monetary 
compensation.  The ICC Act makes provision for the execution of such fines and 
compensation orders within the Republic.232  Such orders must be “registered” with a 
                                                 
222 Article 103(3). 
223 Article 106(2). 
224 Section 31. 
225 Section 32. 
226 Act 111 of 1998. 
227 Section 32(4)(b).  This provision is a reflection of the prescription in article 110(2) of the Rome 
Statute whereby the ICC “alone shall have the right to decide any reduction of sentence”. 
228 Schabas supra note 221 75. 
229 The Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons reported at the end of 2000 that prisons were severely 
overcrowded, with some at 200 per cent occupancy rate, and that a third of the prison population who 
were awaiting trial were detained under inhumane conditions and in breach of national law and 
international standards.  See Amnesty International Country Report, South Africa – 2002 (available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/afr/south+africa!Open).  See further J Steinberg Prison 
Overcrowding and the Constitutional Right to Adequate Accommodation in South Africa CSVR 
Monograph January 2005. 
230 Article 77(2)(a). 
231 Article 75(2). 
232 Sections 25 and 26. 
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court in the Republic having jurisdiction.233  Once the order has been registered, that 
sentence or order “has the effect of a civil judgment of the court at which it has been 
registered”, and the Director General of Justice and Constitutional Development must 
pay over to the ICC any amount realized in the execution of the sentence or the order, 





The question of official immunities might arise in two contexts under the ICC Act.  
The first context involves the domestic prosecution in a South African Court of a 
foreign official whose high standing accords him immunity under international law.  
The second context involves cooperation by South Africa with the ICC in respect of 
the surrender of a high-standing foreign official who claims immunity under 
international law as a bar to that surrender.    
 
While the ICC Act provides South African Courts with potential jurisdiction over 
persons who may have committed ICC crimes, the issue of immunity from 
jurisdiction for high ranking officials remains contentious.  The controversy arises 
because of the heated debate under international law around the extent to which 
serving heads of state and other senior government officials can justifiably claim 
immunity, on the basis of their official status, from proceedings brought against them 
for allegedly committing international crimes.   
 
Before the ICC matters are relatively clear.  Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides 
that the “official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a 
government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute.”  The 
position of international law immunities before national courts is however less 
obvious.  For instance, in the groundbreaking Pinochet cases the House of Lords 
accepted that serving international functionaries (such as current heads of state) retain 
absolute immunities rationae personae (ie, personal immunity on account of their 
status), irrespective of the nature of the crime alleged, unless waived by the sending 
state.  Their Lordships denied immunity to Pinochet in his capacity as a former head 
of state.  However, their Lordships made it clear that if he had still been an acting 
head of state, this immunity in international law would have continued to subsist.235 
The International Court of Justice has affirmed this immunity in its decision in 
Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium.236 With regard to the provisions precluding 
                                                 
233 Sections 25(2) and (3). 
234 Section 26. 
235 For instance, Lord Nicholls in the first Pinochet case held that “...there can be no doubt that if 
Senator Pinochet had still been the head of the Chilean state, he would have been entitled to immunity” 
(see R v Bow St Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 4 All ER (Pinochet 1) at 938).  Lord 
Millett in the third Pinochet case said that “Senator Pinochet is not a serving head of state.  If he were, 
he could not be extradited.  It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of Chile to arrest him or 
detain him” (see R v Bow St Magistrate, Ex p. Pinochet (No.3) [1999] 2 WLR 824 at 905 H). 
236 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 2002 ICJ Reports 
3. 
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immunity found in the constitutive instruments of a myriad of international criminal 
tribunals (the most recent being the Rome Statute of the ICC), the Court expressly 
held that this exception to customary international law was not applicable to national 
courts.237  This case law therefore suggests that the diplomatic or head of state 
immunity of an accused prevents national courts from dealing with allegations of 
international crimes unless that immunity has been waived, or the senior official has 
left office. This lack of clarity is particularly problematic in light of the fact that 
national courts of States Parties to the Rome Statute are expected to act in a 
“complementary” arrangement with the International Criminal Court, prosecuting 
individuals for ICC crimes and deferring to the ICC only where the national State is 
unwilling or unable to perform its prosecutorial role.  
 
South Africa has attempted to cut its way past this controversy by providing in section 
4(2)(a) of the ICC Act that notwithstanding “any other law to the contrary, including 
customary and conventional international law, the fact that a person … is or was a 
head of State or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official … is neither – (i) a defence to a crime; nor (ii) 
a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted of a 
crime”.  In terms of the Act, South African courts, acting under the complementarity 
scheme, are accorded the same power to “trump” the immunities which usually attach 
to officials of government as the International Criminal Court is by virtue of article 27 
of the Rome Statute. 
 
As John Dugard and Garth Abraham have pointed out, section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act 
represents a choice by the legislature to wisely not follow the “unfortunate”  Arrest 
Warrant decision “of which it must have been aware”.238  Support for an argument 
that s 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act does indeed scrap immunity, notwithstanding the 
contrary position under customary international law, comes from no less a source than 
the Constitution.  Section 232 of the Constitution provides that “[c]ustomary 
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament”.  
 
That being said, it is difficult to predict what a court will decide.  There is foreign 
precedent to suggest that a South African court dealing with section 4(2)(a) of the 
ICC Act and faced with a claim of head of state immunity might find that the section 
does not do away with personal head of state immunity.  In Sharon and others239 the 
Belgian Court de Cassation considered the Belgian equivalent of South Africa’s ICC 
Act.  That legislation provides in article 5(3) that whatever the official capacity of 
persons accused of crimes enumerated in that law, they are not precluded from 
prosecution.  One of the arguments advanced in support of the applicability of article 
5(3) in relation to Mr Arial Sharon, the serving Israeli Head of State, was that article 
5(3) was in conformity with Article 27 of the Rome Statute.  The Court rejected this 
argument, finding that Article 27 of the Rome Statute does not affect or prevent the 
                                                 
237 Para. 58. 
238 See J Dugard and G Abraham “Public International Law” (2002) 140 Annual Survey of South 
African Law 166. 
239 See decision of 26 June 2002, available at 
http://www.sabrashatila.be/documents/arrest020226.pdf.pp.22 (accessed 5 May 2007).  
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application of the customary rules of absolute immunity.240  According to the Court, 
because the customary international law rule of absolute personal immunity for a head 
of state was applicable (and binding), article 5(3) of the Belgian law had to be taken 
to refer to another customary international law rule that prevents persons accused of 
international crimes from invoking their official capacity as a reason for not being 
held criminally responsible.241  
 
Similarly, a South African court, faced with a claim for immunity from a serving head 
of state, and in light of the prevailing international and foreign case law which serve 
to indicate binding customary international law, might be inclined to uphold the 
personal immunity of a head of state notwithstanding the provisions of section 4(2)(a) 
of the ICC Act.  The argument might run that, merely because the national court is 
exercising jurisdiction in terms of the Rome Statute does not change its status as a 
national court, and arguably the customary international law barrier to it prosecuting 
individuals enjoying immunity remains in place.  In addition, and in evident tension 
with section 232 of the Constitution in this respect, is section 233.  It provides that 
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”.  
 
Whatever the outcome of this debate, certain aspects regarding immunity appear to 
be beyond doubt.  First is that even if section 4(2)(a) does not do away with 
personal immunities of incumbent senior officials before a South African court, it 
might nonetheless be read as referring to some other customary international law 
rule that strips an official of immunity when he or she has committed an 
international crime.  That immunity is immunity ratione materiae242 – the 
functional immunity which attaches to any State official for acts performed on 
behalf of the State.  The import of section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act would thus be to 
give effect to the exception to immunity ratione materiae.  Accordingly, while a 
high ranking official like a Head of State might remain clothed with a personal 
immunity whilst in office, such a high ranking official, and all other officials below 
him or her, will find that after leaving office the functional immunity which may 
have attached to their official functions and actions is lifted in respect of 
international crimes and private acts.  Under section 4(2)(a) such an individual may 
be prosecuted for international crimes he has committed and the official capacity 
held while performing the act offers no shield.  Secondly, even if section 4(2)(a) is 
made to yield to customary international law upholding immunity for senior 
officials, that is not to say that the high-ranking individual who attracts personal 
immunity by virtue of being an incumbent head of state or foreign minister, and 
                                                 
240 See A Cassese “The Belgium Court of Cassation v. the International Court of Justice: the Sharon 
and others Case” (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 439, and A Cassese “When May 
Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes?” (2002) 13 European Journal of International 
Law 853, 870 et seq. 
241 Cassese supra note 240 443.  The other customary international rules in question would be those 
relating to immunity ratione material, but which were not applicable in the case at issue.  The 
possibility thus remains that functional immunities might legitimately have been removed article 5(3) 
of the Belgian law, and similarly, under the South African ICC Act – see the discussion immediately 
below.  
242 See Cassese International Criminal Law (2001) 444. 
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who is arrested whilst in South Africa for an international crime, must necessarily 
be set free.  Under the complementarity scheme it will be expected of a State Party 
to the Rome Statute that finds itself unable to exercise jurisdiction (because, for 
instance, such prosecution is in respect of a foreign State’s Head of State) to send 
the accused to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.243  Article 98(1) of 
the Rome Statute entails that States parties to the Statute have a duty of cooperation 
with the court requiring such States to arrest and surrender to the Court persons 
charged with an ICC crime.  And where South Africa chooses to surrender a high 
standing official to the ICC the ICC Act makes clear that whatever immunity might 
have otherwise attached to the official, that immunity does not constitute a bar to 
the surrender of the person to the ICC.244    
 
It appears, however, that such obligation would only be incumbent upon South Africa 
as a State Party where the Head of State charged before its Court is head of 
government of a State that is also a party to the Rome Statute.  That is because both 
States, as parties to the Rome Statute, have accepted that the constitutive instrument 
of the International Criminal Court has scrapped immunities for Heads of State and 
other government officials through article 27.    
 
What is the position where the accused person is the head of a government of a State 
not party to the Statute, as would be the case with President Mugabe,245 for example?  
The answer appears to lie in article 98(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides that: 
 
“The [International Criminal] Court may not proceed with a request for 
surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the 
State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless 
the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of 
the immunity.” 
 
Thus if one accepts that under international law personal immunity attaches to 
incumbent senior cabinet officials such as Heads of State, then not only would any 
prosecution of a current head of state of a country which is not party to the Rome 
Statute by South Africa under its ICC Act be possibly inconsistent with its (South 
                                                 
243 The state’s “inability” to prosecute the head of state because of the shield of personal immunity 
would thus trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction.  See P Gaeta “Official Capacity and Immunities” (2002) in 
Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary vol. 1 994 and 
997-1000.   The ICC, acting within the complementarity scheme with domestic states, can only step 
into the fray when domestic states are either “unwilling” or “unable” to act.  See article 17 read with 
article 1 of the Rome Statute.   
244 Section 10(9) of the ICC Act (read with section 4(2)(a) and (b)) provides that the fact that the 
person to be surrendered “is or was a head of state or government, a member of a government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official; or … being a member of a security 
service or armed force, was under a legal obligation to obey a manifestly unlawful order of a 
government or superior” does not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an order committing that 
person to prison pending his or her surrender to the ICC. 
245 I mention President Mugabe of Zimbabwe since there have been calls in South Africa for his 
prosecution under the ICC Act.  Zimbabwe is not a party to the Rome Statute.  For further detail see M 
du Plessis and A Coutsoudis, “Serious Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe: Of International 
Crimes, Immunities, and the Possibility of Prosecutions” (2005) 21(3) South African Journal on 
Human Rights 337. 
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Africa’s) obligations under customary international law, but the International 
Criminal Court would also be prevented from requesting the surrender of that person, 
which may in fact mean that proceedings against such a person are effectively 
precluded.246  The only exception to this situation would be a waiver of the immunity 




South Africa has shown itself to be an avid supporter of the International Criminal 
Court and the ICC Act formalises that support.  South Africa’s ratification of the 
Rome Statute, followed by the passing of the ICC Act, demonstrates that the country 
is responding to the world public’s demand for a stand on genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.  That response is important.  The International Criminal 
Court is part of a continuum, a process that was catalysed in Nuremburg, and which 
strives for a world where the worst criminals are dealt with as “international” 
offenders.  Africa as a continent is home to many of these criminals, and the 
International Criminal Court’s first docket is testimony to the serious crimes that are 
committed daily in African States.  South Africa’s role as an African leader in its 
support of the ICC is therefore important, and its ICC Act might hopefully serve as a 
useful example for other African States Parties in their efforts to domestically give 







                                                 
246 Since trial in absentia are not allowed by the Rome Statute, in order to prosecute the ICC must rely 
on States for assistance and the surrender of individuals, yet in respect of those individuals enjoying 
personal immunity article 98(1) of the Rome Statute would prevent the ICC from making such 
requests; see Gaeta supra note 243 992. 
247 Gaeta supra note 243 993-994, argues that article 98 should be interpreted to mean that a request for 
the waiver of immunity will only be required if the State (whose national enjoys immunity) is not a 
party to the Rome Statute. 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE COURT BEGINS ITS WORK – AN AFRICAN 




In this chapter an attempt is made to grapple with certain myths that have recently 
been propagated by a number of individuals, including government officials, political 
leaders, and civil society members regarding the world’s first permanent international 
criminal tribunal – the International Criminal Court (the ICC).  These distortions, 
misconceptions and errors relate to or arise from the ICC’s work in Africa.  
 
The ICC has sparked immense interest since it opened its doors in 2002.  As one 
noted commentator puts it: “Whether or not one is supportive of the International 
Criminal Court, any knowledgeable specialist has to admit that in the history of public 
international law it is a truly extraordinary phenomenon”.249  It may just be “the most 
important institutional innovation since the founding of the United Nations”.250 
 
A measure of the Court’s rise is the number of States that have joined the ICC.  Since 
the Court’s statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, it has been signed by 139 States 
and ratified by 108. Of those 108 states parties, 31 – a significant proportion – are 
African.  Africa is also the largest regional grouping on the Assembly of States 
Parties; three judges on the Court are from the African regional grouping, including 
the First Vice President; and the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC is African.   
 
Africa is thus well represented on the ICC.  This siding with an institution designed to 
deal a blow to the perpetrators of international crimes continues a trend begun in the 
early 1990s. For example, Rwanda requested the United Nations Security Council to 
establish the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR), although they differed on various issues, 
notably the death penalty and the location of the tribunal.251 The President of the 
Appeals Chamber for the Rwanda Tribunal, prior to her appointment as a judge of the 
ICC, was Judge Navi Pillay.252  And Sierra Leone appealed to the United Nations to 
                                                 
248 This is an expanded and updated version of a book chapter published in Chile Eboe-Osuji (ed) 
Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay (2010).  
Parts of the chapter also appeared in an occasional paper published by the Institute for Security Studies 
entitled “Confronting the myths: the International Criminal Court and its work in Africa”, paper 173, 
November 2008.   
249 William Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd ed (2007) xi. 
250 Ibid, citing Robert C Johansen, “A Turning Point in International Relations? Establishing a 
Permanent International Criminal Court” (1997) 13 Report No 1, 1 (Joan B Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies, 1997).  
251 SC Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.  For detail see C Scheltema and W van der Wolf (eds) The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda: Facts, Cases, Documents (1999). 
252 Judge Pillay’s impressive work at the ICTR, particularly in the field of sexual violence and the 
groundbreaking decision of the ICTR in Akayesu, have been noted elsewhere.  In relation to the 
importance of female judges at the ICC drawing on the experience of Judge Pillay’s involvement in 
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help deal with impunity in that country. That request gave the world the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.253   
 
Africa is therefore a continent that is no stranger to the emerging international 
criminal justice initiatives that have marked the end of the Cold War.  However, more 
recently there is reason to believe that the initial support among African States for 
international criminal justice more generally and for the ICC in particular has begun 
to wane.  Take the ICTR by way of example. Rwanda’s President Kagame has 
complained that the ICTR is moving too slowly and is grossly inefficient.  Kagame’s 
views of international criminal justice have become even frostier after calls by a 
French judge for President Paul Kagame to be investigated by the ICTR for the killing 
of his predecessor, which is widely regarded as the act that sparked the genocide.254   
The French have been joined by the Spanish when in early 2008 a Spanish magistrate 
said he also had evidence implicating Rwanda's current president Paul Kagame in 
international crimes but cannot charge him because as a sitting president Kagame has 
immunity.255 Both cases are examples of domestic investigators probing the 
commission of international crimes by relying on so-called “universal jurisdiction”.  
The response to them from Kagame not surprisingly has been to severely criticize the 
“arrogant” assertion of universal jurisdiction by European states.  
 
The ICC too has come under attack. Notwithstanding that it was Kagame that called 
on the UN to create the ICTR to prosecute Rwandan genocidaires, his original support 
for international criminal justice has evaporated.  His tone is bristling: he is of the 
view that the ICC has been created to deal only with African countries and that 
“Rwanda cannot be part of that colonialism, slavery and imperialism”.256  And, as we 
shall see, he is not alone in his criticism of international criminal justice, at the centre 
of which is the ICC.  
 
The anti-ICC voices have reached a crescendo in response to the decision in early 
July 2008 by the ICC Prosecutor to request an arrest warrant for President Omar al-
                                                                                                                                            
Akayesu, see Cherie Booth and Max du Plessis “The International Criminal Court and Victims of 
Sexual Violence” (2005) 18(3) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 241. 
253 In January 2002 the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established as a result of an agreement 
between the UN and Sierra Leone to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for crimes against 
humanity and disrupting the peace process. The Court is a hybrid, staffed by local and international 
personnel, and has an international prosecutor.  See Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 
January 2002.   
254 See BBC News 30 January 2007, “Rwanda leader defiant on killing claim”, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6312579.stm (accessed on 11 October 2008).  See also Daniel Wallis, 
“Rwanda Genocide Court Poses Questions on Justice”, Reuters, 7 August 2008, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2008/0807poses.htm (accessed 12 October 
2008). 
255 See  USA Today, “Spanish judge charges Rwanda's military with genocide”, 6 February 2008, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-06-spain-rwanda_N.htm (accessed 12 
October 2008). 
256 See Nicole Fritz “Black-white debate does no justice to a nuanced case”, Business Day, 13 August 
2008.  See also The Nation (Nairobi) “Rwanda: Kagame Tells Why He is Against ICC Charging 
Bashir”, 3 August 2008, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200808120157.html (accessed 12 
October 2008). 
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Bashir of Sudan, on account of his alleged involvement in genocide and crimes 
against humanity, and the confirmation of that request (in respect of at least war 
crimes and crimes against humanity) by the ICC pre-trial chamber on 4 March 2009.  
But the underlying attacks on the ICC, of which Kagame’s forms part, have been 
coming long before July 2008.  They are captured in statements to the effect that the 
ICC is a Western, or imperialistic initiative; that it is some form of colonial 
throwback; or the imposition of a developed world’s form of justice on an 
unsuspecting and servile African people; and that the Court is unhealthily preoccupied 
with the African continent.    
 
Of unfairness, myths, and new (old) world orders 
 
The founding document of the ICC is the Rome Statute, which was adopted after the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of a 
Permanent International Criminal Court in Rome on 17 July 1998.   The Rome 
Conference was specifically aimed at attracting States and Non-Governmental 
Organisations so that they might debate and adopt a statute which would form the 
basis for the world’s first permanent international criminal tribunal. 
 
The various allegations made against the ICC include the following principal 
complaints.  
 
• First, there is the suggestion that the ICC is a creation of western 
powers.257   
 
• Second, and related to the first allegation, is the argument that the ICC is a 
tool designed to target Africans, be they leaders or foot-soldiers.   
 
The argument finds support in the recent statement by the Chairperson of 
the AU Commission – Jean Ping – who reportedly expressed Africa’s 
disappointment with the ICC in noting that rather than pursuing justice 
around the world – including in cases such as Columbia, Sri Lanka and 
Iraq258 – the ICC was focusing only on Africa and was undermining rather 
than assisting African efforts to solve its problems.  The BBC has quoted 
Ping as complaining that it was “unfair” that all those indicted by the ICC 
so far were African.  While purporting to confirm that “[the AU] is not 
against international justice”, he has apparently lamented that “[i]t seems 
that Africa has become a laboratory to test the new international law.”259 
 
                                                 
257 See for example Mohau Pheku, “It seems the West’s war crimes tribunals are reserved for 
Africans”, Sunday Times, 27 July 2008.  See also BBC Monitoring, “Sudanese Leader Calls 
International Court ‘Tool of Imperialist Forces’” [State-owned] Suna News Agency, 20 August 2008. 
258 As we shall see further below, in fact the Prosecutor of the ICC has indicated that his Office is 
conducting analysis of several situations outside Africa – Columbia and Georgia amongst others have 
been or are under analysis. And we shall see too that the Prosecutor has considered prosecution of 
crimes committed in Iraq, but declined to investigate and gave detailed reasons for that decision. 
259 See BBC News, 27 September 2008, “Vow to pursue Sudan over ‘crimes’”, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7639046.stm (accessed 10 October 2008). 
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• Third, and articulated most recently by a renowned African scholar, 
Mahmood Mamdani, is the more sophisticated (but also related) notion 
that the ICC is part of some new “international humanitarian order” in 
which there is (to Mamdani) the worrying emphasis “on big powers as 
enforcers of justice internationally”.260 
 
Part of his thesis is that the ICC is a component of this new order, an order 
which “draws on the history of modern Western colonialism”, and that the 
ICC shares an aim of “mutual accommodation” with the world’s only 
superpower:  a fact which to Mamdani “is clear if we take into account the 
four countries where the ICC has launched its investigations: Sudan, 
Uganda, Central African Republic and Congo”, given that all of these “are 
places where the United States has no major objection to the course 
chartered by ICC investigations”.261 Mamdani concludes this line of 
reasoning by stating: “Its name notwithstanding, the ICC is rapidly turning 
into a Western court to try African crimes against humanity.  It has 
targeted governments that are US adversaries and ignored actions the 
United States doesn’t oppose, like those of Uganda and Rwanda in eastern 
Congo, effectively conferring impunity on them”.   
 
To similar effect but in more strident language are the claims by Rwanda’s 
Kagame portraying the ICC as a new form of “imperialism” that seeks to 
“undermine people from poor and African countries, and other powerless 
countries in terms of economic development and politics”.262 
 
The danger with each of these arguments is that they will find traction – not 
surprisingly – with dictators and their henchmen who seek reasons to delay or resist 
being held responsible under universally applicable standards of justice.  But 
compounding matters is the fact that each of the arguments is not substantiated by the 
true facts, or, perhaps worse (even if unwittingly so), is a distortion of the true facts.  
The danger of these distortions is obvious.  As one commentator has put it: the risk is 
that “the rhetoric of condemnation – that the ICC is an agent of neocolonialism or 
neo-imperialism, that is it anti-African – may so damage the institution that … it is 
simply abandoned”.263   
 
The ICC is a tool for justice in a continent where impunity (the polar opposite of 
justice) has been emblematic.  The importance of international criminal law for the 
                                                 
260 Mamdani’s thesis is set out in a recent article appearing in The Nation (29 September 2008) under 
the title “The New Humanitarian Order” available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080929/mamdani (accessed 8 October 2008).  References hereinafter 
are to the article as it appears on the Web and without page citations.  
261 Ibid.  
262 See AFP “Rwanda’s Kagame says ICC Targeting Poor, African Countries ” 31 July 2008; Rwanda 
Radio via BBC Monitoring “Rwandan President Dismisses ICC as Court Meant to ‘Undermine’ 
Africa” 1 August 2008.  See also Oraib Al Rantawi “A Step Forward or Backward?” Bitter Lemons 
32(6), 14 August 2008. 
263 See Nicole Fritz “Black-white debate does no justice to a nuanced case” Business Day, 13 August 
2008. 
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African continent is starkly highlighted by a(n African) senior legal adviser of the 
ICC’s Registry:264 
 
“No other continent has paid more dearly than Africa for the absence of 
legitimate institutions of law and accountability, resulting in a culture of 
impunity. Events in Rwanda were a grim reminder that such atrocities could 
be repeated anytime. This served to strengthen Africa’s determination and 
commitment to the creation of a permanent, impartial, effective and 
independent judicial mechanism to try and punish the perpetrators of these 
types of crimes whenever they occur.”  
 
The International Criminal Court is a call to responsibility for persons guilty of “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”.265  In this 
respect it takes seriously the words of Justice Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at 
Nuremberg, who famously said that letting major war criminals live undisturbed to 
write their memoirs in peace “would mock the dead and make cynics of the living”.266  
The function of a trial in the ICC is thus first and foremost a proclamation that certain 
conduct is unacceptable to the world community.  That may sound like an obvious 
statement, particularly to a domestic law prosecutor, but it is not one which 
international law has always embraced.  While war crimes are committed every day 
and whole races have been defined by their experience of genocide or crimes against 
humanity, international laws designed to punish these acts have, for a variety of 
political reasons, only been put into practice at Nuremberg and Tokyo after WWII, 
and in the 1990s by the creation of The Hague Tribunals.  This very limited 
outpouring of indignation has for too long sent out an insidious message at the 
international level that to a large degree war crimes and crimes against humanity are 
followed by impunity.  For anyone committed to the notion of human rights, the 
message must change. As Kofi Annan reminded when observing the International 
Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda: 
 
“We have little hope of preventing genocide, or reassuring those who live in 
fear of its occurrence, if people who have committed this most heinous of 
crimes are left at large, and not held to account.  It is therefore vital that we 
build and maintain robust judicial systems, both national and international – so 
that, over time, people will see there is no impunity for such crimes”.267 
 
The ICC and national criminal law systems working to complement it are the means 
by which we can cure this defect in the international legal system.  The act of 
punishing particular individuals – whether the leaders, or star generals, or foot-
soldiers – becomes an instrument through which individual accountability for massive 
human rights violations is increasingly internalised as part of the fabric of our 
international society.  At the same time, it is a method by which we put a stop to the 
                                                 
264 See Phakiso Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court” in E Ankumah and E 
Kwakwa (eds) African Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (2005) 249.  
265 See the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
266 Robert H. Jackson, The Nurnberg Case, as Presented by Robert H. Jackson, (1947), at 8. 
267 “Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on 1994 Rwanda Genocide”, 07 April 
2004, UN Press Document, available at http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/sg04003e.htm 
(accessed 10 October 2008). 
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culture of impunity that has taken hold at the international level, and by which we 
provide a public demonstration of justice.  The ICC, building on the work done by 
The Hague Tribunals, is the means by which such a public account of justice is now 
possible in respect of every crime set out in the Rome Statute.  In that regard, it is of 
singular importance to note – as the recent furore over the ICC’s call for President al-
Bashir’s arrest highlights – that no one, not even a serving head of state, will be able 
to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
It is of obvious concern then that the ICC has come under such vitriolic attack from 
within Africa and by scholars associated with Africa.  What this article proceeds to do 
is to consider the criticisms in turn.  How valid are the attacks on the ICC?  And what 
lessons (if any) might be drawn from the fact that these attacks have been made?   
 
An ICC by and for Africans – if one takes the time to look closely 
 
The suggestion that the ICC is the creation of Western powers couldn’t be further 
from the truth.  It is only by ignoring the history of the Court’s creation and the 
serious and engaged involvement of African states in that history that one can assert 
that the ICC is a western court.  The assertion is in any event belied by the Court’s 
composition. While the Court is situated in The Hague, in the Netherlands, its staff is 
drawn from around the world and in accordance with UN rules on regional 
representation, includes a number of Africans. For example, of the eighteen Judges 
first appointed to sit on the ICC, four are from Africa,268 and the Deputy President of 
the Court is an African, Akua Kuenyehia. The Prosecutor is Luis Moreno Ocampo (an 
Argentine) and his deputy is Fatou Bensouda, a highly respected Gambian who was 
formerly Attorney General and then Minister of Justice in her home state. In addition, 
Medard Rwelamira, a citizen of South Africa and Tanzanian by birth was the first 
Director of the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties, before his untimely 
passing in 2006.269 
 
The ICC is not a tool designed for use specifically in the least developed and 
developing countries in Africa and Asia.  This view is demeaning to Africans more 
generally, but more specifically does no justice to the high ideals and hard work that 
marked African states’ participation in bringing the ICC to life in Rome.  Thus,  
 
“[c]ontrary to the view that the ICC was shoved down the throats of unwilling 
Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome and who had no 
alternative but to follow their Western Masters under threat of withholding of 
economic aid if they did not follow”, a closer inspection of “the historical 
developments leading up to the establishment of the court portray an 
international will of which Africa was a part, to enforce humanitarian norms 
                                                 
268 Navi Pillay (South Africa) (who in 2008 resigned to take up the position of UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights), Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana), Fatoumata Dembele Diarra (Mali) and Daniel Ntanda 
Nsereko (Uganda). 
269 For further information about the work of Dr Rwelamira at the Court see the ICC Press Release 
dated 5 April 2006 http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/139.html (accessed 20 October 2008). 
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and to bring to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community”.270 
 
African states contributed extensively to the preparations leading up to, during and 
after the diplomatic conference in Rome at which the Rome Statute of the ICC was 
finalised.  
 
In the period leading up to the Rome diplomatic conference, various ICC-related 
activities were organised throughout Africa. This approach (replicated in other 
regional blocs) was consistent with the idea of enhancing universal support, and was 
also seen as fostering a better understanding of the substantive issues raised in the 
draft text of the statute.271 Some 90 African organisations based in, among others, 
Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia joined the NGO 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court. They lobbied in their respective 
countries for the early establishment of an independent and effective international 
criminal court.272 
 
Also forgotten by those who would label the Court “western”, is the active and 
important role played by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
its support for the ICC.  In ICC-related negotiations after the International Law 
Commission presented a draft statute for an international criminal court to the General 
Assembly in 1993, experts from the group met in Pretoria, South Africa in September 
1997 to discuss their negotiation strategies and to agree on a common position in 
order to make a meaningful impact on the outcome of negotiations. This meeting 
provided impetus for a continent-wide consultation process on the creation of the 
court.273  The participants agreed on a set of principles that were later sent to their 
respective ministers of justice and attorneys-general for endorsement. These 
principles – which no doubt today would draw winsome criticism from African critics 
of the court – included the far-reaching suggestions that: (1) the court should have 
automatic jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; (2) the 
court should have an independent prosecutor with power to initiate proceedings 
proprio motu; (3) there should be full cooperation of all states with the court at all 
stages of the proceedings; and (4) that stable and adequate financial resources should 
be provided for the court and that states should be prohibited from making 
reservations to the statute. 
 
On the basis of the principles submitted to them, SADC ministers of justice and 
attorneys-general issued a common statement that became a primary basis for the 
SADC’s negotiations at Rome.274 These principles also appeared in the Dakar 
                                                 
270 See Mochochoko supra note 264 243.  See also Hassan Jallow and Fatou Bensouda “International 
Criminal Law in an African Context”, in Max du Plessis (ed) African Guide to International Criminal 
Justice (2008).  I have drawn extensively on the chapter by Jallow and Bensouda in describing the 
Africa-heavy involvement in the lead up to the Rome Statute and during the Rome Conference itself. 
271 Mochochoko supra note 264 246. 
272 Mochochoko supra note 264 248. 
273 Mochochoko supra note 264 248. 
274 See generally Sivu Maqungo, “The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s 
participation in the negotiations” (2009) 9(1) African Security Review available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/9No1/InCriminalCourt.html (accessed 20 October 2008). 
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declaration on the ICC and other declarations.275 At a meeting on 27 February 1998, 
the council of ministers of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African 
Union) took note of the Dakar declaration and called on all OAU member states to 
support the creation of the ICC. This resolution was later adopted by the OAU summit 
of heads of state and government in Burkina Faso in June 1998. 
 
During the Rome conference itself, several circumstances resulted in African states 
having a significant impact on the negotiations; for example, African delegates 
participating in the Rome conference had two guiding documents: the SADC 
principles and the Dakar declarations. Both the SADC principles and the Dakar 
declaration were in line with the principles of the “like-minded group”, the members 
of which were committed to a court independent from Security Council control, 
staffed by an independent prosecutor, and with inherent jurisdiction over the core 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.276 
 
Most of the work of the conference was carried out in working groups and informal 
working sessions. It is notable that Africans took the lead in either chairing or 
coordinating various issues. For instance: 
 
• The Lesotho delegate was elected one of the vice-chairpersons of the conference 
and also coordinated the formulation of part 9 of the Rome Statute 
South Africa was a member of the drafting committee of the conference and 
coordinated the formulation of part 4 of the Rome Statute. As a consequence, 
South Africa was frequently invited to participate in the meetings of the bureau of 
the conference.277  
 
As Schabas notes, at the Rome Conference “[a] relatively new force, the Southern 
African Development Community …, under the dynamic influence of post-apartheid 
South Africa, took important positions on human rights, providing a valuable counter-
weight to the Europeans in this field”.278 
 
It is thus beyond doubt that African states had the opportunity to ensure that the 
principles enshrined in the SADC and Dakar declarations were implemented to the 
extent possible. Regular African group meetings also contributed towards a 
coordinated effort.  The true picture that emerges then is a Court created with 
extensive and deep involvement of African nations – a Court in reality created by 
Africans, in concert with other nations of the world who came together at Rome. 
 
It is also a Court which proudly counts amongst its members such a significant coterie 
of African nations that Africa today is the largest regional bloc represented at the ICC. 
After the statute was completed, in February 1999 Senegal become the first state party 
to ratify the Rome Statute. Steadily following suit were a host of African states parties 
so that today the Court enjoys – at least on paper – significant support in the region. 
To date, the Rome Statute has been signed by 139 states and 106 states have ratified 
                                                 
275 Mochochoko supra note 264 at 248–249. 
276 Mochochoko supra note 264 at 250. 
277 See Maqungo supra note 274. 
278 Schabas supra note 249 19. 
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it.279 Of those 106 states a very significant proportion — 30 — are African.280 Of the 
53 African Union nations, Africa boasts as states parties to the Rome Statute Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comores, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.  
 
Aside from the fact of continent-wide ratification of the Rome Statute, African 
commitment to the ICC, and to the cause of international justice, has been 
demonstrated by for instance the strategic partnership agreement signed at the EU-
Africa summit in Lisbon in December 2007 which proclaims a joint commitment that 
“crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide should not go unpunished and 
their prosecution should be ensured”.281 This commitment reflects an understanding 
that responsibility for the prosecution of core international crimes in Africa (and for 
raising awareness of these issues) are broader than the ICC alone.  It is a commitment 
which was earlier reflected by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in its 2005 Resolution on ending impunity in Africa and on the domestication 
and implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in which the Commission called 
on civil society organisations in Africa to work collaboratively to develop 
partnerships to further respect for the rule of law internationally and strengthen the 
Rome Statute.  
 
In short, suggestions that the Court is a western creation, or anti-African, must 
overcome the overwhelming evidence of African involvement in the Court.  The 
African support for the Court described above thus leads to an important conclusion.  
That conclusion is that the Court, and the Rome Statute which underpins its substance 
and processes, was regarded by Africa’s states parties as being an institution which is 
for Africa.  That is, the Court has been regarded by the majority of Africa’s leaders as 
supportive of African ideals and values, including the goal of ridding the continent of 
its deserved reputation as a collage of despots, crackpots and hotspots where impunity 
for too long has followed serious human rights violations. 
 
The ICC in Africa: invited yet not welcome? 
 
The ICC is currently considering four situations.  Three of those arise from so-called 
“State referrals” from Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Central African 
Republic, all states parties to the Rome Statute. 282  The fourth has come to the Court 
                                                 
279 For latest ratification status, see www.iccnow.org. 
280 For status of African ratification, see 
www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/RATIFICATIONSbyUNGroups.pdf. 
281 See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/04/africa17466.htm. 
282 The practice of self-referrals is in some respects a practice encouraged by the OTP.  The Prosecutor 
has explained that self-referrals are encouraged as part of a “policy of inviting and welcoming 
voluntary referrals by territorial states as a first step in triggering the jurisdiction of the Court” (see 
OTP, “Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years (June 2003 – June 2006)”, 12 
September 2006, 7.  While the practice has been welcomed by some (see for instance Claus Kress, 
“‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’: Some Considerations in Law and Policy” (2004) 
2 JICJ, 945), it has also been criticised as allowing states to abdicate their responsibility to prosecute 
international crimes to the ICC (see for example Schabas supra note 249 150; and Paula Gaeta, “Is the 
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by a Security Council referral requesting the ICC to consider the serious crimes that 
have been committed in Sudan, which has not ratified the Rome Statute.  In addition 
to these, the Court is also considering violations in Cote d’ Ivoire, which has also not 
ratified the Rome Statute but which has made a declaration in accordance with Article 
12(3), which allows a non-party State to lodge a declaration with the Registrar of the 
Court accepting the Court’s jurisdiction for specific crimes.   
 
While geography tells us that these are all African situations, that fact alone cannot 
prove that the ICC has a discriminatory practice of choosing African violations over 
those from other parts of the world.  Here is why. 
 
The Court’s screening process 
 
The OTP’s current cases are but a small minority of matters that the Court has been 
asked to investigate. However, before glib conclusions can be drawn about the 
African focus of the Court’s docket of cases, it is necessary to consider the process by 
which cases are screened.  
 
As a starting point it might be noted that the OTP has adopted an impressively open 
and transparent approach to its work.283  The OTP has explained in public documents 
its strategies and policies and – within the necessary constraints of confidentiality – 
attempted to justify the exercise of its discretion.  For example, Article 15(6) of the 
Rome Statute requires the Prosecutor to inform those who have provided information 
concerning a possible prosecution when he concludes that there is no reasonable basis 
to proceed further.  The Prosecutor has interpreted the provision generously and – as 
we shall see below – has issued public and detailed statements explaining his decision 
not to investigate crimes committed in Iraq and Venezuela, and has issued more 
general comments explaining why situations fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
    
The Office of the Prosecutor receives numerous submissions from various sources 
alleging the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. A summary of 
the submissions received by the OTP is publicly available.284  After attracting the 
necessary ratifications the Statute entered force on 1 July 2002.  And in just over a 
year of its existence, by November 2003, the Court, through the Prosecutor, had 
received over 650 communications.  It is important to consider these complaints.  
They come to the Court from a variety of sources, including States Parties and non-
                                                                                                                                            
Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?” (2004) 2, JICJ 952).  This debate, and the (to 
this author) valid concerns about self-referrals as an excuse for states to push to The Hague cases they 
should be prosecuting domestically, is beyond the scope of this article. The political and historical fact 
remains that each of the three self-referral cases discussed below involved a choice on the part of 
African states to cooperate with the ICC. 
283 See further Schabas supra note 249 356. 
284 For example, see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_2006.pdf (accessed 14 
October 20008). 
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party States, and NGOs and individuals.285 As will be seen they reveal a disturbing 
lack of understanding about the Court and the Court’s functioning.   
 
Fifty of the complaints contained allegations of acts committed before 1 July 2002.  
This is problematic because the ICC’s jurisdiction is forward looking, and it does not 
have retrospective jurisdiction over acts committed prior to 1 July 2002.  A number of 
communications alleged acts which fall outside the subject matter of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, and complained about environmental damage, drug trafficking, judicial 
corruption, tax evasion and less serious human rights violations that do not fall within 
the Court’s remit.   
 
Thirty-eight complaints alleged that an act of aggression had taken place in the 
context of the war in Iraq in 2003.  The problem here is that the United States of 
America is not a party to the Statute, and in any event, the ICC cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over alleged crimes of aggression until the crime is properly defined – 
something which the drafters of the Statute expressly left until a future date, most 
probably some time after 2009.  Two communications referred to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  The difficulty here is that Israel is not a party to the statute, and 
the Palestinian authority is not yet a state and so cannot be a party.  By early 2006 the 
Prosecutor’s office recorded that it had received 1732 communications from over 103 
countries, and that 80% of those communications were found to be “manifestly 
outside [the Court’s] jurisdiction after initial review”.286 
 
In short, the overwhelming number of communications directed at the OTP is simply 
not actionable. That fact alone places in better perspective the actual – and 
significantly smaller – number of communications which have lawfully been open for 
consideration by the OTP for possible investigation.  The Court has thus dealt quickly 
and effectively, but also transparently, with manifestly unfounded communications, 
which is evidence of the robustness of its screening methods.   
 
The approach adopted by the OTP in screening these submissions will be discussed in 
detail below, and results ultimately in a decision as to whether there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation.   The policy of the Office is to maintain the 
confidentiality of the analysis process, in accordance with the duty to protect the 
confidentiality of senders, the confidentiality of information submitted and the 
integrity of analysis or investigation.287  
 
In the great majority of cases, where a decision is taken not to initiate an investigation 
on the basis of communications received, the Office submits reasons for its decision 
                                                 
285 Aside from obvious sources such as States Parties (in the case of State Party referrals) or the 
Security Council (in the case of Security Council referrals) the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to 
take action proprio motu on the basis of information he has gathered from “States, United Nations 
organs, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations … and other reliable sources that he or 
she deems appropriate” (Rome Statute, Article 15(2)).  
286 See Updated on Communications received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, dated 10 
February 2006 (see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_2006.pdf).  
287 See inter alia Rules 46 and Rule 49(1) of the International Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. 
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only to senders of communications. This policy is consistent with Rule 49(1) of the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and is necessary to prevent any danger to 
the safety, well-being and privacy of senders and helps to protect the integrity of the 
analysis process. However, in the interest of transparency, the Office may make 
publicly available its reasons for decision where three conditions are met: (1) a 
situation has warranted intensive analysis, (2) the situation has generated public 
interest and the fact of the analysis is in the public domain and (3) reasons can be 
provided without risk to the safety, well-being and privacy of senders. Accordingly, in 
the interests of transparency, the Office made available its decisions in relation to Iraq 
and Venezuela, both of which are available on the Court’s website.288  Five 
unspecified situations were reported to be subject to ongoing examination, although 
their identity was not publicly disclosed.289  Among them are the Central African 
Republic, which has since been referred to the Court, and Cote d’Ivoire, which has 
made a declaration under Article 12(3).  As Schabas points out, that “leaves three 
remaining situations about which we can only speculate.  Columbia and Afghanistan 
would be good candidates for the list”.290 
 
The responses to information received regarding the alleged commission of crimes in 
Venezuela and Iraq illustrate how this process functions in practice.291  These 
examples are useful given the complaint that the ICC is unfairly skewing its attention 
in favour of African states. Even if one disagrees (legally or otherwise) with the 
OTP’s approach for refusing to act on requests for investigation, a reading of those 
reasons reveals that there is little basis for suggesting that the ICC is a Court which 




Most of the information submitted to the OTP related to crimes alleged to have been 
committed by the Venezuelan government and associated forces. One complaint 
related to crimes alleged to have been committed by groups opposed to the 
government.  In his response, the Prosecutor emphasised his duty to analyse the 
information received on potential crimes in order to determine whether there was a 
reasonable basis on which to proceed with an investigation.292 He also stated that the 
analysis of the situation in Venezuela was conducted under article 15 of the statute 
since no state referral had been received. 
 
The OTP reviewed the information provided, together with additional material 
obtained from open sources, media reports and reports of international and non-
governmental organisations. The Office noted that, as Venezuela had ratified the 
                                                 
288 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html (accessed 20 October 2008).  See also Lynn 
Gentile, “Understanding the International Criminal Court”, in Max du Plessis (ed), African Guide to 
International Criminal Justice (2008), Institute for Security Studies. 
289 See OTP, “Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years (June 2003 – June 
2006)”, 12 September 2006, 9. 
290 Schabas supra note 249 163. 
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292 See Rome Statute article 53(1)(a). 
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Rome Statute in July 2000, the Court had jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated on the 
territory or by nationals of Venezuela after 1 July 2002, when the statute entered into 
force.  Because a significant number of the allegations referred to incidents alleged to 
have occurred prior to 1 July 2002, the OTP focused only on those that fell within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court.  In the view of the OTP, the available information 
did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the crimes against humanity 
allegedly perpetrated against opponents of the Venezuelan government were 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population, as required under article 7(1) of the statute.  The allegations relating to 
crimes against humanity committed by groups opposed to the government were 
found, with the exception of a few incidents, to be very generalised; they could not, 
furthermore, be substantiated by open-source information. Again, the Prosecutor 
found that the information available did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that 
the crimes in question would have been committed as part of a widespread and 
systematic attack against any civilian population. 
 
There were no specific allegations of war crimes having been committed.  In any 
event, based on the available information concerning events in Venezuela since 1 July 
2002, the situation was found not to meet the threshold of an armed conflict. There 
was therefore no reasonable basis to believe that war crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court have been committed. 
 
Finally, there were no allegations concerning genocide, and the available information 
was found not to provide a reasonable basis to believe that the crime of genocide had 
been committed. The Prosecutor concluded that the statutory requirements to seek 
authorisation to initiate an investigation into the situation in Venezuela had not been 
satisfied. As stated in the response, the OTP’s conclusion could be reconsidered in the 
light of new facts or evidence, and it remained open to the information providers to 




The allegations regarding crimes committed in Iraq related to the launching of 
military operations and the resulting fatalities by US and allied forces. The 
Prosecutor’s response to the allegations outlined the process of receiving and 
analysing information employed by the OTP. The response noted that the events in 
question occurred on the territory of Iraq, which was not a State Party and which had 
not lodged a declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction under article 12(3). In addition, 
crimes committed on the territory of a non-State Party only fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Court when the perpetrators were state party nationals. 
 
A number of submissions concerned the legality of the war in Iraq in relation to which 
the Prosecutor advised that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, and that under the Rome Statute the Court has a mandate to examine 
conduct during the conflict and not the legality of the decision to engage in armed 
conflict. 
 
Few factual allegations were submitted concerning genocide and crimes against 
humanity. The OTP was of the view that the available information provided no 
reasonable indications that coalition forces had “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
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a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such”, as required in the definition of 
genocide.293 Similarly, the available information provided no reasonable indications 
of the required elements for a crime against humanity, namely, a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population.294 
 
The OTP examined allegations relating to the targeting of civilians and to excessive 
attacks (namely, where the civilian damage or injury was excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage), and found no reasonable basis to conclude that either 
crime had been committed. 
 
With respect to allegations concerning the wilful killing or inhuman treatment of 
civilians by State Party nationals, the Prosecutor concluded that there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been 
committed. The information available indicated that there were an estimated four to 
twelve victims of wilful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman 
treatment, totalling, less than twenty persons. The Prosecutor’s decision on these 
crimes was that they did not meet the criteria set out in article 8(1) or the general 
threshold of gravity.295  The OTP expressly compared the particular crimes in Iraq 
with the scale of the killings in the DRC, Uganda and Darfur situations, a comparison 
used to highlight that the ICC is a Court which gives priority to the most serious 
crimes committed – whether in Africa or elsewhere.  In the Prosecutor’s words: 
 
“The number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
in this situation – 4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited number of 
victims of inhuman treatment – was of a different order than the number of 
victims found in other situations under investigation or analysis by the Office. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the OTP is currently investigating three 
situations involving long-running conflicts in Northern Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur. Each of the three situations under 
investigation involves thousands of wilful killings as well as intentional and 
large-scale sexual violence and abductions. Collectively, they have resulted in 
the displacement of more than 5 million people. Other situations under 
analysis also feature hundreds or thousands of such crimes.”296 
 
Assessing the gravity of the situation and judicial oversight 
 
We have already seen how the state referral mechanism has caused the ICC, through 
African invitation, to exercise jurisdiction over the situations in Uganda, the DRC and 
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295 Since, as required under article 8(1), the Court has jurisdiction over war crimes, “in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”. In 
addition, although the Prosecutor found that it was unnecessary, in light of this conclusion, to reach a 
conclusion on complementarity, the response notes that the Office of the Prosecutor also collected 
information on national proceedings, including commentaries from various sources, and that national 
proceedings had been initiated with respect to each of the relevant incidents.  
296 See Prosecutor’s decision on Iraq, page 9, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html (accessed 22 October 2008). 
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CAR (all States Parties) and in future Cote d’Ivoire (to date not a State Party).297 
Crucially, the Prosecutor also has the power to open an investigation on his or her 
own initiative on the basis of information indicating the commission of crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction.  Contrary to the expectations of those critics who fear a court 
with unprincipled “universal” aspirations,298 the Prosecutor has to date never 
exercised this power to initiate an investigation.   
 
But whether it is a state party referral (or a future proprio motu investigation by the 
Prosecutor), even where all the jurisdictional requirements have been met, the case in 
question must meet an additional threshold of gravity before the Prosecutor can 
intervene. This criterion is most clearly expressed in article 17(1)(d) of the Rome 
Statute.299  As the Iraq and Venezuala requests indicate, in determining whether a case 
is grave enough to justify further action by the Court, the OTP will take into account a 
range of factors, including the nature of the crimes, the scale and manner of their 
commission, as well as their impact.300 
 
A proper appreciation of the gravity criterion in the Rome Statute requires one to 
acknowledge the inherent differences between domestic and international 
prosecutions, and to simultaneously appreciate the immense challenges facing the 
Prosecutor. Louis Arbour, who was then the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, noted in a statement to the December 1997 
session of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court that there is a major difference between international and domestic 
prosecution. In a domestic context, there is an assumption that all crimes that go 
beyond the trivial or de minimis range are to be prosecuted.  But, before an 
international tribunal  
 
“the discretion to prosecute is considerably larger, and the criteria upon which 
such Prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised are ill-defined, and complex.  In 
my experience, based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the 
real challenge posed to a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious 
complaints the appropriate ones for international intervention, rather than to 
weed out weak or frivolous ones”.301 
 
Philippe Kirsch QC and Darryl Robinson provide further elaboration.  They point out:  
 
                                                 
297 Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute. 
298 On the myth that the Court has inclinations towards exercising a (politically or discriminatory) 
motivated form of universal jurisdiction, see further below. 
299 According to this provision, the Court is bound to find a case inadmissible where it is “not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court”.  In addition, Articles 53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b) of 
the Rome Statute refer to the admissibility test set out in Article 17, indicating that in his or her 
determination as to whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation or a sufficient basis 
for a prosecution, the Prosecutor must have regard to the Article 17 criterion of gravity, among others.   
300 The prosecutorial strategy of the OTP has been published and is available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/otp/otp_events.html. 
301 “Statement by Justice Louis Arbour to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, December 8, 1998”, pp 7-8 (emphasis added), quoted in Schabas supra 
note 249 159-160. 
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“Since the issue of trigger mechanisms relates to the special problems of 
activating an international criminal justice mechanism, it is hardly surprising 
that there could be no relevant legal precedents in national procedural laws. … 
The ICC, however, presented a novel problem as it represented the first 
permanent international criminal law institution empowered to deal with future 
and unknown situations.  Thus, it was necessary to determine the procedural 
mechanisms to “trigger” ICC proceedings over future situations that may 
arise”.302 
 
One of the ways in which the drafters of the Rome Statute purported to assist the ICC 
Prosecutor to choose from many complaints the appropriate ones for international 
intervention by the ICC was by means of the gravity criterion.  That the Prosecutor 
requires this trigger mechanism is made clear by the breadth and depth of complaints 
that the OTP has received.  In its first three years of operation alone, the OTP 
received nearly 2000 communications from individuals or groups in more than 100 
countries.  One can thus appreciate the manifest difference between the OTP’s 
decisions on investigation and prosecution from those that a domestic prosecutor 
might have to make, the place for the gravity criterion within the Rome Statute, and 
the concomitant constraints placed on the Prosecutor.   
 
The Prosecutor has said that, in determining whether to exercise his powers, he is 
required to consider three factors, all of them rooted in the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.  First, he must determine whether the available information provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
or is being committed.303  Secondly, he must assess whether the case would be 
admissible in accordance with Article 17 of the statute: this necessitates examining 
the familiar standard of whether the national courts are unwilling or unable genuinely 
to proceed.  But it also involves assessing what Bill Schabas has described as “the 
rather enigmatic notion of ‘gravity’”.304  If these conditions are met, then the third 
requirement must be considered: whether it is in the “interests of justice” for the 
matter to be investigated.305  As the Prosecutor himself has explained: 
 
“While, in a general sense, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is 
‘grave’, the Statute requires an additional threshold of gravity even where the 
subject-matter jurisdiction is satisfied.  This assessment is necessary as the 
Court is faced with multiple situations involving hundreds of thousands of 
crimes and must select situations in accordance with the Article 53 criteria”.306 
                                                 
302 In Cassese et al supra note 163 620-621. 
303 See Schabas supra note 249 163, and Rome Statute Article 53(1)(a). 
304 See Schabas supra note 249 164. 
305 See Rome Statute Article 53(1)(c). Naturally these twin criteria of “gravity” and “interests of 
justice” will interact, and together they “provide enormous space for highly discretionary 
determinations” by the ICC Prosecutor (see Schabas supra note 249 164).  But that is as an unavoidable 
consequence of creating a permanent international criminal court, and this “space” is imperative in 
relation to the ICC Prosecutor’s difficult task described by Arbour, of choosing “from many 
meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for international intervention”.   Whatever the largesse of 
the Prosecutor’s discretion in theory, in practice it is a discretion which must be justified by reference 
to the Rome Statute’s conditions and which is subject to review by the Judges of the Court (in relation 
to review by Judges of the Court, see immediately below). 
306 “Letter of Prosecutor dated 9 February 2006” (Iraq) 8, emphasis added. 
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Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s decisions are subject to oversight by Judges of the 
Court.307 That is to say that much of the Prosecutor’s so-called independence is in fact 
significantly constrained.   While the Prosecutor is not required to obtain authorisation 
to initiate an investigation when a State Party or the Security Council refer a situation 
to the Court, he is still required at a preliminary stage to decide whether there is a 
“reasonable basis” to proceed”.308  There is increased oversight over decisions to 
decline an investigation. For instance, where the Prosecutor declines to investigate a 
case he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber (and the relevant State in cases of 
State referrals and the Security Council in cases of a Security Council referral) of his 
or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.309  In response, the State 
concerned or the Security Council may demand that the Pre-Trial Chamber review a 
decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to 
reconsider that decision.310  So too, where the Prosecutor, taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, nonetheless declines to initiate an 
investigation because he or she has substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice,311 the Prosecutor must inform the Pre-trial 
Chamber of the Court accordingly. The Pre-trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, 
review this decision, in which event it becomes final only when confirmed by the 
Chamber.312 
 
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction: not lightly, and on behalf of African states 
 
While it is a geographic fact that the Court’s first cases involve situations on the 
African continent, it is simplistic to argue that the ICC is therefore “unfairly” 
targeting Africa.  As the short synopsis of each situation has already indicated, each 
of these cases is before the ICC because the state in question self-referred the 
situation to the Court in terms of the Rome Statute. Reportedly, the Prosecutor has 
received self-referrals only from African countries.313 Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s 
decision to investigate each of these situations has been taken within the constraints 
laid down by the Rome Statute, including such factors as the gravity criterion and 
whether a reasonable basis exists for the prosecution of the perpetrators. 
 
The Rome Statute strictly defines the jurisdiction of the Court.  The subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court is limited to investigations of the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community, and the temporal jurisdiction of the Court is 
                                                 
307 A powerful example of this is the decision of the Pre-trial Chamber in relation to the Lubanga 
matter.   
308 See Schabas supra 2007, 239. 
309 See Article 53(2) of the Rome Statute. 
310 See Article 53(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. 
311 See Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. 
312 Article 53(3)(b) of the Rome Statute. 
313 See Stephanie Hanson, Global Policy Forum, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, July 24, 2008, cited in Alexis Arieff et al “International Criminal Court 
Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues”, Congressional Research Service Report, September 12, 
2008, 3. 
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limited to crimes occurring after the entry into force of the Statute, namely 1 July 
2002.314  For those States that become party to the Statute after 1 July 2001, the ICC 
has jurisdiction only over crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute 
with respect to that State.315 In addition to these subject-matter and temporal 
restrictions, the Rome Statute further restricts the jurisdiction of the Court to the most 
clearly established bases of jurisdiction known in criminal law: the territorial principle 
and the active national principle. Absent a referral from the Security Council, the 
Court may act only where its jurisdiction has been accepted by the state on whose 
territory the crime occurred, or the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrators.  
 
All states that become parties to the Rome Statute thereby accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to these crimes. That is a consequence of ratification.  In order 
to become a party to a multilateral treaty, a State must demonstrate, through a 
concrete act, its willingness to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in 
the treaty.  In other words, it must express its consent to be bound by the treaty.  A 
State may express its consent to be bound in several ways, in accordance with the 
final clauses of the relevant treaty. One of the most common ways is ratification. 
 
A State that has ratified the Rome Statute may refer a situation to the Prosecutor 
where any of these crimes appears to have been committed if the alleged perpetrator 
is a national of a State Party or if the crime in question was committed on the territory 
of a State Party or a state that has made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Thus, Article 12 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction if: a) the state where the alleged crime was committed is a party to the 
Statute (territoriality); or, b) the state of which the accused is a national is a party to 
the Statute (nationality).  
 
The Uganda, DRC and Central African Republic referrals demonstrate how in terms 
of Article 14 of the Statute any State Party may refer to the Court a ‘situation’ in 
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been 
committed, so long as the preconditions to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction have 
been met, namely, that the alleged perpetrators of the crimes are nationals of a State 
Party or the crimes are committed on the territory of a State Party.316 As an 
illustration, it is just as well to recall the announcement by the Court after it received 
the first of its three African requests for investigation, from the DRC: 
                                                 
314 Article 11. 
315 Article 11(2). 
316 See Press Release of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, No.: pids.008.2003-EN, 15 
July 2003, available at http://www.icc.int. See also P Kirsch (QC) & D Robinson “Trigger 
mechanisms” 623-625 in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary 1 (2002). Not relevant here, but discussed further below, is the ICC Prosecutor’s 
power under the Rome Statute in Article 15 to initiate independent investigations on the basis of 
information received from any reliable source. The granting to the Prosecutor of a proprio motu power 
to initiate investigations was one of the most debated issues during the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute. In the end, the drafters of the Statute determined that in order for the Prosecutor to exercise this 
power, the alleged crimes must have been committed by nationals of a State Party or have taken place 
in the territory of a State Party – the preconditions set out in terms of Article 12 (See Press Release of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, No.: pids.008.2003-EN, 15 July 2003, available at 
http://www.icc.int (accessed 23 October 2008). See also P Kirsch (QC) & D Robinson supra note 316 
661–663).  At the time that this chapter was published, the Prosecutor had not utilised his proprio motu 
powers. Since then, however, the Prosecutor has done so in respect of Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire. 
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“The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
has received a letter signed by the President of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) referring to him the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 2002.  By means of this letter, 
the DRC asked the Prosecutor to investigate in order to determine if one or 
more persons should be charged with such crimes, and the authorities 
committed to cooperate with the International Criminal Court.”317 
 
The referrals – particularly by Uganda and the DRC – demonstrate how there have 
been attempts by African States to used the ICC for political ends.  It is no secret that 
the Ugandan and the DRC Governments had their own reasons for inviting the ICC to 
do business in their respective countries.  These appear to have been to employ the 
Court to prosecute rebel bands within their own territories.318  While there has been 
criticism directed at the ICC Prosecutor for too tamely complying with these self-
referrals in order to ensure cases before the Court, there is a double irony in 
suggesting that these African situations are evidence of the ICC’s meddling in 
Africa.319 
 
It is thus difficult to comprehend or take seriously suggestions that the DRC, Uganda 
and CAR referrals stand as proof that the ICC is unhealthily preoccupied with Africa.  
It is not that the ICC is transmuting into a Western court with some colonial affection 
for punishment of Africans guilty of crimes against humanity. Assertions about the 
Court’s apparently over-developed appetite for African atrocities, or intimations of 
US-behind-the-scenes machinations in the Court’s choice of African investigations, 
are complaints that do not match the facts or the processes adopted by the OTP.   
 
A reflection on the OTP’s screening process and the self-referrals by Uganda, DRC 
and the CAR suggest rather that Africa is in the court’s sights because African states 
parties – with serious consideration, one may fairly assume, of their rights and 
                                                 
317 Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=19&l=en.html. In respect of the 
Ugandan referral: “In December 2003 the President Yoweri Museveni took the decision to refer the 
situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
... President Museveni met with the Prosecutor in London to establish the basis for future co-operation 
between Uganda and the International Criminal Court.” (available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html (accessed 22 October 2008)).  In respect of the Central 
Africa Republic referral: “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
has received a letter sent on behalf of the government of the Central African Republic.  The letter 
refers the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed anywhere on the territory 
of the Central African Republic since 1 July 2002, the date of entry into force of the Rome Statute” 
(available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html (accessed 22 October 
2008)).  
318 See Amnesty International, “Uganda: First Ever Arrest Warrants by International Criminal Court – 
A First Step Towards Addressing Impunity”, 14 October 2005, AI Index: AFR 59/008/2005; see also 
Schabas supra note 249 36. 
319 In any event, it should be noted that the Court has consciously taken steps to resist attempts to use 
the Court for political ends.  For instance, note the comments of the Prosecutor immediately following 
the Uganda referral, to the effect that the OTP would investigate conduct by all parties to the conflict – 
this despite the wording of the referral, which mentions only the “situation concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army”. 
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responsibilities as states parties to the Rome Statute, and/or because of their own 
strategic objectives – have chosen that outcome, and the Court has accepted that there 
is a reasonable basis for initiating an investigation.  There is thus an insincerity to the 
claim that the Court is acting “unfairly” in respect of Africa.  It reminds one of the 
host who invites guests round for dinner only to feign disappointment when they 
arrive.  
 
The invitations made by the independent governments of Uganda, DRC and CAR to 
the ICC to investigate situations in their respective states, are invitations made by 
states parties to the Rome Statute.   This is not insignificant. By ratifying the Statute 
these three states showed their acceptance (morally, and legally under international 
law) of the Rome Statute’s ideals. Those ideals are captured in the Statute’s preamble, 
which records, inter alia, a recognition by states parties that “grave crimes threaten the 
peace, security and well-being of the world”; an affirmation “that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished 
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national 
level and by enhancing international cooperation”; a determination “to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention 
of such crimes,” and “to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, 
to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship 
with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole”. 
 
By becoming states parties then, the DRC, Uganda and CAR “resolved”, along with 
all other states that chose or choose to become members of the Rome Statute, “to 
guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice”.  Putting to one 
side the political mileage that these Governments might have assumed was to be 
gained by self-referring a situation to the ICC, a plausible interpretation which 
deserves encouragement is that their actions also show respect for the principles of 
international criminal justice through a request to the ICC for assistance in acting 
against those members of rebel groups who are most responsible for international 
crimes.  
 
Suggestions that these three states are unwitting pawns in some neo-colonial project 
are not only patronizing, they also devalue the international rule of law. It is worth 
noting the generic problems with treaty implementation, ones that have been 
encountered in many countries in terms of following up the ratification of human 
rights instruments, for example.320 It is not necessary to explore the literature on this 
issue, except to note that the Rome Statute is not the only instrument of great 
aspirational and practical utility that countries are quite prepared to ratify, but which 
they have failed over many years to take steps to implement or compile reports upon.  
                                                 
320 An African example relates to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Parties are 
obliged to recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this charter and should undertake to 
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them (see Article 1 of the Charter and the decisions 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Commission Nationale des Droits de  l 
’Homme et des Libertes v Chad 55/91 Para 20, and Amnesty International and Others v Sudan 48/90, 
50/91, 52/91, 89/93, Para 40).  The African Charter was drafted and acceded to voluntarily by African 
States wishing to ensure the respect of human rights on this continent. Once ratified, states parties to 
the Charter are legally bound to its provisions.  As the African Commission has noted, a state not 
wishing to abide by the African Charter might have refrained from ratification (see International Pen 
and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 Para 116). 
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What is remarkable about the Uganda, DRC, and CAR referrals is that they buck this 
trend.  By choosing to self-refer under the Rome Statute each of the states parties 
demonstrated their commitment to utilise the Rome Statute and the principles agreed 
on at Rome by African and other states. Sadly, critics who denounce the Court’s 
involvement in these states as anti-African not only miss the point, they also 
unwittingly contribute to what is rightly regarded as an African malaise: the failure to 
take seriously treaty commitments voluntarily assumed by States.  
 
 
The ICC as proxy superpower: misunderstanding universal jurisdiction 
 
Fears of an unbridled Court 
 
Alex de Waal recently wrote that “… Africa has lost confidence in the ICC and is 
taking rapid steps to become a zone free of universal jurisdiction”.321  It is not clear 
whether De Waal himself believes that the ICC was the means which established the 
“zone” of universal jurisdiction.  
 
Domestic crimes, as is the tradition, are largely the responsibility and concern of 
domestic legal systems.  However, certain crimes, through their seriousness, take on a 
characteristic which “internationalises” them.  Two broad opportunities for 
prosecution arise from the internationalisation of the offender’s conduct.   
 
First, the international crimes at issue might be the subject of a prosecution before an 
international criminal tribunal constituted especially for the investigation and 
prosecution of such universally despicable acts.  The ICC is, par excellence, the 
model for such a prosecution (and States that are party to the Rome Statute would 
under the terms of the Statute have an opportunity to prosecute the ICC crimes 
through their domestic courts acting as an international surrogate).322     
 
Quite aside from this treaty-inspired prosecution under the aegis of the Rome Statute, 
the internationalisation of certain crimes in turn provides the potential to all States of 
the world (in addition to the State on whose territory the crime was committed) to 
investigate and prosecute the offender under their domestic legal systems and before 
their domestic courts. This entitlement goes under the heading of what international 
lawyers understand as the principle of “universal jurisdiction”: the competency to act 
                                                 
321 See Alex de Waal, writing in reference to a decision by the AU Peace and Security Council to 
criticize the ICC Prosecutor’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for President el-Bashir (“ICC, Making 
Sense of Darfur: Africa’s Position on the ICC” posted by Alex de Waal, 23 September 2008, available 
at http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/09/23/africas-position-on-the-icc/ (accessed 12 October 
2008)).  De Waal continues: “The positions taken at the PSC do not provide much solace to the 
supporters of the ICC and the advocates of universal jurisdiction”. 
322 Another possibility of prosecution before an international criminal tribunal is exemplified in the ad 
hoc tribunals which have been created for Yugoslavia (the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia), Rwanda (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), East Timor, Kosovo, 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone.  A discussion of these tribunals is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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against the offender, regardless of where the crime was committed and regardless of 
the nationality of the criminal.  While there is ongoing debate about the scope and 
limits of the potential exercise of universal jurisdiction under international law, 
Professor Cassese – previously President of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – has convincingly explained that 
universal jurisdiction cannot sensibly be an absolute right of jurisdictional 
competence (such that any and every State is empowered to investigate and prosecute 
the occurrence of an international crime).323  Rather, while all States are potentially 
empowered to act against international criminals, “universality may be asserted 
subject to the condition that the alleged offender be on the territory of the prosecuting 
State”.324   
 
The State concerned must of course have taken steps under its domestic law to 
empower its officials and Courts to act upon this potential. France and Spain are 
examples of States that have done so, much to President Kagame’s chagrin.325  The 
African Union has recently added its voice. In a strongly worded declaration African 
Presidents at the African Union Heads of State Summit in the Egyptian port city of 
Sharm El Sheikh condemned the French and Spanish indictments against senior 
officers of the Rwanda Defence Forces. The declaration calls for a meeting between 
the African Union and the European Union to discuss lasting solutions and to ensure 
that the warrants are withdrawn.  The declaration concludes that the “[t]he political 
nature and abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by judges from non-African 
States against African leaders is a clear violation of their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”.326   
 
These examples and De Waal’s sentiments about Africa taking steps to become a 
universal jurisdiction free zone chime with the view of many (African) critics of the 
ICC, who believe that the ICC may – like the French and Spanish judges in respect of 
Kagame and other senior officers in the Rwanda Defence Forces – exercise a form of 
universal jurisdiction against African leaders.  This belief conjures images of the ICC 
with unlimited interference power: that it is a superpower unto itself.  Mamdani’s 
concerns about the Court are reflected in different language, but the result is the same.  
His complaint is that “the new humanitarian order” (of which he believes the ICC to 
be a part) has resulted “once again [in] a bifurcated system, whereby state sovereignty 
obtains in large parts of the world but is suspended in more countries in Africa and 
the Middle East”.327 
                                                 
323 The danger of countenancing such an absolute notion of universal jurisdiction was highlighted by 
the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Belgium) ICJ Rep 14 Feb. 2002 case (the Arrest Warrant case).  President Guillaume held, for 
instance, that such a system “would risk creating total judicial chaos”, and would “encourage the 
arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly acting as an agent for an ill-defined ‘international 
community’” (para. 15). 
324 Cassese supra note 165 592.  See also Roger O’Keefe “Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic 
Concept” (2004), 2 JICJ 735. 
325 See the earlier discussion of Kagame’s response to the “arrogant” European calls for an 
investigation of his role in the Rwandan genocide. 
326 See Thijs Bouwknegy, “African Presidents Condemn Western Indictments”, 2 July 2008, 
International Justice, RNW, available at 
http://www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/specials/Universal/080702-rwanda (accessed 12 October 2008). 
327 See Mamdani supra note 260. 
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Now there is unquestionably merit in complaints about the unacceptably skewed 
nature of international politics and the abuse of international legal rules by powerful 
states. The United States’ and United Kingdom’s unlawful invasion of Iraq has 
sharpened the debate in this respect considerably. Nobody, let alone international 
lawyers, would seriously suggest that the current system is free from serious defects. 
There is also a real concern – otherwise well expressed by African and allied States – 
that the Security Council is in urgent need of reform.328 But these complaints and 
concerns should not too easily or speedily be pressed into service against the ICC 
without a proper appreciation of the Court’s statute.  The fear seems to be that a rogue 
prosecutor will assert some form of unbridled universal jurisdiction wherever he or 
she so chooses; to drag the unsuspecting and the unworthy to The Hague, and in the 
process violate the sovereignty of (weak) States under the guise of “humanitarian” 
concern for the victims. This view appears to be based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Rome Statute and the system of complementarity that is so 
central to the work of the International Criminal Court. 
 
Fearing the ICC’s jurisdiction – a case of being uncomplimentary about 
complementarity 
 
The Rome Statute of the ICC has its flaws – the cost of compromise in a politically-
sensitive drafting process and the political issues at stake ensured that – but African 
states along with their counterparts at Rome concluded a treaty in which the principle 
of individual criminal liability is established for those responsible for the most serious 
human rights violations, and whereby an institution has been established – on a 
permanent basis – to ensure the punishment of such individuals. This punishment 
does not follow after the Court’s exercise of universal jurisdiction – as though it was 
an international manifestation of the French or Spanish domestic calls for action 
against Kagame.  Investigation and punishment takes place within a carefully crafted 
system of complementarity between domestic actors and the ICC.  Indeed, 
complementarity is arguably the key feature of the ICC regime.  It is thus important to 
appreciate its significance, and in so doing, to appreciate how hollow are the fears of 
those who believe that the Court wields excessive and far-reaching powers of 
investigation (and hence the potential for interference in State sovereignty). 
 
Proposals that the principle of universal jurisdiction should apply in respect of State 
referrals were rejected at the Rome Conference.  The Preamble to the Rome Statute 
says that the Court’s jurisdiction will be complementary to that of national 
jurisdiction, and Article 17 of the Statute embodies the complementarity principle. At 
the heart of the complementarity principle is the ability to prosecute international 
criminals in one’s national courts, on behalf of the international community, or to 
have in place mechanisms to arrest and surrender to the ICC persons that the ICC 
seeks to prosecute and who happen to be in one’s jurisdiction. 
                                                 
328 What this reform entails is beyond the scope of this chapter but encompasses a variety of proposals, 
including procedural reforms, such as eliminating the veto held by the five permanent members, and 
expansion of the Council (to include amongst others an African member).  For further information see 
Ramesh Thakur “United Nations Security Council Reform” (2004) 13(3) African Security Review 66. 
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The general nature of national implementation obligations assumed by States which 
elect to become party to the Rome Statute are wide ranging. The Rome Statute 
indicates that effective prosecution is that which is ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by international cooperation.  Because of its special nature, States 
Party to the Rome Statute are expected to assume a level of responsibility and 
capability the realisation of which will entail taking a number of important legal and 
practical measures.  
 
Aside from enabling its own justice officials to prosecute international crimes before 
its domestic Courts, a State Party is furthermore obliged to cooperate with the ICC in 
relation to an investigation and/or prosecution which the Court might be seized with.  
The prosecution of a matter before the ICC (and the process leading to the decision to 
prosecute) will normally require very considerable investigation, information-
gathering, and inter-agency cooperation, often with high levels of confidentiality and 
information or witness protection required.  
 
Contact between the ICC (in particular the OTP) and the national authorities will 
likely become extensive during the course of an investigation and any request for 
arrest and surrender or any prosecution. Indeed in many cases there is likely to be a 
fairly complex and substantial process of information gathering, analysis and 
consideration that must be undertaken before the decision to formally investigate can 
even be taken. The ICC lacks many of the institutional features necessary for a 
comprehensive handling of a criminal matter: for ordinary policing and other 
functions, it will rely heavily on the assistance and cooperation of States’ national 
mechanisms, procedures and agencies.  
 
In order to be able to cooperate with the OTP during the investigation or prosecution 
period329 (or otherwise with the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Court once a matter is 
properly before these, for example in relation to witnesses), a State Party is obliged to 
have a range of powers, facilities and procedures in place, including by promulgation 
of laws and regulations. The legal framework for requests for arrest and surrender (on 
the one hand) and all other forms of cooperation (on the other) is mostly set out in 
Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Article 86 describes the general duty on States to 
cooperate fully with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Article 87 
sets out general provisions for requests for cooperation, giving the ICC authority 
(under article 87(1)(a)) to make requests of the State for cooperation. Failure to 
cooperate can, amongst other things, lead to a referral of the State to the Assembly of 
States Parties, or, where the original referral came from the Security Council, a 
referral of the State to the Security Council (article 87(7)).  
 
Article 88 is a significant provision, obliging States to ensure that there are in place 
nationally the procedures and powers to enable all forms of cooperation contemplated 
in the Statute. Unlike inter-State legal assistance and cooperation, the Rome Statute 
makes clear that by ratifying States accept that there are no grounds for refusing ICC 
                                                 
329 The extent of cooperation required of States Party is evident from the fact that the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) has a very wide mandate to “extend the investigation to cover all facts” and 
investigate circumstances generally “in order to discover the truth”: Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome 
Statute.  
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requests for arrest and surrender.330 States are therefore obliged, under the relevant 
arrest and surrender processes provided in their own national laws, to follow up arrest 
warrants or summons issued by the ICC, and to surrender persons in due course.  
 
While the Rome Statute envisages a duty to cooperate with the Court in relation to 
investigation and prosecution, it should be remembered that the principle of 
complementarity is premised on the expectation that domestic states that are willing 
and able should be prosecuting these crimes themselves.  The principle of 
“complementarity” ensures that the ICC operates as a buttress in support of the 
criminal justice systems of states parties at a national level, and as part of a broader 
system of international criminal justice. The principle proceeds from the belief that 
national courts should be the first to act.  It is only if a State party is “unwilling or 
unable” to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed by its nationals 
or on its territory that the ICC is then seized with jurisdiction.331   
 
To enforce this principle of complementarity and to further limit the Court’s 
propensity for interference with sovereignty, Article 18 of the Rome Statute requires 
that the Prosecutor must notify all states parties and states with jurisdiction over a 
particular case – in other words non states parties – before beginning an investigation 
by the Court,332 and cannot begin an investigation on his own initiative without first 
receiving the approval of the Pre-trial Chamber.333 At this stage of the proceedings, it 
is open to both states parties and non-states parties to insist that they will investigate 
allegations against their own nationals themselves: the International Criminal Court 
would then be obliged to suspend its investigation.334 If the alleged perpetrator’s state 
investigates the matter and then refuses to initiate a prosecution, the ICC may only 
proceed if it concludes that that decision of the state not to prosecute was motivated 
purely by a desire to shield the individual concerned.335  The thrust of the principle of 
complementarity is that the system effectively creates a presumption in favour of 
action at the level of states. 
  
Complementarity is therefore an essential component of the Court’s structure and a 
means by which national justice systems are accorded an opportunity to prosecute 
international crimes domestically. The ICC is one component of a regime – a network 
of states that have undertaken to the do the ICC’s work for it; to act, if you will, as 
domestic international criminal courts in respect of ICC crimes. Because of the ICC’s 
system of complementarity we can therefore expect national criminal justice to play 
an important role of doing the ICC’s work by providing exemplary punishments 
which will serve to restore the international legal order.  In this respect, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at 
Princeton, has pointed out that: 
 
                                                 
330 See Article 89 – although Article 97 provides for consultation where there are certain practical 
difficulties. 
331 Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute. 
332 Article 18(1) of the Rome Statute. 
333 Article 15 the Rome Statute. 
334 Article 18(2) the Rome Statute. 
335 Article 17(2)(a) the Rome Statute. 
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“One of the most powerful arguments for the International Criminal Court is 
not that it will be a global instrument of justice itself – arresting and trying 
tyrants and torturers worldwide – but that it will be a backstop and trigger for 
domestic forces for justice and democracy.”336 
 
This is the promise of international criminal justice as exemplified in the ICC’s 
complementarity regime.  One way in which we will come to regard the ICC as 
effective – as having achieved its promise – will be when its very existence operates 
to encourage domestic institutions to comply with their responsibilities under 
international humanitarian and human rights law to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes as defined by the ICC.  In this respect the Prosecutor of the Court 
has himself stressed the importance of what is called “positive complementarity”.  
Paragraph 6 of the preamble to the Rome Statute declares that “it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes”.  The Prosecutor has often invoked this principle.  In his September 2006 
“Prosecutorial Strategy”, he stated: 
 
“With regard to complementarity, the Office emphasizes that according to the 
Statute national states have the primary responsibility for preventing and 
punishing atrocities in their own territories.  In this design, intervention by the 
Office must be exceptional – it will only step in when States fail to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions, or where they purport to do so but in reality 
are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.  A Court based on 
the principle of complemenatarity ensures the international rule of law by 
creating an interdependent, mutually reinforcing international system of 
justice.  With this in mind, the Office has adopted a positive approach to 
complementarity, meaning that it encourages genuine national proceedings 
where possible; relies on national and international networks; and participates 
in a system of international cooperation”.337 
 
The very principle of complementarity makes it clear that by domestic prosecutors 
acting against international criminals, domestic courts ensure the international rule of 
law through a mutually reinforcing (or complementary) international system of 
justice.338  As Professor Antonio Cassese points out, there was a practical basis at 
Rome for this principle:  
 
“It is healthy, it was thought, to leave the vast majority of cases concerning 
international crimes to national courts, which may properly exercise their 
jurisdiction based on a link with the case (territoriality, nationality) or even on 
universality.  Among other things, these national courts may have more means 
available to collect the necessary evidence and to lay their hands on the 
accused”.339 
                                                 
336 Slaughter, “Not the Court of First Resort”, 21 December 2003, The Washington Post. 
337 “Report on Prosecutorial Strategy”, 14 September 2006, page 5, emphasis added.  
338 See further William W Burke-White “Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court 
and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice” (2008) 49(1) Harvard International 
Law Journal 53. 
339 Cassese supra note 242 351, emphasis added. 
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From the aforegoing, it rather seems that instead of the ICC being an instrument of 
global or universal (in)justice disrespectful of particularly African states’ sovereignty, 
the very premise of complementarity ensures appropriate respect for states by 
demanding that the ICC defers to their competence and right to investigate 
international crimes.  The choice that complementarity offers and symbolises has 
apparently been ignored by the Court’s African critics.  As Slaughter expresses, the 
choice is for a nation to try its own or they will be tried in The Hague.  Instead of 
weakening states and undermining sovereignty, properly understood the International 
Criminal Court regime does the opposite: it “strengthens the hand of domestic parties 
seeking such trials, allowing them to wrap themselves in a nationalist mantle”.340 
 
The Sudan referral as (another) example of the ICC’s African adventurism? 
 
We have seen that the Rome Statute does not empower the ICC to roam large as an 
enforcer of some new world order. That being said, under the Statute the UN Security 
Council is empowered to refer to the Court situations in which crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed.341  The referral power is a 
mechanism by which the Court might be accorded jurisdiction over an offender, 
regardless of where the offence took place and by whom it was committed, and 
regardless of whether the State concerned has ratified the Statute or accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction.342  The Statute provides that the Council may only make such a 
referral by acting under its well-established Chapter VII powers of the United Nations 
Charter, which is to say that it must regard the events in a particular country as a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.  These same 
Chapter VII powers were invoked by the Security Council to create the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s.  What 
the Rome Statute has done is allowed the Council to refer similar situations to a new, 
permanent international criminal body – the ICC.   
 
 In determining whether a “threat to the peace” exists the Council will be guided by 
the gravity of the crimes committed, the impunity enjoyed by the crimes’ perpetrators 
and the effectiveness or otherwise of the national jurisdiction in the prosecution of 
such crimes.343 Having had regard to these factors, the Security Council on 31 March 
2005 referred the atrocities committed in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC for 
investigation. 
 
After analysing the information available, the Prosecutor determined that there was a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, which was duly initiated in June 
2005. In his periodic reports to the UN Security Council, the Prosecutor has stated 
that the evidence available shows a widespread pattern of serious crimes, including 
                                                 
340 Slaughter supra note 336. 
341 Rome Statute, Article 1, 13(b). 
342 See P Kirsch (QC) & D Robinson supra note 316 634.  
343 See in general P Kirsch (QC) & D Robinson supra note 316 630–631.  
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murder, rape, the displacement of civilians and the looting and burning of civilian 
property.344 
 
In February 2007, the Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue summons 
to appear or, alternatively, warrants of arrest in respect of Ahmad Muhammad Harun 
and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (also known as Ali Kushayb). Ahmad 
Harun is the former Minister of State for the Interior and the current Minister of State 
for Humanitarian Affairs while Ali Kushayb is a militia leader known to have been 
operating in Darfur at the relevant time.345 The charges against Harun and Kushayb 
relate to war crimes and crimes against humanity. In April 2007, the Court issued 
warrants of arrest for these individuals and requests for their arrest and surrender have 
since been transmitted to the Government of Sudan. At the time of writing, neither 
suspect has been surrendered to the Court.346 
 
Then, in early July 2008 the Prosecutor of the ICC decided to seek an arrest warrant 
against President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in Darfur. That warrant was confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber in respect of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity on 4 March 2009. The decision to proceed 
against al-Bashir has drawn fierce resistance from South Africa’s (now former) 
Mbeki-led Government, which together with Libya in July 2008 sought to defer any 
investigation or prosecution of Bashir for a 12-month period under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC.347  That attempt failed, but the noise continues.  To 
demonstrate their pique with the Prosecutor’s decision, the 53-member African Union 
and the 56-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference have more recently 
pushed for action against the Court.  As The Economist writes: “Both groups have 
demanded that the Security Council suspend proceedings against Mr Bashir, quite a 
few of their members no doubt fearing that it could be their turn next”.348 
 
Whether the ICC Prosecutor has acted prudently or otherwise in his call for al-
Bashir’s arrest is a thorny debate beyond the scope of this paper.  What can be said is 
that his call has fomented what Alex de Waal has described as Africa’s “push-back 
against the ICC”.349   But even if the Prosecutor’s decision is ultimately proved 
                                                 
344 Detailed summaries of the crimes on which the Office of the Prosecutor has gathered information 
and evidence can be found in the Prosecutor’s periodic reports to the Security Council on the 
investigation. They are available on the Court’s website (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html (accessed 14 October 2008)). For an analysis of the referral, 
see amongst others Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, “Darfur goes to the International Criminal 
Court (perhaps)”, African security review (2005), 14(2), 23-34. 
345 Copies of the warrants of arrest are available on the Court’s website (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases/Darfur.html) (accessed 14 October 2008). 
346 Although Kushayb has long been in the custody of Sudanese authorities, allegedly on charges 
relating to Darfur (though not the same incidents charged by the Prosecutor).  See BBC News, Africa, 
“Darfur militia leader in custody”, 13 October 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7666921.stm (accessed 14 October 2008). 
347 Article 16 provides as follows: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that 
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” 
348 See “Saving the President”, The Economist, 25 September, 2008. 
349 See De Waal supra note 321. 
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unwise (for example, because it undermines the chances of peace in Sudan350), that 
does not mean that the other criticisms already directed at the Court and examined 
earlier have substance.  Those criticisms (that the Court is western and is 
discriminating against Africans through the exercise of unbridled powers) are equally 
as hollow in respect of the Sudan referral, whatever the outcome of Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo’s actions against President al-Bashir. 
 
For instance, it will be recalled that the Sudan referral is cited as further evidence of 
the ICC’s predilection for African situations. Mamdani is firm about this.  In his view 
it “is clear if we take into account the four countries where the ICC has launched its 
investigations: Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic and Congo”, then Africans 
might conclude that the Court is rapidly becoming “a Western court to try African 
crimes against humanity”.351  What is more, Mamdani believes that these situations 
are before the Court because they occur in “places where the United States has no 
major objection to the course chartered by ICC investigations.”   
 
But this is simply not correct.  We have already seen that three of these situations are 
self-referrals, and the Darfur situation has been referred by the United Nations 
Security Council. 
 
It will be recalled that before the referral the Security Council had adopted resolution 
1564 which charged the Secretary-General with establishing a commission of inquiry 
 
 “to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts 
of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations 
with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable”. 
 
The Darfur Commission presented its report to the Security Council in February 
2005.352  The Commission, under the leadership of Professor Antonio Cassese and 
including African and Arab members,353 fulfilled its mandate by visiting Sudan on 
                                                 
350 An outcome which is not possible to predict, although it seems that the accusations that Bashir’s 
indictment will endanger the Sudan peace process are exaggerated.  What the indictment appears so far 
to have achieved is movement (finally) on the part of a recalcitrant and defiant regime as it begins to 
run out of options.  See for example Godfrey Musila “In The Face Of Impunity, We Play Politics With 
International Criminal Tribunals” ISS Today, 8 August 2008, available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=5&slink_id=6446&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
(accessed 14 October 2008). See too Nicole Fritz “Black-white debate does no justice to a nuanced 
case”, Business Day, 13 August 2008. 
351 Mamdani supra note 260.  
352 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Geneva, January 25, 2005 (hereinafter 
“Darfur Report”).  The full report is available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed 10 October 2008). 
353 The African members were Therese Striggner-Scott (a barrister and principal partner with a legal 
consulting firm in Accra, Ghana, and who served as Judge of the High Courts of Ghana and Zimbabwe, 
and was the Executive Chairperson of the Ghana Law Reform Commission from January 2000 to 
February 2004), and Dumisa Ntsebeza (a former Commissioner on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa, and who served as acting judge on the High Court of South Africa, as 
well as the South African Labour Court).  The Arab member was Mohammed Fayek (then Secretary-
General of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, and who previously served in Egypt as Minister 
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two occasions. The Commission found, inter alia, evidence of violations ‘violations of 
international human rights law and humanitarian law’ and that ‘clear links’ existed 
between all of these groups and the Sudanese government.354 After an exhaustive 
report, the Commission’s final recommendation was that the Security Council refer 
the situation in Darfur to the ICC “to protect the civilians of Darfur and end the 
rampant impunity currently prevailing there”.355 In advocating the referral of the 
situation in Darfur by the Security Council, the Commission pointed out that the 
situation in Darfur met the requirement of Chapter VII, in that it constituted a “threat 
to peace and security” as was acknowledged by the Security Council in its resolutions 
1556 and 1564. Furthermore, the Commission also took note of the Security 
Council’s emphasis in these resolutions of the “need to put a stop to impunity in 
Darfur, for the end of such impunity would contribute to restoring security in the 
region”.356  The Commission endorsed the ICC as the “only credible way of bringing 
alleged perpetrators to justice”.357  It was on the strength of this recommendation that 
on 31 March 2005 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1593, referring the 
situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the International Criminal Court. 
 
Mamdani’s belief that Sudan is now in the Court’s sights because the United States 
wanted it that way does not sit comfortably with the following facts. Much has been 
said elsewhere about the “unhappy and extravagant”358 objections of the United States 
to the ICC. The United States, as is well known, opposed the Court359 and does not 
stand alone in its opposition to the ICC: it has rather unlikely allies in the form of 
China, Iraq and Libya, and a more predictable ally in Israel.  Together these states 
formed part of a group of only seven countries that voted against the Rome Statute.360 
Indeed, it may be recalled that the US government is prohibited by law from assisting 
the ICC in its investigations, arrests, detentions, extraditions, or prosecutions of war 
crimes, under the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002.361 Title II). The 
prohibition is extensive, covering, among other things, the obligation of appropriated 
funds, assistance in investigations on US territory, participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations unless certain protections from ICC actions are provided to specific 
                                                                                                                                            
of Information, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Guidance, and Chef de 
Cabinet and Advisor to the President for African and Asian Affairs). 
354 Darfur Report at paras. 110 – 111. 
355 Darfur Report at para. 569. 
356 Darfur Report at para.  .590. 
357 Darfur Report at para. 573. 
358 James Crawford “The drafting of the Rome Statute” in Philippe Sands (ed) From Nuremberg to The 
Hague (2003) 109.  
359 For a discussion of US opposition to the ICC, see amongst others William Schabas “United States 
Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security Council’, (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 701-720; Max du Plessis “Seeking an International International 
Criminal Court” (2002) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 301-320. 
360 See Michael Scharf “The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’c Jurisdiction 
over the Nationals of Non-party States: A Critique of the U.S. position” (2001) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 64. 
361 ASPA (P.L. 107-206) Title II. 
 102 
categories of people, and the sharing of classified and law enforcement 
information.362  
 
Given the United States’ vehement opposition to the ICC, even before the 
Commission’s report was released the US implemented contingency plans in the 
event that the Commission recommended that the situation in Darfur be referred to the 
ICC. It objected to the UN Security Council referral to the ICC because of its stated 
objections to the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of states not party to the Rome 
Statute.363  The US thus advocated the idea of a “Sudan Tribunal”, as an alternative to 
the ICC, to the other members of the Security Council.364  However, the 
Commission’s report dealt with the reasons why such a tribunal would not be an 
effective alternative to the ICC. The United States even went so far as to present its 
“Sudan Tribunal” as an “African Court” and the ICC as a “European” tribunal, fatally 
ignoring the strong relations that existed then between ICC and African Union 
countries.365 For these, and other reasons, the United States’ proposal was not 
considered as an effective alternative.366  As momentum built up to refer the situation 
in Darfur to the ICC, the United States obstinacy began to look churlish in the face of 
the ongoing massacres in the region. On 24 March 2005 France proposed a resolution, 
that would eventually become resolution 1593, referring Darfur to the ICC. Faced 
with the reality that its obstinacy was doing more damage to its reputation than the 
referral would do, and having secured “immunity guarantees” for U.S personnel,367 
the United States agreed not to veto the resolution and abstained when the Security 
Council voted to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC.  The US representative’s 
reasons for this acquiescence are worth noting.  She explained that “we do not agree 
to a Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC”, but stated that 
 
“[w]e decided not to oppose the resolution because of the need for the 
international community to work together in order to end the climate of 
impunity in the Sudan and because the resolution provides protection from 
                                                 
362 It is only more recently that restrictions on military assistance to ICC members under the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 were repealed under the National Defense Authorization Acts 
for FY2007 and FY2008.  See generally Alexis Arieff et al “International Criminal Court Cases in 
Africa: Status and Policy Issues”, Congressional Research Service Report, September 12, 2008, at p 6.  
363 See US Mission to the United Nations (USUN) Press Release #055, “Explanation of Vote on the 
Sudan Accountability Resolution”, Ambassador Ann W. Patterson, March 31, 2005. 
364 See “U.S. Fiddles Over ICC While Darfur Burns: U.N. Security Council Should Reject U.S. 
Scheme for Ad Hoc Court”, Human Rights Watch, available 
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/31/usint10091_txt.htm (accessed 10 October 2008). 
365 “U.N. Rights Chief Details Crimes in Darfur”, Human Rights Watch, available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/16/sudan10182.htm (accessed 10 October 2008). 
366 See further: “U.S. Proposal for a Darfur Tribunal: Not an Effective Option to Ensure Justice” 
Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/15/sudan10179.htm 
(accessed 10 October 2008). 
367 Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 states that “nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State outside Sudan which is not party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts of 
omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council of 
the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing 
State”. 
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investigation or prosecution for United States nationals and members of the 
armed forces of non-State parties”.   
 
Her final comment is revealing: she said that although “the United States believes that 
the better mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa, it is important that 
the international community speak with one voice in order to help promote 
accountability”.368 
 
Mamdani’s views about the US-involvement in ensuring that Sudan is before the ICC 
reflect an exaggerated view of the US as a Machevellian force in world affairs.  As 
Geoffrey Robertson has written about the US antics against the Court: ‘ironically they 
have helped to refute the argument (made by some voices on the European left) that 
international criminal justice serves the interests of American hegemony”.369   
 
It is any event worth highlighting the reasons advanced by the Darfur Commission’s 
recommendation that the Security Council refer the situation in Darfur to the 
International Criminal Court. According to the Commission there were at least six 
major benefits to a referral to the ICC.370  
 
First, the prosecution of the crimes committed would be conducive to peace and 
security in Darfur.  Second, the ICC, as the “only truly international institution of 
criminal justice” would ensure justice is done regardless of the authority of prestige of 
the perpetrators as the ICC sits in The Hague, far from the perpetrators’ spheres of 
influence. Third, the cumulative authority of the ICC and the Security Council would 
be required to compel those leaders responsible to acquiesce to investigation and 
potential prosecution.  Fourth, the ICC is the “best suited organ for ensuring a 
veritably fair trial of those indicted by the Court Prosecutor” due to its international 
composition and established rules of procedure. Fifth, the ICC is the only 
international court that can investigate and prosecute without delay.  Sixth, the ICC 
was the most cost-effective option.371  
 
All these reasons (independently and cumulatively compelling) stand in the way of 
assertions that the ICC is biased against Africa by its involvement in investigating the 
Darfur situation.  It might in any event be observed that the referral – under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter – was exacted without a veto from any of the permanent 
members.  That is to say, not even China and Russia (long-standing defenders of the 
principle of non-intervention in nations’ sovereign affairs) stood in the way of the 
ICC referral.  Whatever unfolds in respect of the al-Bashir indictment, and whether or 
not the Prosecutor may be criticised for his handling of the affair, does not detract 
from the fact that in the first place the Darfur crisis came before the ICC for the right 
                                                 
368 Quoted in Schabas supra note 249 31. 
369 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 3rd ed (2006) 464. 
370 See Darfur Report, para.  648. 
371 In this regard, Human Rights Watch has noted:  “The ‘Sudan Tribunal’ is estimated to cost some 
$30 million in the first 6-8 months and then rise up to $100 million annually, while the ICC’s 2005 
overall budget is approximately $88 million.” – “EU Should Push for ICC Referral of Darfur During 
Rice Visit”, Human Rights Watch, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/09/sudan10155.htm 
(accessed 10 October 2008). 
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reason (and despite – rather than because of – US involvement372).  That is because – 
as the Security Council recognised – the human rights violations involved demanded 
an international prosecutorial response in the interests of peace and justice. 
 
Lessons to be learnt 
 
Africa has already demonstrated a clear commitment to the ideals and objectives of 
the ICC: more than half of all African states (30) have ratified the Rome Statute, and 
many have taken proactive steps to ensure effective implementation of its provisions.  
These efforts have already slowly been replaced by a “push-back” against the ICC.  
While the recent African opposition to the ICC will have been (rightly or wrongly) 
aggravated by the ICC Prosecutor’s decision to seek President al Bashir’s indictment, 
the residual reasons for that opposition remain flimsy at best.   
 
What is worse, the reasons (or at least the motivations of some who advance them) 
appear to reflect an outdated and defensive view of sovereignty as a trump to human 
rights and justice.  This is not only inconsistent with advances in international human 
rights worldwide, it is also today – if one takes the AU’s documents at face value – 
ironically un-African.  The provisions of the AU’s Constitutive Act suggest that 
human rights are to play an important role in the work of the Union.373  For instance, 
the preamble speaks of states being “determined to promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and to ensure good 
governance and the rule of law”. As one of its central objectives, the AU recognises 
the need to “encourage international co-operation, taking due account of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ and to 
‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples” Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments.374  Member States are accordingly expected to promote gender equality 
and to have “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance” and to respect the sanctity of life.375  Of obvious importance, given the 
peer review mechanism that exists under the AU, is the principled commitment by the 
Union under its Constitutive Act to condemn and reject “unconstitutional changes of 
governments”.376  There is thus a clear trend in the Act towards limiting the 
sovereignty of Member States and, in appropriate circumstances, permitting the 
involvement of the Union in the domestic affairs of African countries notwithstanding 
                                                 
372 It was only after the Security Council referred the Darfur situation to the ICC on 31 March 2005 that 
the United States began to perceive support for the ICC’s work in Sudan. In the case of Darfur, that 
support was only formalised more than two years later through the Darfur Accountability and 
Divestment Act of 2007 (H.R. 180), passed by the House on August 3, 2007, which allows US support 
to the ICC's efforts to prosecute those responsible for acts of genocide in Darfur (and thereby allowing 
for a limited exception to the prohibitions on support for the ICC contained in the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002).  
373 See generally Rachel Murray Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (2004) 
and Andew Lloyd and Rachel Murray “Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights Protection 
under the African Union” (2004) Journal of African Law 48(2) 165. 
374 Article 3(e) and (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
375 Article 4(l), (m), and (o) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
376 Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
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the principle of non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of 
another.377  There is also the very clear commitment by African States in Articles 
4(m), 3(h) and 4(o) of the AU’s Constitutive Act to ensuring respect for the rule of 
law and human rights, and condemning and rejecting impunity. 
 
The myths around the Court’s anti-African nature and its discriminatory singling out 
of African situations for investigation are an attack on an institution which deserves 
support. One can hardly overestimate the importance of Africa to the Court.  The 
ICC’s first “situations” are all on the continent. Africa is a high priority for the ICC – 
because African States in the case of self-referrals by the DRC, Uganda and CAR 
chose so, and because the international community through the Security Council felt 
compelled to do something about a situation in Darfur which is recognised as one of 
the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. It is likely to remain a high priority for the 
foreseeable future. It is the most represented region in the ICC’s Assembly of States 
Parties, and is a continent where international justice is in the making.  
 
Ensuring the success of the ICC is important for peacebuilding efforts on the 
continent. However, the task of reversing the culture of impunity for international 
crimes and thereby strengthening the rule of law cannot simply be devolved to the 
ICC. As we have seen, the Court’s jurisdiction and capacity are limited so that it will 
be able to tackle a selection of only the most serious cases.  
 
The danger is that the Court’s work in Africa and perhaps beyond Africa will be 
jeopordised by myths such as those confronted in this article.  If there is a lesson that 
might be drawn from the discussion herein it is this:  there is a need in Africa for 
greater and more accurate public and official awareness about the work of the 
International Criminal Court, and a need for enhanced political support for the work 
of the Court and for international criminal justice more generally.  The fulfilment of 
the aims and objectives of the ICC on the African continent – in particular through the 
complementarity regime – are dependent on the support of African States and 
administrations, the AU and relevant regional organisations, the legal profession, and 
civil society. Meeting this need requires commitment to a collaborative relationship 
between these stakeholders and the ICC. It is also important to remember that 
questions of responsibility for the prosecution of core international crimes in Africa 
(and for raising awareness of these issues) are broader than the ICC alone.  Other 
structures such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and other pan-African institutions can 
play a meaningful role in this regard which should be encouraged. That these African 
structures and organisations should be at the forefront of awareness raising is vitally 
important not least of all because of the perception present within certain African 
states that international criminal justice and the ICC is an “outside” or “Western” 
priority and relatively less important than other political, social and developmental 
goals.  The need for these structures and organisations to raise awareness is all the 
more acute in the current climate of myth-peddling and anti-ICC rhetoric.  
 
This is a time for African voices, regional organizations and civil society to speak out 
against inaccuracies and distortions regarding the ICC’s work in Africa.  Of course 
that discussion must include criticism of the Court’s work where criticism is due, but 
                                                 
377 Article 4(g). 
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with an understanding that the Court’s position in Africa is one that needs 
strengthening and nurturing, for the benefit of Africans.  
 
While it is correct that all situations currently under investigation by the ICC are 
African, the more plausible reason for this reality is because African victims – the real 
beneficiaries of the International Criminal Court’s work – outnumber victims of 
serious human rights violations in other parts of the world. And the accusation of 
“unfair” prosecution of African situations is an insult to the careful screening process 
that the OTP has adopted in conformity with its obligations under the Rome Statute in 
order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for initiating an investigation.  
These allegations ignore the objective fact that the Court’s systems promote 
transparency, oversight and accountability, for example by requiring that Judges of 
the Court sit in oversight of the decisions of the Prosecutor to investigate or not to 
investigate situations of alleged international criminal law violations. 
 
It is thus unfortunate that African leaders are now choosing to balk at the Court’s 
work on the continent, particularly on the basis of such flimsy, and often politically 
motivated reasons. An alternative, and far more positive interpretation of the current 
(largely self-driven) focus on Africa is that some African states have chosen to break 
the cycle of violence and impunity that has symbolized its history, even if (as the 
Uganda and DRC referrals appear to show) the motivation for doing so may have 
been to secure short-term political gains. It is imperative that Africa’s 30 members of 
the ICC are encouraged to take seriously their obligations under the Rome Statute to 
ensure accountability for perpetrators; and that its 53 members of the African Union 
are called to affirm rather than cheapen the AU’s commitment to stamp out impunity 
and ensure responsibility for perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide. This effort is one that African victims of international crimes deserve.  The 
ICC as an integral means by which Africans might end impunity on their continent, 
and civil society and others committed to the work of the ICC in Africa need urgently 
to proclaim the varied and compelling reasons why it can be trusted.  A failure to do 







CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 






On 31 March 2005 the United Nations Security Council by Security Council 
Resolution 1593 referred the conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan, to the International 
Criminal Court.379 Not only is this one of the first cases to come before the world’s 
first permanent international criminal court, it is also the first time the Security 
Council has used its powers under Article 13 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court380 to “refer” a situation to the Court. Consequently, the Court now has 
jurisdiction in respect of a situation in the territory of a State that has not ratified the 
Rome Statute.  On the back of this referral, the Court has also taken the step of issuing 
an indictment for the President of Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.   
In light of the defiant response of the Sudanese government to the Security 
Council’s decision and the ICC’s action against Sudanese suspects, including 
President al-Bashir, this extraordinary jurisdiction raises several questions regarding 
the Court’s ability to enforce the referral. And given the African Union’s strident 
criticism of the Security Council for failing to defer the case – an option under Article 
16 of the Rome Statute, which allows for investigations and prosecutions to be 
suspended for 12-month periods – there is increasing attention being given to the 
question of the deferral power built into the Rome Statute.  
Accordingly, the issue of the Sudan referral and deferral is arguably one of the 
most significant events since the Court’s inception and worthy of close analysis.  The 
need for such an analysis within Africa is moreover heightened by an alignment of 
factors, including the fact that the ICC Appeals Chamber on 3 February 2010 opened 
the possibility that President al-Bashir might also be liable for genocide, in addition to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes;381 the fact that Presidential elections in 
                                                 
378 This chapter is ready to be submitted for publication to an international journal under the title: The 
Law and Politics of Referrals and Deferrals under Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Portions of it have already been published as a monograph: “The 
International Criminal Court that Africa wants”(2010) Institute of Security Studies. 
379 In this chapter the International Criminal Court will be referred to interchangeably as the ICC, the 
Court, and the International Criminal Court. 
380 Referred to herein as the Rome Statute. 
381 In March 2009, Sudan’s President became the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the 
International Criminal Court.  In their original ruling, the judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber issued 
an arrest warrant against President al-Bashir for a total of five counts of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, but the panel threw out charges of genocide that had also been requested by Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo.  The Prosecutor appealed this decision, and on 3 February, 2010, the Appeals 
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Sudan are set for April 2010382 and the concomitant complaint that the ICC’s work is 
interfering with the domestic democratic process within Sudan; and the fact of the 
ICC Review Conference, scheduled for late May early June 2010 in Kampala, 
Uganda, at which the question of the Sudan referral and deferral will in all likelihood 
be considered within the stocktaking session, and thereafter will come to be more 
formally debated at the 9th Assembly of States Parties Meeting in November 2010.383  
The need for a meaningful debate is obvious.  Many of the criticisms of the 
ICC’s involvement in Sudan stem in great measure from a central problem of the 
United Nations – the skewed politics of the Security Council.  Because of the Security 
Council’s legitimacy problem, many States see its work as a cynical exercise of 
authority by great powers. The Security Council’s (dis)engagement with article 16 
since the Rome Statute became operative will have exacerbated rather than softened 
those impressions. And the result for the world’s first permanent international 
criminal court?  The result is that the uneven political landscape of the Security 
Council has become a central problem of the International Criminal Court.  
In this paper consideration is given to the legal procedures and rules relevant 
to Security Council referral of cases to and deferral of cases before the International 
Criminal Court.  In addition, the political factors and complexities implicated in these 
referral and deferral scenarios will be highlighted, with a view to better understanding 
complaints by the African Union and its members that international criminal justice is 
being applied within an uneven global political landscape.   The paper also stresses 
the difference between “deferral” by operation of the Prosecutor’s independent 
decision under Article 53 not to proceeed with an investigation or prosecution out of 
concern for the interests of justice, and a “deferral” by reason of the Security 
Council’s assessment that a prosecution or investigation is not in the interests of peace 
and security. 
The intention of the chapter is to provide a clearer picture of the law and 
politics involved in Security Council referrals and deferrals, and thereby to steer the 
path for more fruitful discussion and recommendations to address the concerns raised 
within and by the African Union (and other developing nations and blocs) arising 
from the International Criminal Court’s work in Sudan, and in particular, the ICC’s 
declared intention of pursuing a case against the incumbent head of state of Sudan, 
President Omar al-Bashir. 
                                                                                                                                            
Chamber rendered its judgment, reversing, by unanimous decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision of 4 
March, 2009, to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in respect 
of the charge of genocide. The Appeals Chamber directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide anew 
whether or not the arrest warrant should be extended to cover the charge of genocide. See further 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pr494 (accessed 12 May 
2009). 
382 See “Sudan’s Coming Elections: How did it come to this? The man at the top of the International 
Criminal Court’s most-wanted list is the favourite to be elected president, if elections take place at all”, 
Jan 14, 2010, The Economist.  
383 It was decided at the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties held in The Hague from 16 to 
26 November 2009 that there would be no formal discussion of the African Union’s proposal regarding 
an amendment to Article 16 (on which see further below), and that that and other proposals would be 
discussed after the Review conference at the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties.  
However, it was decided at the Eighth ASP that the Review Conference will conduct a stocktaking of 
international criminal justice focusing on four topics: complementarity, cooperation, the impact of the 
Rome Statute system on victims and affected communities, and peace and justice. 
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The ICC’s jurisdiction and the Security Council 
 
The “revolutionary institution”384 that is the International Criminal Court came into 
force on 1 July 2002 and is the culmination of initiatives that began after World War 
I. The founding document of the court is the Rome Statute, which was adopted after 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of a Permanent International Criminal Court in Rome on 17 July 1998.385 The Statute 
empowers the Court to prosecute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. Cassese noted in 1999386 that only in time will one be able to gauge 
the effect the introduction of this institution will have on the international legal order.  
As we shall see in this paper, time is beginning to tell: the Court has made significant 
strides and in respect of the Sudan referral probably its most significant stride to date, 
including the indictment of Sudan’s sitting president, President Omar al-Bashir. 
In reviewing the establishment of the International Criminal Court it is 
necessary to take account of the “unhappy and extravagant”387 objections of the 
United States to the Court. The United States, as is well known, has opposed the 
Court388 and does not stand alone in its opposition to the ICC: it has rather unlikely 
allies in the form of China, Iraq and Libya, and a more predictable ally in Israel.  
Together these states formed part of a group of only seven countries that voted against 
the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court.389   
It is not insignificant that the P5 States – some of whom stood and still stand 
outside the Court’s statute – are able nevertheless to exert influence over the ICC 
through the Security Council. Thus, for instance, the United States (which is not a 
state party) was able implicitly to endorse the referral of the Darfur situation to the 
ICC, and may threaten to veto a deferral of the Court’s work in Sudan.  And while 
Sudan – a non-state party – is before the ICC, the United States will ensure that the 
crimes committed by Israel (another non-state party) during Operation Cast Lead are 
never investigated by the Court.    
The Rome Statute was drafted by a plethora of the world’s states and 
accordingly the Court was established by way of a multi-lateral treaty.  This is a 
significant feature of the ICC system.  In the first place, it highlights that states parties 
have a duty to respect the Court’s legal mandate and to assist and cooperate with the 
Court in the achievement of its functions.  In the second place, it highlights that the 
ICC is not a universal court.  Unless its jurisdiction is extended to a situation on the 
                                                 
384 Antonio Cassese “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections” 
(1999) 10(1) European Journal of International Law 145.  
385 Phenyo Keiseng Rakate “An International Criminal Court for a new millennium –The Rome 
Conference” (1998) 23 South African Yearbook of International Law 217.  
386 Cassese supra note 384 145. 
387 James Crawford “The drafting of the Rome Statute” in Philippe Sands (ed) From Nuremberg to The 
Hague (2003) 109.  
388 For a discussion of US opposition to the ICC, see Max du Plessis “Seeking and International 
International Criminal Court” (2002) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 301-320. 
389 Michael Scharf “The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s Jurisdiction 
over the Nationals of Non-party States: A Critique of the U.S. position” (2001) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 64. 
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territory of a non-State party by a Security Council referral under Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute, the Court may only exercise territorial jurisdiction or personal 
jurisdiction in relation to states that are parties to the Rome Statute. The exceptional 
quality of the Court’s jurisdiction is highlighted by the fact that the Court is a novel 
mechanism which does not base its jurisdiction solely on the Security Council’s 
chapter VII power as do the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
nor “Special Agreements” such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  Rather the 
Court ‘inherits’ the jurisdiction of State parties to the Rome Statute. In this respect the 
Court has jurisdiction ratione loci as well as jurisdiction ratione personae. The former 
grants the Court jurisdiction over crime committed in the territory of a State party and 
the latter grants it jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals of a State party.  
The ICC is thus primarily a treaty-based mechanism and does not have 
universal jurisdiction of its own. The abovementioned jurisdictional limitations of the 
Court are particularly important for our purposes as it is precisely these limitations 
that necessitated the referral brought about by Security Council resolution 1593.   
 
Referrals: the law and the politics 
 
Article 13 – a legal means for “positive” political intervention 
 
The Rome Statute acknowledges an important role for the Security Council of the 
United Nations by allowing the Council to influence the work of the Court in two 
essential matters. As we have seen, aside from the territoriality and nationality 
triggers for the Court’s jurisdiction, one further means by which the Court might 
come to deal with a case is by way of a Security Council referral.  Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute provides the Council an opportunity for  “positive” intervention in the 
following terms: 
 
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: … (b) A situation 
in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations …”. 
 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in turn declares that:   
 
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide which measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security”. 
 
These two provisions together envisage a situation where the Security Council, acting 
under its Chapter VII authority, refers a situation to the ICC for investigation and 
possible prosecution.  Through such a referral the Court may be seized with 
jurisdiction in relation to crimes committed on the territory of a state that is not party 
to the ICC regime, such as Sudan.  A referral by the Security Council provides the 
ICC with jurisdiction over countries and their nationals, irrespective of whether those 
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countries are party to the Rome Statute.390 The reason for this is that the Court’s 
jurisdiction under an Article 13(b) referral comes from a resolution by the Security 
Council, such resolutions being binding on all member States of the UN.  In order for 
the referral to be lawful it must be exercised in accordance with Chapter VII; that is, 
the situation referred to the Court must constitute a ‘threat to peace and security’ 
within the international community.  Such a referral of a matter to the Court by the 
Security Council must be seen for what it is however, namely, an exceptional 
occurrence which until recently appeared highly unlikely judging from the initial 
responses to the Court, specifically from veto-bearing States such as the US and 
China.  
One of the most divisive issues at the Rome Conference, described by Cassese 
as a clash “between sovereignty-oriented countries and states eager to implement the 
rule of law in the world community”,391 was the question of how prosecution would 
be initiated in the International Criminal Court. On the one side the “like-minded 
countries” argued for a progressive prosecutorial regime whereby the prosecutor 
could undertake proprio motu prosecutions.  On the other side, United Nations 
Security Council veto-bearing states such as China and the United States predictably 
sought a court that would be subject to Security Council control. As Schabas points 
out the real reason for the United States’ well-recorded contempt for the International 
Criminal Court is the peripheral role the Security Council plays in the Court’s 
functioning.392   
In the end the Rome Statute reserved power to the Security Council to refer 
“situations” to it pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Court’s Statute.  This referral power 
has far-reaching implications for many States, particularly for the Court’s detractors.  
That is because, as pointed out earlier, the Court potentially has jurisdiction that 
covers the territory of every State in the world, whether or not the State in question is 
a party to the Statute.393  This extraordinary and controversial jurisdiction stems from 
the binding nature of Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council on all UN 
member States.  In this sense the Security Council referral process “operates in the 
spirit of the UN collective security framework”.394 
Article 13(b) then is especially important in relation to intra-state conflicts 
involving States that are not part to the Rome Statute, such as Sudan. This is because 
these States, which may either directly or indirectly be involved in the atrocities 
committed, would be beyond the grasp of the ICC. Consequently, Cassese calls this 
article the “sledgehammer” of the ICC, which “may prove to be the most effective to 
seize the Court whenever situations similar to those in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda occur”.395 
                                                 
390 Bourgon “Jurisdiction ratione loci” in Antonio Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 556.   
391 Cassese supra note 384 161. 
392 William A. Schabas “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: Its All About the 
Security Council” (2004) 15(4) European Journal of International Law 701-720. 
393 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden “The International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution” 
(2000) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 404. 
394 See Gerry Simpson, “Politics, Sovereignty and Remembrance” (2004) in Dominic McGoldrick et al 
(eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues 56. 
395 Cassese supra note 384 161. 
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From a legal perspective, it is enough to point that that apart from article 13(b) of 
the Rome Statute, there is limited guidance under the Statute on the mechanics of a 
Security Council referral to the ICC.   The exercise of the powers of referral by the 
Security Council is however submitted to specific conditions arising from its 
competence under the UN Charter and from the inherent characteristics of a 
permanent international criminal court as established by the Statute.396  The most 
important of these are two substantial conditions that arise directly from article 39 of 
the UN Charter:  
 
“(a) the Security Council can take action only if it determines, in the first place, 
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; 
and (b) the measures taken must pursue the objective of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security”.  
 
The Council has a wide discretion in determining the exercise of these conditions, 
but the following factors will play a role: 
• the gravity of the crimes committed; 
• the impunity enjoyed by the crimes’ perpetrators; and 
• the effectiveness or otherwise of national jurisdictions in the prosecution of 
these crimes.397 
It might also be noted that the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations 
and the ICC makes provision for cooperative steps to be taken by the two institutions 
in respect of a referral: 
 
“Article 17. Cooperation between the Security Council of the United 
Nations and the Court 
1. When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, decides to refer to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 13, 
paragraph (b), of the Statute, a situation in which one or more of the crimes 
referred to in article 5 of the Statute appears to have been committed, the 
Secretary-General shall immediately transmit the written decision of the 
Security Council to the Prosecutor together with documents and other 
materials that may be pertinent to the decision of the Council. The Court 
undertakes to keep the Security Council informed in this regard in accordance 
with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Such information 
shall be transmitted through the Secretary-General. 
… 
3. Where a matter has been referred to the Court by the Security Council and 
the Court makes a finding, pursuant to article 87, paragraph 5 (b) or paragraph 
7, of the Statute, of a failure by a State to cooperate with the Court, the Court 
shall inform the Security Council or refer the matter to it, as the case may be, 
and the Registrar shall convey to the Security Council through the Secretary-
General the decision of the Court, together with relevant information in the 
case. The Security Council, through the Secretary-General, shall inform the 
                                                 
396 See generally Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando “Referral and Deferral by the Security 
Council” in Antonio Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary 1 (2002) 630 et seq. 
397 Ibid 631. 
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Court through the Registrar of action, if any, taken by it under the 
circumstances.” 
 
We thus see that article 13(b) of the Rome Statute is narrowly drawn,398 providing 
merely for the possibility of a referral to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
“acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.  Given this paucity 
of guidance under the Statute, the Sudan referral remains the guiding (and only) 
precedent; and we would do well therefore to consider in detail the facts that 
contextualise the referral.  As demonstrated below, there are positive lessons, but also 
very many negative ones, to be drawn from the referral. 
 
The Sudan referral: good guide, bad guide? 
   
i)  The facts that gave rise to the Sudan referral 
 
On 31 March 2005 the United Nations Security Council for the first time 
invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as read with Article 13(b) of 
the Rome Statute and referred the conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan, to the 
International Criminal Court. 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a territory covering about 2.5 million 
square kilometres and has an estimated population of 39 million. It shares borders 
with Egypt in the North, the Red Sea, Eritrea and Ethiopia in the East, Uganda, Kenya 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the South, and the Central African 
Republic, Chad and Libya in the West. The predominant religion in Sudan is Islam 
and the predominant language is Arabic.399 
Sudan has a violent history.  Since gaining independence in 1956 it has been 
ruled by military regimes (occasionally interspersed with periods of democratic rule) 
and power has repeatedly come to be had through coups d’état.400 The current 
President, General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, came to power after a coup d’état in June 
1989, which resulted in the exile or imprisonment of many Sudanese.401 
Since February 2003 the region of Darfur in Western Sudan has been ravaged 
by mass scale atrocities seemingly motivated by underlying racial tensions. The 
conflict is rooted in tensions over arable land. There was sporadic violence reported in 
the 80s and 90s402 with clashes between “African” and “Arab” tribes.  The fighting 
has been further exacerbated by “competing economic interests” (largely over oil 
reserves) and the “political polarisation” of the region.403  
                                                 
398 The other two trigger mechanisms by contrast are regulated in detail: see article 13 read with article 
14 (for the referral of a situation by a State Party) and article 15 (for a proprio motu investigation by 
the ICC Prosecutor). 
399 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General, February 2005 paras. 40 – 41.  
400 Ibid para. 43. 
401 Ibid para. 47. 
402 Ibid para. 58 
403 Ibid para. 60. 
 114 
The tensions simmered over in April 2003, when the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A), made up of discontented “African” rebels, attacked 
numerous government installations. One such attack was on an airport in al-Fashir in 
which seventy-five Sudanese soldiers were killed.  In response, the Sudanese 
Government, relying on the underlying racial tensions in the region, called on local 
tribes to assist in repelling the rebels. Evidence suggests that the Sudanese 
government then armed and provided military support, largely in the form of air 
support, to the “Arab” militia (known as the janjaweed),404 who have since killed, 
raped and robbed black “Africans”. Although the Sudanese government continues to 
deny any involvement in these atrocities,405 survivors and aid workers, as well as the 
UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and numerous human rights 
organisations,406 confirm it. The Sudanese government admits creating “self-defence 
militias”407 (paramilitary units known as the Popular Defence Forces (PDF)) but 
denies any involvement with the janjaweed which has been responsible for the 
majority of the violence.  
The situation in western Darfur has been exacerbated and complicated by the 
ongoing north-south civil war in Sudan, which began in 1983 and finally ended on 9 
January 2005 when the First-Vice President Taha and Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army Chairman John Garang signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is 
estimated that two million people have died as result of this 21-year civil war408 and it 
has been suggested that the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in this conflict paved the way for the atrocities committed in 
Darfur.  
In March 2004 the Secretary-General of the UN spoke out fervently against the 
conflict in Darfur calling the “civilian casualties and human rights violations 
unacceptable” and expressing his grave concern regarding the situation in Darfur.409 
In response, the Security Council in February 2005 unanimously passed a resolution 
to deploy 10 000 peacekeepers to southern Sudan to monitor the peace treaty.  This 
followed a decision in May 2004 by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Governments of the African Union to deploy the African Mission in Sudan to monitor 
the situation in Darfur.  
                                                 
404 This is a local Arabic colloquialism which, loosely translated, means “devils on horseback” and has 
been used by locals to describe Arab militiamen and the Security Council in Resolution 1564. Ibid 
para.  100. 
405  “Arms and injustice continue to fuel the war in Sudan” (2005) 35(1) The Wire 4. 
406 Ibid.  Also, in a video interview given to Human Rights Watch, an alleged top militia leader, Musa 
Hilal, said that the Sudanese government “backed and directed Janjaweed activities in northern 
Darfur”. Although Hilal denied that he was a leader of the militia and that any of his followers had 
committed atrocities, various eyewitness accounts contradict his assertions. Human Rights Watch also 
claim to be in possession of government documents that evidence Khartoum’s official support of Hilal. 
See “Darfur: Militia leader implicates Khartoum: Janjaweed Chief says Sudan Government backed 
attacks” Human Rights Watch,  available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/02/darfur10228.htm 
(accessed 16 May 2009). 
407 “Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur conflict” BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm (accessed 16 May 2009). 
408 “UN imposes sanctions over Darfur” BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/4392605.stm (accessed 16 May 2009). 
409 “Sudan: Annan warns of ‘devastating impact’ of fighting in Darfur region” UN News, available at 




ii)  The UN commission of enquiry 
 
The Security Council had also previously adopted resolution 1564 which charged the 
Secretary-General with establishing a commission of inquiry  
 
“to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts 
of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations 
with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable”. 
 
The Darfur Commission presented its report to the Security Council in February 
2005.  The Commission, under the leadership of Professor Antonio Cassese, fulfilled 
its mandate by visiting Sudan on two occasions.  
On its first visit, from 8 to 20 November 2004, the Commission met with 
various senior government officials, non-governmental organization representatives, 
political parties and United Nations officials from Sudan. It met with witnesses to 
atrocities, internally displaced persons, tribal leaders and also visited refugee camps in 
Chad.  
On its second visit, from 9 to 16 January 2005, the Commission interviewed 
witnesses and met further with officials and UN staff. The Commission also sent a 
member to Eritrea over 25 to 26 November 2004 to meet with representatives of the 
rebel groups. Two members of the Commission also met with a delegation from the 
African Union from 30 November to 3 December 2004 in Addis Ababa to discuss the 
AU’s role in resolving the situation in Sudan.410 The Commission reported that on the 
whole the Government of Sudan, as well as the rebel groups willingly co-operated 
with the Commission. 
The Commission reported that the term janjaweed is being used to describe 
members of the PDF and other government agencies as well as the Arab militia,411 
which suggests that the distinction proffered by the government is a false one. In any 
event, the Commission found that evidence suggests that members of all of these 
groups were guilty of committing “violations of international human rights law and 
humanitarian law” and that “clear links” exist between all of these groups and the 
Sudanese government.412 On the basis of these links and the circumstances 
surrounding the various attacks, the Commission found that, in most instances, the 
relevant Government officials could be held criminally responsible for the crimes 
committed by these groups on the basis of the doctrine of common purpose or the 
notion of superior responsibility.413 
The Commission also found that the various reported attacks by the government 
and the janjaweed on civilians constituted “large-scale war crimes” and that the mass 
killing of civilians by the government and the janjaweed were both widespread and 
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411 Ibid paras. 104 – 105. 
412 Ibid paras. 110 – 111. 
413 Ibid paras. 121 – 126. 
 116 
systematic, and, as such, were “likely to amount to a crime against humanity”.414 With 
regard to the rebels, the Commission found that although they were also responsible 
for attacks on civilians, there was no evidence to suggest that these attacks were 
widespread or systematic. Therefore, while the killing of a civilian by the rebels 
would amount to a very serious war crime, the Commission did not conclude that 
these constituted crimes against humanity.415 Important, given the horrific sexual 
violence committed against women and children in Darfur, is that the Commission 
found that “rape or other forms of sexual violence committed by the janjaweed and 
Government soldiers in Darfur was widespread and systematic and may thus well 
amount to a crime against humanity”, as would the crime of sexual slavery.416 
Regarding the question of genocide, the Commission concluded that the 
Government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide. The Commission came 
to this conclusion on the basis of the absence of the crucial element of genocidal 
intent on behalf of the government. However, the Commission did not rule out the 
possibility of individuals involved in the conflict possessing the requisite genocidal 
intent. The Commission was resolute in pointing out that its conclusion with respect 
to genocide “should not be taken as in any way detracting from, or belittling, the 
gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region”.417 
As far as the Commission’s objective of identifying perpetrators goes, it decided 
to withhold the names from the public domain and instead placed them in the custody 
of the Secretary-General who would deliver them to the relevant prosecutor.418 
The Commission found that as far as mechanisms for ensuring accountability 
for the atrocities committed in Sudan are concerned, the “Sudanese courts are unable 
and unwilling to prosecute and try the alleged offenders… Other mechanisms are 
needed to do justice”.419 (As pointed out earlier in this thesis, this is no small finding).  
The complementarity principle built into the Rome Statute Statute might be relied on 
by the Sudanense government (even as a non-party State) to argue that it is willing 
and able to prosecute the offenders.  Should it in fact be willing and able, then the 
ICC may have to acquiesce in the prosecution of offenders so as to allow the 
Sudanese authorities to perform domestic prosecutions.  It is apparently for this 
reason that the Commission saw fit to stress that the Sudanese courts are unable and 
unwilling to prosecute and try the alleged offenders, thereby clearing the way for a 
“clean” referral of the matter by the Security Council to the ICC.  
The Commission’s final recommendation was that the Security Council refer 
the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court “to protect the civilians of 
Darfur and end the rampant impunity currently prevailing there”.420 The Commission 
endorsed the ICC as the “only credible way of bringing alleged perpetrators to 
justice”.421 The Commission also recommended that the Security Council establish a 
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Compensation Commission to provide compensation to the numerous victims of the 
atrocities committed in Darfur.  
On 31 March 2005 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1593, referring 
the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the International Criminal Court. 
 
iii)  Why the ICC was considered appropriate to deal with the crimes committed in 
Darfur 
 
It is important to highlight the reasons advanced by the Darfur Commission’s 
recommendation that the Security Council refer the situation in Darfur to the 
International Criminal Court.  No doubt these considerations played a role in the 
Security Council’s determination of whether it ought to exercise its powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to refer the matter to the ICC.  According to the 
Commission there were at least six major benefits to a referral to the ICC.   
First, the prosecution of the crimes committed would be conducive to peace and 
security in Darfur.  
Second, the ICC, as the “only truly international institution of criminal justice” 
would ensure justice is done regardless of the authority of prestige of the perpetrators 
as the ICC sits in The Hague, far from the perpetrators’ spheres of influence.  
Third, the cumulative authority of the ICC and the Security Council would be 
required to compel those leaders responsible to acquiesce to investigation and 
potential prosecution. 
Fourth, the ICC is the “best suited organ for ensuring a veritably fair trial of 
those indicted by the Court Prosecutor” due to its international composition and 
established rules of procedure.  
Fifth, the ICC is the only international court that can investigate and prosecute 
without delay. 
 Sixth, the ICC is the most cost-effective option.422  
Thereafter, the Commission detailed why it considered other possible judicial 
mechanisms inadvisable. The Commission also provided cogent reasons against the 
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, such as those for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, on the 
grounds that they are both expensive and notoriously dilatory in the prosecution and 
punishment of offenders and consequently the “political will” required within the 
international community to establish tribunals of this nature would be absent.423 Also, 
protracted expansion procedures, already overburdened schedules and similar 
concerns regarding cost, militated against the expansion of the existing ad hoc 
tribunals.424 Similarly, concerns regarding, inter alia, delays endemic in establishing 
infrastructure as well as unavoidable cost implications went against the creation of 
“mixed courts” such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone.425 
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In advocating the referral of the situation in Darfur by the Security Council, the 
Commission pointed out that the situation in Darfur meets the requirement of Chapter 
VII, in that it constitutes a “threat to peace and security” as was acknowledged by the 
Security Council in its resolutions 1556 and 1564. Furthermore, the Commission also 
took note of the Security Council’s emphasis in these resolutions of the “need to put a 
stop to impunity in Darfur, for the end of such impunity would contribute to restoring 
security in the region”.426 
 
iv)  The problems begin: the ambivalent text of SC resolution 1593 
 
For the reasons set out above the Sudan referral appears to be a good example of the 
Security Council acting in compliance with article 39 of the UN Charter by 
considering that the crisis in Sudan was sufficient for it to take action because of the 
existence of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace; and thereby concluding that 
an article 13(b) referral of the situation to the ICC would be a suitable measure to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.  The lead-up to the referral – and 
in particular the Security Council’s decision to invoke the assistance of an 
independent Commission of Enquiry – reflect well on the process.  
 However, there are significant difficulties with the referral itself, which arise 
both at the level of politics and at the level of law. 
 Starting with the politics: paragraph 6 of SC Resolution 1593 includes an odd 
statement.  It reflects that the Security Council: 
 
“Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of that contributing state for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or 
related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the 
African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived 
by that contributing State.” 
 
It is an open secret that the paragraph was inserted to mollify the United States, and to 
ensure that it did not exercise its veto (it instead abstained) during voting on SC 
Resolution 1593.  However, this form of immunity for non-parties’ nationals sits 
uncomfortably within a Security Council referral of a situation on the territory of a 
non-party state to the International Criminal Court.  As the representative for 
Denmark said in a statement at the time Resolution 1593 was adopted: “We also 
believe that the International Criminal Court (ICC) may be a casualty of resolution 
1593 (2005).  Operative paragraph 6 of the resolution is killing its credibility – softly, 
perhaps, but killing it nevertheless”.427 
 Now to the law: it is accepted by international lawyers that paragraph 6 is 
legally invalid.  As Schabas points out: 
 
                                                 
426 Ibid para. 590. 
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3rd ed (2007) 156. 
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“This is quite plainly contrary to treaty provisions binding upon virtually all 
United Nations Member States, including the United States.  It is well known 
that the four Geneva Conventions oblige a State Party ‘to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches, and [to] bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts’.  Similar duties are imposed by the Convention Against Torture.  
But Resolution 1593 tells them to do the opposite”.428 
  
It is also incompatible with the Rome Statute, it being recalled that when Uganda self-
referred violations by the rebel Lords Resistance Army to the ICC in a manner which 
avoided scrutiny of violations by Government soldiers, the Prosecutor of the Court 
(after an initial misstep) clarified that no such exception could be effective.429  As 
Schabas highlights: 
 
“Indeed, this is why the concept of referral in the Rome Statute relates to 
‘situations’ rather than to ‘cases’.  The language was adopted specifically to 
avoid the danger of one-sided referrals, which could undermine the legitimacy 
of the institution.  But, when the Security Council performed a similar 
manoeuvre, the Prosecutor was silent.  He might have sent the Resolution 
back, telling the Security Council that it was impossible to proceed on such a 
basis, and to reprise the adoption without paragraph 6.”430 
 
The politicised nature of the referral is thus self-evident, yet “[t]hose States favouring 
referral to the Court must have felt that they had the better of the Americans, and that 
the poisonous [paragraph] injected by the latter did not fatally compromise the 
referral itself”.431 
 
v)  A luta continua: the ongoing difficulty of enforcing SC resolution 1593 
  
There are other, perhaps more serious, problems with Resolution 1593.  Arguably the 
most glaring is that regarding cooperation with the Court.  Paragraph 2 of the 
Resolution states as follows: 
 
“Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in 
Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the 
Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing 
that States not party to the Rome Statute have obligation under the Statute, 
urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations 
to cooperate fully”. 
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This language is obtuse and the expression “cooperate fully” is made without 
reference to the legal framework in the Rome Statute applicable to Sudan’s 
cooperation duties.432  As Goran Sluiter points out: 
 
“‘Full cooperation’ is a complex legal notion, and may be subject to various 
interpretations.  One may be tempted – with a view to effectively combating 
impunity – to regard it as imposing an unconditional obligation of result, in 
the sense that every request for assistance must be executed.  The problem, 
however, is that full applicability, mutatis mutandis, of Part 9 of the [Rome] 
Statute is inconsistent with such a notion of ‘full cooperation’, because it 
contains a number of grounds for justifying refusal of cooperation”.433 
 
In his June 2006 address to the Security Council, Luis Moreno Ocampo stated that:434 
 
“I wish to emphasize … that we are now entering a new phase where 
unconditional cooperation will be essential to complete the investigation and 
identify those most responsible for crimes committed in Darfur in an 
expeditious manner. Our speed will depend on the cooperation received.” 
 
Following the Prosecution’s identification of those most responsible for the 
crimes selected for prosecution, cooperation from the Government of Sudan or the 
Security Council will not only expedite the prosecution of such individuals, but will 
be a sine qua non for such prosecutions.  
Although the Government of Sudan has cooperated with the ICC on certain 
issues, such cooperation appears to be limited to supplying information in support of 
their assertion that their national “accountability mechanisms” preclude the ICC’s 
involvement on the basis of complementarity.435 This is clearly illustrated by the 
recent statement by the Sudanese Justice Minister that: “If they are here to discuss the 
progress of trials or the role of national justice then we are ready to give them 
whatever information they are looking for…But if the matter is about investigations, 
then they ... don't have the jurisdiction.”436 
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On the assumption then that there may be a number of cases declared 
admissible before the International Criminal Court, how will the ICC carry out its 
investigations and ultimate prosecutions?  As Cassese has stressed:437 
 
“[T]he principal problem with the enforcement of international humanitarian 
law through the prosecution and punishment of individuals is that the 
implementation of this method ultimately hinges on, and depends upon, the 
goodwill of states”. 
 
This “goodwill” is vital in intra-state conflicts such as the conflict in Sudan.  De 
Waynecourt-Steele has noted that “[o]ver the last few decades, many of the [ICC] 
crimes have been committed internally, that is, by organs of the state or by persons 
controlled by the state, against nationals of that state”.438 Consequently,  the State 
with jurisdiction over the the majority of these crimes is the same State that was 
involved in the perpetration of the crimes.  This has an obviously severe impact on the 
‘the [C]ourt’s ability to fulfil the Rome Statutes mandate’.439  The fact that such an 
internal conflict has been referred to the ICC by the Security Council under Article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute does not detract from these problems.  
 The Court’s task is complicated and aggravated by the fact that because 
Sudan is not a State party to the ICC, it owes no treaty obligations to the Court. This 
is an inevitable problem with the referral of situations involving non-party States to 
the ICC as the referral extends the Court’s jurisdiction beyond the enforcement 
parameters of the Rome Statute, leaving the Court to rely on the Security Council to 
enforce that jurisdiction.   This problem is one that was foreseen by the drafters of the 
ICC Statute, but which was never satisfactorily attended to. 
Cassese proposes that there are two definitive state cooperation regimes in 
international criminal law:  the inter-state regime and the supra-state regime. Under 
the inter-state regime, the Court concerned has no “superior authority over states 
except for the legal power to adjudicate crimes perpetrated by individuals subject to 
state sovereignty”. In terms of this regime, “the Court cannot in any way force states 
to lend their cooperation, let alone exercise coercive powers within the territory of 
sovereign states.” 440 
Under the supra-state regime it is presumed that “the international judicial 
body is vested with sweeping powers not only vis-à-vis individuals subject to the 
sovereign authority of states, but also towards states themselves”.441 In terms of this 
regime, the court is empowered to issue binding orders to states and, in case of non-
compliance, may set in motion enforcement procedures. It is generally accepted that 
the ICTY and ICTR – being bodies created by the Security Council – fall within the 
remit of the “supra-state” model.   
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The provisions of the Rome Statute that relate to “International Cooperation 
and Judicial Assistance” are Articles 86 to 102. Article 86 places a general obligation 
on State Parties to cooperate with the Court and Articles 87 and 88 deal with the 
pragmatics of State party cooperation. The remaining Articles deal with a variety of 
issues, including: requests for surrender, competing requests, provisional arrests, 
postponements, costs and other forms of cooperation. These provisions are not limited 
to State party cooperation but empower the court, in various instances to request the 
cooperation of non-party States as well. An example of this is Article 89 which 
provides that “the Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a 
person …. to any State on the territory of which that person may be found…” 
(emphasis added). 
Because the Rome Statute is a treaty-based legal instrument, States were able 
to set out exactly “how they wish international justice to work”.  In so doing, they 
appear to have adopted “a mostly state-oriented approach”.442 This is apparent from at 
least the following four features of the Statute:443 
 
i) The Rome Statute does not provide that the execution of judicial 
processes must be done by agents of the Prosecutor and, in light of the 
“insistence in the Statute on the need to comply with the requirements 
of national legislation”, one must assume that these processes will be 
executed by the relevant authorities within the respective State. 
 
ii) Although Article 87(7) does allow the Court to refer a recalcitrant state 
to the Assembly of State Parties or the Security Council in the case of 
an Article 13 Security Council referral, it does not set out any 
consequences that might be incurred as a result of the State’s 
recalcitrance.  
 
iii) In terms of Article 90(6) and (7), when faced with two conflicting 
requests, a State may choose whether to comply with a request for 
surrender from the Court or a request for extradition from a non-party 
State. 
 
iv) Article 93(4) creates a “national security exception” that a State may 
use to refuse to cooperate with the Court.444  
 
Consequently, the Rome Statute represents the conservative consensus of states 
regarding the practices relating to state cooperation. Arguably, therefore, the judges of 
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the ICC do not have the same latitude as their counterparts in the ad hoc tribunals to 
adopt far-reaching and sovereignty-inhibiting formulations of the provisions relating 
to the cooperation of States. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which carry the imprimatur of the Security Council, the 
International Criminal Court is a creature created by states, and limited by state 
sovereignty concerns.  It is thus possible that the ICC will be obliged to follow an 
inter-state model in terms of which the court has no “superior authority over states’ 
and is unable in ‘any way [to] force states to lend their cooperation”.445 This would be 
debilitating for those wishing to see justice in Darfur.   As Cassese notes: 
 
“[T]he framers of the Rome Statute were not sufficiently bold to jettison the 
sovereignty-oriented approach to state cooperation with the Court and opt for 
a ‘supra-national’ approach. Instead of granting the Court greater authority 
over states, the draughtsmen have left too many loopholes permitting states to 
delay or even thwart the Court’s proceedings.”446 
 
On the other hand, the referral of a situation to the Court by the Security Council is by 
no means an ordinary event. A referral adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
extends the Court’s jurisdiction to all UN member States, including Sudan. There are 
certain provisions in the Rome Statute that indicate that there is a distinction between 
Article 13 referrals and the other instances whereby the Court become seized with a 
matter.  These provisions suggest that an Article 13 referral stands as an exception to 
the otherwise debilitating “state-orientated” approach that resonates through the other 
jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute. For example, Article 12(2) requires that 
one or more of the States with jurisdiction over the crimes concerned in terms of 
territoriality or nationality must be a State party to the Statute.   
This requirement does not apply in the instance of a Security Council referral 
under Article 13(b). De Waynecourt-Steele suggests that this means that “a referral by 
the SC automatically establishes the jurisdictional competence of the court and 
provides a potentially powerful basis for the enforcement of individual criminal 
responsibility upon non-party States to the Rome Statute”.447  Similarly, Article 18(1) 
states that once a Prosecutor has ‘determined that there would be a reasonable basis to 
commence an investigation’, he or she must notify all States who would ‘normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned’. However, this provision only applies 
to referrals by State parties and Prosecutor-initiated proceedings and its application is 
explicitly excluded as far as Article 13(b) referrals are concerned.  
These two Articles, 12(2) and 18(1), suggest that there is less deference owed 
to States and their sovereignty, in terms of consent and notification, in the case of an 
Article 13(b) referral.  Finally, in terms of Article 87(7), if a State party refuses to 
comply with a request from the Court for cooperation, it may be referred to the 
Assembly of States, or, in the event of an Article 13(b) referral, to the Security 
Council. This article demonstrates that there is a difference regarding enforcement of 
an order of the Court in a matter where the Court has been seized with jurisdiction in 
terms of Article 13(b) – such matters are to be left to the Security Council.  
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Accordingly, a Security Council referral may clothe the ICC with enforcement 
powers that are akin to those of the ad hoc tribunals in The Hague.448  In the instance 
of a referral, the Court is on all fours with the ICTY or the ICTR in that it has a 
mandate from the Security Council to bring justice to a situation, and it will act, for 
all intents and purposes, as a supra-state institution.  In Tadic, the ICTY discussed the 
nature of the Security Council’s Chapter VII power and stated that: 
“These powers are coercive vis-à-vis the culprit State or entity. But they are 
also mandatory vis-à-vis the other Member States, who are under an 
obligation to cooperate with the Organization (Article 2, paragraph 5, Articles 
25, 48) and with one another (Articles 49), in the implementation of the action 
or measures decided by the Security Council”.449 
The problem of recalcitrant states was also experienced by the ICTY and the approach 
there adopted in dealing with such states is of assistance to the Court in dealing with 
the potentially recalcitrant Sudan. The mechanism adopted by the ICTY is a rule 61 
proceeding in terms of which the ICTY reports a state that has refused to execute its 
warrants of arrest to the Security Council which would then, in turn, take appropriate 
action against the state concerned. Were the ICC to follow this example, then, 
according to Sadat & Carden, this would involve the ICC making ‘findings of 
noncompliance’ and directing them to the Security Council.450 The ICC would then be 
at the mercy of the Security Council to adopt a similar procedure against a recalcitrant 
Sudan as it could not force the Security Council to ensure Sudan’s cooperation.   
One thing is manifestly clear:  active Security Council involvement will prove 
vital for the effective functioning of the ICC.  As one noted author points out: 
 
“[T]he Security Council could decide that compliance by all UN Member States 
with a particular ICC decision is a measure necessary for the maintenance of 
peace and security pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter, and, as such, bind all 
UN Member States under Article 25 of the Charter to comply with specific ICC 
decisions”.451 
 
From the aforegoing discussion it is apparent that the referral represents many 
challenges for the ICC. As Cassese suggests, whilst  
 
“the establishment of such tribunals [as the ICC] constitutes a major inroad into 
the traditional omnipotence of sovereign states’, regrettably ‘state sovereignty 
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resurfaces when it comes to the day-to-day operations of the Tribunal and its 
ability to fulfil its mandate.”452 
 
 In addition to the complexities of the Sudan referral and its meaningful 
enforcement with (and increasingly, it would appear, without) the assistance of the 
Security Council, the situation is complicated even further by increasing calls by the 
African Union and aligned partners that the Sudan investigation in respect of 
President Al-Bashir be deferred by a further Security Council resolution pursuant to 
article 16.   Before coming to a discussion of the legal and political ramifications of 
such deferral power, it is important to consider two matters: 
 The first is the manner in which the ICC is dealing with the Sudan referral, and 
thereby to understand that the Prosecutor’s investigations in relation to Sudan stand 
independently from the Security Council referral that triggered the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the first place; 
 The second is the ICC’s responsibility to respect the complementarity principle, 
and to defer under Article 53 of the Rome Statute to any meaningful local 
investigation and/or prosecution within Sudan of the crimes that are in the Court’s 
purview. 
 
Security Council referrals and prosecutorial investigations: a 





Article 13 is limited to cases where ICC crimes appear to have been committed and 
the situation “is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.453 
 The text of article 13 thus itself indicates that the Council is empowered to 
refer cases to the Prosecutor of the ICC. It is for the prosecutor to independently 
decide what and who should be investigated from the “situation” which the Security 
Council has chosen to refer to the Court. Two important points may be made here.  
First, article 13 retains such an independent power of assessment for the Prosecutor 
because of the considerable importance placed by certain states on the ICC being an 
independent judicial institution free from political influence, including the United 
Nations and in particular its politicised Security Council.  Second, because of this 
independent discretion, the fact that the Security Council has referred a situation to 
the Prosecutor does not necessarily mean that the Prosecutor will investigate the case 
or that the referral will lead to prosecution. 
 This is amply demonstrated by the Prosecutor’s work in response to Security 
Council resolution 1593 referring the Sudan situation to the ICC.  Following the 
referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC by the Security Council, the various ICC 
mechanisms were engaged. First, the ICC Prosecutor was required to inform the ICC 
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453 Emphasis added. 
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judges of the referral of a situation, which the Prosecutor duly did by way of a letter 
on 4 April 2005. Subsequently, on 21 April 2005, the situation in Darfur was assigned 




We have seen that the Prosecutor is not obliged to investigate and prosecute a situation at 
the behest of the Security Council. His duty to make an independent assessment whether 
or not such investigations and prosecutions are warranted is affirmed by Article 53 of the 
Rome Statute. In this regard Article 53 (1) states that:  
 
“[t]he Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or 
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable 
basis to proceed under this Statute”.  
 
This pre-investigation phase has been termed the preliminary analysis of the situation. 
 Accordingly, the ICC prosecutor, pursuant to the referral and in terms of 
Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute, began by gathering and assessing relevant 
information in order to determine whether there was a reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation into the crimes committed in Sudan.  Article 53(1) of the Statute 
enunciates three considerations that inform his decision regarding whether or not to 
initiate an investigation: whether a crime has been or is being committed within the 
Court’s jurisdiction; whether complementarity precludes admissibility, and; whether 
or not the interests of justice militate against initiating an investigation.455 To assist 
with this process, the Prosecutor received a list of 50 names as well as over 2500 
evidential items from the Darfur Commission.456 The Prosecutor indicated that he did 
not consider the list of names binding and may undertake his own investigation to 
determine which individuals bear the “greatest responsibility for the crimes to be 
prosecuted by the Court”.457  
It is important to note that the principle of complementarity is equally 
applicable to states – like Sudan – that are not party to the Statute.  Article 17, which 
sets out the complementarity regime, provides that the ICC must defer to the 
investigation or prosecution of a “State which has jurisdiction over” the case.  It does 
not talk about “States Parties” that have jurisdiction over the case.  So it seems clear 
that this reference to a state “which has jurisdiction” over a case includes non-party 
States, in that a non-party State may well have jurisdiction over the case on the basis 
of traditional principles of jurisdiction (territoriality, or nationality).  This is also 
apparent from Article 18(1) which provides that all states parties, as well as “those 
States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned”, must be notified by the Prosecutor that he 
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intends to initiate an investigation.  It is thus clear that Sudan may be able to frustrate 
the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction by insisting that it is willing and able to prosecute 
the offenders allegedly guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
Darfur region. We return to this prospect further below. 
In undertaking his preliminary analysis, the Prosecutor interpreted Article 
53(1) of the Rome Statute as entailing the consideration of “whether there could be 
cases that would be admissible within the situation in Darfur”.458 On 1 June 2005, 
after examining, inter alia, the Sudanese justice system and “traditional systems for 
alternative dispute resolution”, and interviewing various interested parties, the 
Prosecutor decided that there are cases that will be admissible in terms of Article 
53(1); which is to say that the Prosecutor’s office believes that the complementarity 
principle does not stand in the way of a prosecution by the International Criminal 
Court of at least certain cases. What is important to note is that this determination 
does not mean that the Sudanese Government is “unwilling and unable” to prosecute 
all crimes committed in Darfur; it merely means that for the purposes of the 
Prosecutor’s preliminary analysis there was scope for the Court’s intervention.  
So far the ICC Prosecutor has taken a proactive position as far as 
complementarity is concerned.  Mr Ocampo has explained that: 
 
“The admissibility assessment is an on-going assessment that relates to the 
specific cases to be prosecuted by the Court. Once investigations have been 
carried out, and specific cases selected, the OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) 
will assess whether or not those cases are being, or have been, the subject of 
genuine national investigations or prosecutions. In making this assessment the 
OTP will respect any independent and impartial proceedings that meet the 
standards required by the Rome Statute.”459 
 
Having considered all the requirements of Article 53(1), the Prosecutor wrote to the 
Presiding Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I on 1 June 2005 to say that he believed there was 
“a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into the situation in Darfur”.460 
Subsequently, the ICC publicly announced on 6 June 2005 that the Prosecutor would be 




The initiation of a formal investigation in terms of Article 53 of the Rome Statute 
brought the Prosecutor’s investigative powers under the Rome Statute into full 
effect.462 According to the Prosecutor, there are numerous sub-phases to the 
investigatory process: during the first sub-phase the Prosecutor “collects information 
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relating to the universe of crimes alleged to have taken place in Darfur, as well as the 
groups and individuals responsible for those crimes”.463 During the second sub-phase 
of the investigation the Prosecutor “will select specific cases for prosecution unless he 
considers, in accordance with article 53(2) of the Statute, that there is not a sufficient 
basis for prosecution”.464  
In undertaking the first phase of investigation through collating information 
relating to the crimes committed in Darfur the Prosecutor has reportedly documented 
“thousands of alleged direct killings of civilians by parties to the conflict”, “hundreds 
of alleged cases of rape”, “information and evidence to suggest that the civilian 
population was forcibly displaced from their homes, in a widespread and systematic 
manner” and “information indicating that parties to the conflict directed attacks on 
other non-military objectives”.465 Although the Prosecutor explicitly stated that he 
“has not, and will not, draw any conclusions as to the character of the crimes [under 
investigation] pending the completion of a full and impartial investigation”, from the 
Prosecutor’s general description of the crimes documented by his Office it appears 
that they may qualify as war crimes, crimes against humanity or possibly genocide or 
instances of genocide. The question of whether genocide or acts of genocide have 
been committed is particularly contentious in the context of Darfur, and from an early 
stage in the investigation the Prosecutor noted in a report to the Security Council that 
witnesses have stated that “men perceived to be from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa 
groups were deliberately targeted”. This, according to the Prosecutor, includes eye-
witness accounts of statements made by the perpetrators “reinforcing the targeted 
nature of the attacks, such as ‘we will kill all the blacks’ and ‘we will drive you out of 
this land’”.466  
Consequently, after comprehensively analysing the crimes allegedly 
committed in Darfur since 1 July 2002, the Prosecutor “identified particularly grave 
events” for full investigation, and possible prosecution. In this regard the Prosecutor 
noted:467 
 
“Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is serious, the 
gravity of the crimes is central to the process of case selection. The Office 
looks at factors such as the scale and nature of the crimes (in particular, high 
number of killings), the systematic character and impact of the crimes, as well 
as other aggravating factors.” 
 
Other factors considered by the Prosecutor in this regard include crime patterns, 
geographical locations of alleged crimes, security concerns, accessibility of evidence 
and the preventative impact that a prosecution might have. 468 The next step involves 
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the identification of those individuals most responsible for the incidents selected. In 
this regard the Prosecutor explained that:469   
 
“Given the scale of the alleged crimes in Darfur, and the complexities 
associated with the identification of those individuals bearing greatest 
responsibility for the crimes, the Office currently anticipates the investigation 
and prosecution of a sequence of cases, rather than a single case dealing with 
the situation in Darfur as a whole.” 
 
The next step: Admissibility in respect of specific cases 
 
In terms of Article 53(2) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor will refrain from 
prosecuting these specific cases if he decides that there is an insufficient legal or 
factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under Article 58;470 the case is 
inadmissible under Article 17471 or the prosecution is not in the interests of justice.472 
Accordingly, at this point the issue of complementarity once again becomes relevant 
in terms of Article 17.  
Although this enquiry will be made in respect of specific cases selected by the 
Prosecutor, it is useful to note that the Prosecutor has explained to the Security 
Council that:473 
 
“Based upon our current assessment, it does not appear that the national 
authorities have investigated or prosecuted, or are investigating or prosecuting, 
cases that are or will be the focus of our attention such as to render those cases 
inadmissible before the ICC.” 
 
It must be noted further however that the Prosecutor qualified this, and other 
statements previously made with regard to complementarity, by stating that this 
assessment is ongoing and a final determination will only be made in respect of 
specific cases.474  
Nevertheless, the importance of this statement cannot be overstated. This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that the Sudanese authorities have already 
indicated that they consider the ICC to be precluded from investigating or prosecuting 
crimes committed in Darfur on the basis of complementarity. The basis of this 
assertion is that the crimes concerned will be investigated by the Special Criminal 
Court on the Events in Darfur (the Darfur Special Court) which was established on 7 
June 2005 – the day after the ICC publicly announced the Prosecutor’s intention to 
formally investigate the situation in Darfur – as, in the words of the Sudanese Justice 
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Minister, “a substitute to the International Criminal Court”.475 Explicit reference was 
made by the Ministry of Justice to Article 17 of the Rome Statute in this regard. 476  
In subsequent reports to the Security Council, the ICC Prosecutor revealed 
that, notwithstanding the Sudanese Government’s announcement at the time the 
Darfur Special Court was established that “approximately 160 suspects had been 
identified for investigation and possible prosecution”, the Special Court has 
conducted only six trials involving less than thirty suspects.477 Similarly, upon the 
Darfur Special Court’s inception its President stated that it would have jurisdiction 
over, inter alia, crimes against humanity and war crimes; however, to date, cases have 
concerned incidents of armed robbery, receipt of stolen goods, unlawful possession of 
firearms, intentional wounding, murder and rape.478 Finally, the defendants concerned 
were either low-ranking military personnel or civilians.    
In addition to the Darfur Special Court, numerous intuitions have been 
constituted by the Sudanese Government to purportedly bring the perpetrators of 
atrocities in Darfur to justice, these include: a Judicial Investigations Committee; 
Special Prosecutions Commissions; National Committee of Inquiry; Committees 
Against Rape; and the Special and Specialised Courts of 2001 and 2003 
respectively.479  
In the event that a case selected for prosecution is being investigated or 
prosecuted by the Darfur Special Court, or another national court or institution, the 
Prosecutor has had to rely on the exceptions to the principle of complementarity 
contained in Article 17 of the Rome Statute to show that the Sudanese authorities are 




In terms of Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute, a State will be considered unwilling to 
investigate or prosecute when: 
 
“(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility… 
 (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice 
 (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice”. 
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From the initial progress, or lack of progress, made by the Darfur Special Court, it is 
reasonable to note that there is a general unwillingness on the part of the authorities in 
Sudan to prosecute the crimes committed in Darfur. Thus, in a report to the Security 
Council on Darfur, the UN Secretary General noted:    
 
“Meanwhile, high-ranking State officials and leaders of armed groups and 
militia have not been held accountable for violence and crimes against 
civilians…The lack of a good faith effort to investigate and hold individuals 
accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other offences 
reinforces a widely shared sense of impunity.” 
 
Moreover, the President of the Darfur Special Court was recently reported as saying 
that:480 
 
“Higher authorities are not interested in these cases to be presented to the 
court or for them to even come to the knowledge of the court”.  
 
ii.  Unable 
 
In terms of Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, a State will be considered unable to 
prosecute when “due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence 
and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”.  
Unlike Article 17(2) which requires a determination of “unwillingness” on a 
case-by-case basis, the wording of this exception suggests that the ICC may make a 
more general determination as far as “inability” is concerned. Article 17(3) describes 
a collapse or unavailability of the judicial system – a fact which is likely to be a 
predictable and long-term condition which will not vary on a casuistic basis.  There is 
an obvious difficulty inherent in proving inability since there is no universal 
benchmark or yardstick against which to measure the efficacy of a national judicial 
system.  According to a policy paper released by the Prosecutor: “This provision was 
inserted to take account of situations where there was a lack of central government, or 
a state of chaos due to the conflict or crisis, or public disorder leading to collapse of 
national systems which prevents the State from discharging its duties to investigate 
and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”.481  
In respect of Darfur, the ICC Prosecutor, the UN Secretary General, the Darfur 
Commission and others have suggested that the Sudanese authorities may in fact be 
unable to effectively prosecute the crimes committed in Darfur. For example, ICC 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has acknowledged that it “is clear that the national 
authorities face significant challenges to the conduct of effective criminal proceedings 
in Darfur, particularly in light of the fact that the conflict has destroyed or dislocated 
the normal criminal justice infrastructure”. He added that “efforts have been made by 
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the Government of the Sudan to rectify these deficiencies, but these efforts have also 
reportedly been restricted by the lack of security on the ground”.482  
 
Tribal reconciliation process or another form of amnesty 
 
In addition to the abovementioned judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms, the 
Government of Sudan has also initiated a “tribal reconciliation and conflict 
resolution” process in terms of which tribes from both sides are brought together to 
negotiate their differences.483 Although this process has reportedly led to the cessation 
of inter-tribal clashes in western Darfur, it has not been as successful in other 
localities in the region.484 As far as the effect that such processes will have on the 
principle of complementarity, the Prosecutor has already stated that “[t]hese processes 
are not criminal proceedings as such for the purposes of assessing the admissibility of 
cases before the ICC”.485 Moreover, the Secretary-General has also noted that they 
“should not be a substitute for the prosecution of war-crimes cases”.486  
To the extent that an individual who falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
may be amnestied in terms of this process, it is worth noting the following. There is 
an ongoing debate regarding the role of Truth Commissions in international justice 
and, more pertinently, their effect on complementarity.  For one thing, the 
repercussions of an accused being granted amnesty under national law might be 
interpreted by the ICC as a decision “not to prosecute” or, arguably as an 
“unwillingness” to prosecute. In this respect the provisions of Article 17(2)(a)  will 
come to the fore as the article provides that an “unwillingness to prosecute” would 
exist where “[t]he proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility”.  The ICC could thereby “ascertain the motivation for the grant of 
amnesty” and make a determination on that basis. 
 
Deferrals: the law and the politics 
 
Article 16: the law’s political compromise / the political compromisation of the law  
 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute is subtitled “Deferral of investigation or prosecution”, 
and declares:  
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“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.” 
 
Article 17(2) of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the ICC 
stipulates: 
 
“When the Security Council adopts under Chapter VII of the Charter a resolution 
requesting the Court, pursuant to article 16 of the Statute, not to commence or 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution, this request shall immediately be 
transmitted by the Secretary-General to the President of the Court and the 
Prosecutor. The Court shall inform the Security Council through the Secretary-
General of its receipt of the above request and, as appropriate, inform the Security 
Council through the Secretary-General of actions, if any, taken by the Court in 
this regard.” 
 
By Article 16 the Security Council of the UN is accordingly provided a power of 
“negative” intervention in the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
The issue of Security Council deferral, and more generally of the relationship 
between the Court and the Council, had been one of the thorniest in the negotiations 
leading to adoption of the Rome Statute.  Article 23(3) of the International Law 
Commission draft of 1994 stated: “3. No prosecution may be commenced under this 
Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a 
threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.”487  In effect, under the ILC 
proposal, the Court could not proceed without Security Council authorization, to the 
extent that “a situation” was “being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII”.  
Although supported by the permanent members of the Security Council, this 
suggested version was heavily criticised, in particular because it allowed the judicial 
function of the ICC to be subject to a decision by a political organ.488  The 
compromise reflected in Article 16 seriously diminishes the authority of the Council 
by requiring the Council to act to prevent a prosecution, rather than to act to authorise 
one.  In other words, Article 16 requires the Security Council to take preventive 
action through a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requesting that no 
investigation or prosecution be commenced for a renewable period of 12 months.  In 
the parlance of the Security Council, this means that a deferral will require the 
approval of nine of the members of the Council and the lack of a contrary vote by any 
of the five permanent members.489 
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The politics (and double-standards) start early: US attempts to highjack article 16 
 
Just short of two weeks after the Court’s statute became operative on 1 July 2002, and 
before the Court itself had opened its doors, Article 16 of the Rome Statute was being 
invoked.  Resolution 1422 was adopted by the Security Council at its 4572nd 
meeting, on 12 July 2002.  It was adopted by the vote of all fifteen members, 
including seven States parties to the Statute, including two permanent members, 
France and the United Kingdom.  The preamble declares that the Council is “Acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.  The Resolution in 
paragraph 1, directly refers to article 16 of the Rome Statute:  
 
“Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or 
omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, 
shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed 
with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise…”. 
 
It is well known that adoption of the Resolution was provoked by the threat of the 
United States, in June 2002, to veto renewal of the mandate of the United Nations 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.490   
 Resolution 1422 would expire after twelve months, and on 12 June 2003, at its 
4772nd meeting, the resolution was renewed for a further 12 months by the Council’s 
adoption of Resolution 1487, which is essentially identical to Resolution 1422.  The 
Council expressed its intention, as it had done the previous year, to renew the 
resolutions “under the same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month periods for as 
long as may be necessary”.  Only twelve members voted in favour of the resolution, 
however.  Germany, France and Syria all abstained. 
Many statements from governments regarding these controversial resolutions 
were highly critical.  Some cited the “deep injustice” of discrimination between 
peacekeeping forces from sending States that are parties to the Rome Statute and 
those that are not.491  It was further argued that the resolutions sought to modify the 
terms of the Rome Statute indirectly, without amendment of the treaty.492  The 
automatic renewal implication in the resolutions was also challenged.493   
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These statements demonstrate the politicised nature of article 16 and the 
Security Council’s invocation thereof at the behest of – and under threat by – a veto-
wielding superpower.  As one leading international criminal text summarises: 
 
“The purpose of [article 16] was to allow the Council, under its primary 
responsibilty for the maintenance of peace and security, to set aside the 
demands of justice at a time when it considered the demands of peace to be 
overriding; if the suspension of legal proceedings against a leader will allow a 
peace treaty to be concluded, precedence should be given to peace.  The 
suspension of the proceedings would be only temporary.  The subsequent 
practice of the Council quoting Article 16 would however have surprised those 
drafting the Statute.”494 
 
If anything positive may be drawn from the United States’ purported political abuse 
of article 16, they are the clear statements by others at the time of the legal parametres 
of article 16. For example, in the Security Council, during the debate on Resolution 
1487, the Netherlands referred to the travaux préparatoires to indicate that real intent 
of the drafters of article 16 of the Rome Statute: 
 
“Article 16 reads that ‘no investigation or prosecution may be commenced 
or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the 
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect’.  From both 
the text and the travaux preparatoires of this article follow that this article 
allows deferrals -only on a case by case basis; -only for a limited period of 
time; -and only when a threat to or breach of peace and security has been 
established by  the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  In our 
view, article 16 does not sanction blanket immunity in relation to 
unknown future events.”495 
 
Germany also joined the Netherlands in opposing adoption of Resolution 1422.  In the 
public debate on 10 July 2002, Germany stated: 
 
“Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter requires the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression – none of 
which, in our view, is present in this case. The Security Council would 
thus be running the risk of undermining its own authority and credibility 
[by adopting the draft Resolution].”496 
 
Canada too noted that article 16 was the product of delicate negotiations, and that it 
was intended to be available to the Security Council on a case by case basis.  In the 
words of its representative: “Most states were opposed to any Security Council 
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interference in ICC action, regarding it as inappropriate political interference in a 
judicial process”.497 
Syria, on behalf of Arab countries, echoed Canada’s sentiments, and appealed 
“to the Security Council to assume its responsibility and not accept these exemptions 
because that might damage the credibility of the Court before it is born”;498 and in the 
Security Council during debate on Resolution 1487, stated that “the adoption of this 
resolution would result in the gradual weakening of the Court’s role in prosecuting 
those who have perpetrated the most heinous crimes that come under its jurisdiction,”, 
concluding that “we have full confidence in international criminal justice…”.499  The 
same theme was picked up by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, who expressed their view that the Security Council’s actions “are not 
consistent with the provision of the Rome Statute and severely damage the Court's 
credibility and independence.”500 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations also weighed in on the debate, 
explaining in simple terms what article 16 was intended for: 
 
“In making this decision, you will again rely on article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.  I believe that that article was not intended to cover such a sweeping 
request, but only a more specific request relating to particular situation…”.501 
 
What may be drawn from the above are two legal observations.  In the first place 
article 16 is limited to deferrals of particular situations and may be invoked on a case-
by-case basis.  It is not a provision which may be used to bestow a general immunity 
on a particular class of individuals or nationals.  And, as we shall see later, it is not a 
provision which may be used in respect of one individual alone.  Secondly, article 16 
is not intended as a means by which the Security Council can undermine or interfere 
in the independent workings of the International Criminal Court.  That is to say that if 
the Council is to invoke article 16, it may only do so once it has made a credible 
finding under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that the continued investigation and/or 
prosecution in a particular situation would constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of 
peace or an act of aggression. Thus, for there to be a valid article 16 deferral there 
should be a formal determination by the Security Council, pursuant to article 39 of the 
UN Charter, that the objective conditions enabling the Security Council to invoke 
Chapter VII are present.  
This follows not only expressly from the text of article 16 as read with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  It follows also from a proper appreciation of the 
                                                 
497 Statement made at a Special Plenary as part of the 10th Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, convened to discuss the proposals before the Security Council with regard to immunity 
for peacekeepers on 3 July 2002, unofficial record prepared by the NGO Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court. 
498 Ibid.  
499  UN Doc. S/PV.4772, at 25-26. 
500 Excerpt on the ICC and UNSC res. 1422 from the Final Document adopted by the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) at its 2003 meeting of Heads of States & Governments held in Kuala Lampur, 
Malaysia, 25 February 2003. 
501 Excerpts from the Public Meeting at the United Nations Security Council on the Renewal of 
Resolution 1422, 12 June 2003, [Note: This is an unofficial record of the statements made at the Public 
Meeting of the Security Council on 12 June 2002, prepared by the NGO Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court.] 
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(limited) role that the Security Council enjoys in relation to the ICC.  This limited role 
is well captured by the ILA ICC Committee in its first report:502 
  
“With recent developments in international criminal law, it may be argued that 
the powers of the Security Council to interfere with international justice are 
implicitly limited, by virtue of a form of ‘separation of powers’ doctrine.  In 
the past, when there was no prospect of international prosecution, the only real 
basis for intervention by the international community was political.  The 
Council adopted measures under Chapter VII that were essentially political 
because there was no alternative.  But international law and international 
institutions have evolved considerably in recent years.  The previously almost 
unlimited power of the Security Council ought now to be balanced with other 
prerogatives, such as the need to preserve the independence and integrity of 
international criminal justice initiatives.  Although the concept had been afloat 
for several years, the delegates to the San Francisco Conference did not 
contemplate a permanent international criminal court as an operative part of 
the post-war international system, and it is therefore not surprising that the 
problem is not addressed expressly in the Charter.  But the landscape has 
evolved, and with the existence of the International Criminal Court it is 
absolutely essential that international political and legislative bodies ensure 
that they do not encroach upon international justice.  The Security Council 
must now apply its mandate in such a way as to enhance and promote newer 




The Darfur referral and article 16 
 
The next time article 16 came expressly to be referred to by the Security Council was 
in the context of the Darfur referral.504  When the Security Council referred the Darfur 
situation to the ICC in 2005 by resolution 1593, there was a reference to article 16 in 
the second paragraph of the resolution: 
 
“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International 
Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to 
that effect”. 
 
It is well-known that that the reference was imposed by the United States as a 
prerequisite for its abstention when the vote was taken.  The US ambassador at the 
time had this to say about the section’s objectives: 
                                                 
502 Presented at the Berlin Conference of the International Law Association, 2004, the text of which is 
available at www.ila-hq.org/...cfm/docid/7BC51FF0-0B5B-4262-806F3593281F0B66 (accessed 20 
May 2009). 
503 Pages 8 – 9. 
504 See generally: Annalisa Ciampi, “The Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of 
their Suspension under Article 16 ICC Statute” (2008) 6 JICJ 885-897. 
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“This resolution provides clear protections for United States persons.  No 
United States persons supporting the operations in the Sudan will be subjected 
to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution.”505 
 
Of course, whatever the reasons may have been for the reference to article 16 in 
resolution 1593, article 16 henceforth came to be invoked directly by the African 
Union in its response to the ICC’s investigation in Sudan. One of the complaints 
forcefully directed by the AU at the ICC’s work in Africa is that the Court is 
undermining rather than assisting African efforts to solve the continent’s problems. In 
this regard the Sudan referral is an illustrative example. The Sudan referral has 
become a touchstone for arguments around an article 16 deferral because of the 
decision by the Prosecutor of the ICC to indict the Sudanese president, Omar al-
Bashir.  This in part appears to be a central reason why South Africa and other 
African states have been pushing for the Security Council to defer the prosecution of 
al-Bashir. 
This call has been repeated at the highest levels of the AU.  For instance, the 
African Union Peace and Security Council called upon the UN Security Council to 
apply article 16 of the Rome Statute and “defer the process initiated by the ICC.”506 
The response of the UN Security Council has been merely to “note” the AU’s 
calls. For instance, the matter was considered by the Security Council when it 
extended the mandate of UNAMID, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
established by SC Resolution 1769, for a further 12 months to 31 July 2009.  In the 
extension resolution – resolution 1828 – adopted on 31 July 2008 with 14 votes in 
favour (with the US abstaining), the Council: 
 
“[e]mphasiz[es] the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of …. Crimes and 
urg[es] the Government of Sudan to comply with its obligations in this 
respect”. 
 
The Council thereafter took “note” of the AU communiqué of 21 July, “having in 
mind concerns raised by members of the Council regarding potential developments 
subsequent to the application by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court of 
14 July 2008, and taking note of their intention to consider these matters further”. 507 
 
This has drawn the ire of the African Union. At a meeting of African States Parties to 
the Rome Statute over 8 to 9 June 2009 the States Parties agreed that “another formal 
resolution should be presented by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to 
the United Nations Security Council to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute by 
deferring the Proceedings against President Bashir of The Sudan as well as expressing 
grave concern that a request made by fifty three Member States of the United Nations 
                                                 
505 Quoted in Goran Sluiter, “Obtaining Cooperation from Sudan – Where is the Law?” (2008) 6 JICJ  
879. 
506 See African Union Peace and Security Council Decision (PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII)), 21 July 2008, 
paras. 3, 5; 9, 11(i); and thereafter African Union Assembly Decision on the Application by the 
International Criminal Court Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the 
Sudan (Dec. 221 (XII)), 3 February 2009, paras. 2, 3 and Peace and Security Council Decision 
(PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXV)), 5 March 2009, paras. 4-6. 
507 See for example UN Doc. S/RES/1828 (2008). 
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has been ignored”.508   The peak (or pique) of its response was a decision in Sirte on 3 
July 2009 of the Assembly of the AU in which it stated that because  
 
“the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member 
States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of 
President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”.509   
 
It also expressed its “deep regret” that the request by the AU to the Security Council 
to defer the proceedings against President Bashir of the Sudan in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute has “neither been heard nor acted upon, and in this 
regard, REITERATES ITS REQUEST to the UN Security Council”.510   
In its Press Release following the 3 July 2009 decision in Sirte on non-
cooperation with the ICC, the AU has explained that its decision “bears testimony to 
the glaring reality that the situation in Darfur is too serious and complex an issue to be 
resolved without recourse to an harmonized approach to justice and peace, neither of 
which should be pursued at the expense of the other”.511  Accordingly, continued the 
press release, the 3 July decision “should be received as a very significant 
pronouncement by the supreme AU decision-making body and a balanced expression 
of willingness to promote both peace and justice in Darfour (sic) and in The Sudan as 
a whole” and “[i]t is now incumbent upon the United Nations Security Council to 
seriously consider the request by the AU for the deferral of the process initiated by the 
ICC, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute”.  
It is clear from this and more recent statements that Africa wants its calls for a 
Security Council deferral of the Sudan investigation to be taken seriously, indeed 
acceded to.  Its call for a deferral ultimately arises from a preference expressed by the 
AU for African solutions to African problems, and in particular for African peace 
efforts on the continent not to be undermined by the ICC.  It is accordingly necessary 
to focus in some detail on the call by the AU for the ICC and/or the Security Council 
to give peace a chance.  
 
The peace and justice debate before the ICC: a presumption in favour of justice  
 
The debate about peace and justice and how the two are to be reconciled is an old one 
and beyond the scope of this position paper.   However, certain points are worth 
stressing in relation to that debate insofar as it engages the ICC.   
In the first place, it may be noted that the ICC’s involvement in Sudan (or 
indeed other parts of Africa) is consistent with an expressed agreement in a variety of 
African documents that international crimes should not be met with impunity.  No 
                                                 
508 See Recommendation 6, page 6: Report of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 8-9 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Min/ICC/Rpt. 
509 Decision on the Meeting of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Doc.Assembly/AU/13(XIII), para. 10. 
510 Decision on the Meeting of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Doc.Assembly/AU/13(XIII) para. 9. 
511 African Union Press Release: Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, Addis Ababa 14 July 2009. 
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less than the African Union’s Constitutive Act (article 4(h)) stresses this principle.  
And the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the precursor to the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights) has affirmed this commitment as an 
African ideal.  It may be said that on paper at least, the African Union’s Constitutive 
Act expresses a presumption in favour of prosecution for international crimes.  
Secondly, striving for justice in respect of these crimes is a principle that is 
supported by widespread state practice on the African continent. In order to become a 
party to a multilateral treaty, a State must demonstrate, through a concrete act, its 
willingness to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in the treaty.  In 
other words, it must express its consent to be bound by the treaty.  A State may 
express its consent to be bound in several ways, in accordance with the final clauses 
of the relevant treaty. The most common way is through ratification.   It is not 
insignificant that more than half of Africa’s States (and the largest regional grouping 
in the world) have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
thereby unequivocally expressing that they consider themselves legally committed to 
the principle that there ought ordinarily to be prosecutions in circumstances where 
serious crimes of concern to the international community have been committed.  For 
African States parties that have domesticated the Rome Statute this principle has been 
given added impetus within national law.  Thus, in respect of South Africa, the Rome 
Statute commitment to a justice-response in relation to international crimes goes 
beyond treaty ratification and is domestically reflected in South Africa’s 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002. The ICC Act provides that there is an obligation to investigate and prosecute.  
The preamble speaks of South Africa’s commitment to  
 
“bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law 
of the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its 
international obligations to do so when the Republic became party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, or in the event of the national 
prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do so, in line 
with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in the Statute, in the 
International Criminal Court, created by and functioning in terms of the said 
Statute”.   
 
Read as a whole there can be no doubt that in terms of the Act, Parliament favours the 
prosecution of international crimes, either by cooperating with the ICC in relation to 
suspects the Court is investigating, or if needs be by domestic prosecution in South 
Africa.512  
                                                 
512 The first object of the Act recorded in section 3(a) is to create a framework to ensure that the Rome 
Statute is effectively implemented in South Africa. The second object of the Act recorded in section 
3(b), is to ensure that anything done in terms of the ICC Act, conforms with South Africa’s obligations 
under the Rome Statute, including its obligation to cooperate internationally with the ICC and to 
prosecute domestically the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Another object of the Act recorded 
in s 3(d), is to enable the National Prosecuting Authority to prosecute and the High Courts to adjudicate 
in cases against people accused of having committed crimes against humanity, both inside South Africa 
and beyond its borders. Once a person suspected of international crimes has been arrested, the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions is obliged in terms of section 5(3), when he considers whether to 
institute such a prosecution, to: “give recognition to the obligation that the Republic, in the first 
instance and in line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in article 1 of the Statute, 
has jurisdiction and the responsibility to prosecute persons accused of having committed a crime”. 
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On the topic of state practice it might also be recalled that the situation in 
Sudan was considered serious enough for the Security Council to invoke its chapter 
VII powers to refer the atrocities to the ICC for its attention.  That decision by the 
Council was taken – in the first place – without a veto being exercised by any of the 
five permanent members, and with the support of African states who recognized the 
gravity of the crimes that were being committed and the need for a justice response.  
In the second place, it must be recalled that before the referral the Security Council 
had adopted resolution 1564 which charged the Secretary-General with establishing a 
commission of inquiry  
 
“to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts 
of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations 
with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable”.   
 
The Darfur Commission, under the leadership of Professor Antonio Cassese and 
including African and Arab members,513 presented its report to the Security Council 
in February 2005,514 and recommended that due to the grave crimes that had been 
committed in Darfur the Security Council invoke its chapter VII powers to refer the 
matter to the ICC.  
There is accordingly an understanding by African states that at the very least 
true and lasting peace requires a commitment to justice.  The two imperatives may – 
and probably ought to – operate side by side.  
The discussion above demonstrates that African States Parties to the ICC have 
already expressed their preference for a justice-response to international crimes:  that 
is, States Parties ratified the Rome Statute because of the importance they attach to 
the view that there should be no impunity for international crimes; and by becoming a 
party to the Statute they have accepted legal duties in respect of the prosecution of 
persons responsible for these crimes.   
Naturally, that is not to say that prosecutions must be pursued at all costs or 
without regard to other considerations such as timing or the progress of a particular 
peace process. The Rome Statute itself recognizes that the pursuit of prosecutions is 
not an absolute or blind commitment.  But at the very least the principle in favour of 
prosecution – voluntarily assumed as a duty to prosecute by States Parties to the 
Rome Statute – should be acknowledged within Africa.  And that presumption in 
favour of prosecution demands that any arguments for investigations/prosecutions to 
be deferred be made convincingly and backed up with demonstrable evidence.  Most 
importantly, as argued immediately below, the arguments should be made in good 
                                                 
513 The African members were Therese Striggner-Scott (a barrister and principal partner with a legal 
consulting firm in Accra, Ghana, and who served as Judge of the High Courts of Ghana and Zimbabwe, 
and was the Executive Chairperson of the Ghana Law Reform Commission from January 2000 to 
February 2004), and Dumisa Ntsebeza (a former Commissioner on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa, and who served as acting judge on the High Court of South Africa, as 
well as the South African Labour Court).  The Arab member was Mohammed Fayek (then Secretary-
General of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, and who previously served in Egypt as Minister 
of Information, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Guidance, and Chef de 
Cabinet and Advisor to the President for African and Asian Affairs). 
514 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Geneva, 25 January 2005.  The full 
report is available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
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faith within – rather than outside – the international criminal justice system created 
under the Rome Statute.  
 
Giving peace a chance – the legal duty on African states parties to the Rome Statute 
to make a case for deferral 
 
It has been said above that although the ICC’s international criminal justice model 
seeks to ensure justice for perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide, there is no irrebuttable presumption in favour of prosecutions under the 
Rome Statute.  At the same time, a deferral of prosecutions is not there simply for the 
asking.  States parties under the Rome Statute – who by their membership added their 
weight to the prosecution preference – have a duty to make out a convincing case for 
a deferral, whether that request is made by those states individually or collectively as 
part of a larger regional grouping such as in the African Union.  And at the very least 
States parties have a good faith obligation as members of the Rome Statute to make 
their claims for deferral with proper consideration for the publicly available evidence, 
and then through the recognized procedures built into the Statute.  
 
i)  An objective weighing of the evidence in favour of prosecution and the evidence in 
favour of deferral 
 
Considering the publicly available evidence first, the following might be noted. The 
Security Council on 31 March 2005 referred the atrocities committed in the Darfur 
region of Sudan to the ICC for investigation. The Security Council had also 
previously adopted resolution 1564 which charged the Secretary-General with 
establishing a commission of inquiry “to investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to 
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the 
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held 
accountable”. The Darfur Commission, under the leadership of Professor Antonio 
Cassese and including African and Arab members,515 presented its report to the 
Security Council in February 2005.516  
The Commission, under the leadership of Professor Antonio Cassese, and 
including respected African a Arab experts, fulfilled its mandate by visiting Sudan on 
two occasions. The Commission found that the various reported attacks by the 
government and the janjaweed on civilians constituted “large-scale war crimes” and 
that the mass killing of civilians by the government and the janjaweed were both 
widespread and systematic, and, as such, were “likely to amount to a crime against 
humanity”.517 With regard to the rebels, the Commission found that although they 
were also responsible for attacks on civilians, there was no evidence to suggest that 
these attacks were widespread or systematic. Therefore, while the killing of a civilian 
by the rebels would amount to a very serious war crime, the Commission did not 
                                                 
515 The African and Arab members are previously noted above. 
516 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Geneva,25  January 2005.  The full 
report is available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
517 Ibid paras. 267 & 293. 
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conclude that these constituted crimes against humanity.518 As discussed in Chapter 6, 
the Commission did find that sexual violence and sexual slavery was widespread and 
systematic, and could amount to crimes against humanity.519 The Commission also 
found that the Sudanese courts were unable and unwilling to prosecute, and thus 
advised that other mechanisms would be required to prosecute alleged offenders.520  
As previously indicated the complementarity principle built into the ICC Statute 
might be relied on by the Sudanense government (even as a non-party State) to argue 
that it is willing and able to prosecute the offenders.  Should it in fact be willing and 
able, then the ICC would have to acquiesce in the prosecution of offenders so as to 
allow the Sudanese authorities to do the job.   
After the matter had been referred to the ICC by the Security Council, and 
after analysing the information available (as he is required to do), the Prosecutor 
determined that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, which 
was duly initiated in June 2005. In his periodic reports to the UN Security Council, 
the Prosecutor has stated that the evidence available shows a widespread pattern of 
serious crimes, including murder, rape, the displacement of civilians and the looting 
and burning of civilian property.521  In February 2007, the Prosecutor requested the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to issue summons to appear or, alternatively, warrants 
of arrest in respect of Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-
Rahman (also known as Ali Kushayb). Ahmad Harun is the former Minister of State 
for the Interior and the current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs while Ali 
Kushayb is a militia leader known to have been operating in Darfur at the relevant 
time.522 The charges against Harun and Kushayb relate to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. In April 2007, the Court issued warrants of arrest for these 
individuals and requests for their arrest and surrender have since been transmitted to 
the Government of Sudan. It is not insignificant that at the time of writing, neither 
suspect has been surrendered to the Court.523  
Then, in early July 2008 the Prosecutor of the ICC decided to seek an arrest 
warrant against President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in Darfur. That warrant also had to be confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber 
before it could be issued.  The Pre-trial Chamber duly did so and its decision is 
publicly available.  While the Pre-trial Chamber accepted that there was a reasonable 
basis for believing that al-Bashir might be responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, the judges of the Pre-trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s 
                                                 
518 Ibid paras. 268 & 296. 
519 Ibid para. 360. 
520 Ibid para. 568. 
521 Detailed summaries of the crimes on which the Office of the Prosecutor has gathered information 
and evidence can be found in the Prosecutor’s periodic reports to the Security Council on the 
investigation. They are available on the Court’s website (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html). For an analysis of the referral, see amongst others Max du 
Plessis & Christopher Gevers, “Darfur goes to the International Criminal Court (perhaps)” (2005) 14(2) 
African Security Review 23-34. 
522 Copies of the warrants of arrest are available on the Court’s website (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases/Darfur.html). 
523 Although Kushayb has long been in the custody of Sudanese authorities, allegedly on charges 
relating to Darfur (though not the same incidents charged by the Prosecutor).  See BBC News, Africa, 
“Darfur militia leader in custody”, 13 October 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7666921.stm  (accessed 22 May 2009). 
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charges of genocide, stating that there was insufficient evidence to proceed against al-
Bashir in respect of that crime. Thus, in March 2009, Sudan’s President became the 
first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court.  
The Prosecutor appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to reject genocide 
charges, and on 3 February 2010 the Appeals Chamber rendered its judgment, 
reversing, by unanimous decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision of 4 March, 2009, 
to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in 
respect of the charge of genocide. The Appeals Chamber directed the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to decide anew whether or not the arrest warrant should be extended to 
cover the charge of genocide.   
 
The following facts are thus beyond dispute:  
 
• regardless of their accurate characterisation (including whether genocide can be 
shown) grave crimes have been committed in Sudan and continue to this day. 
• an independent body of experts (including a number of African and Arab 
individuals) has concluded that Sudan is not willing to act against the perpetrators 
by prosecuting them for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity 
• to date the Sudanese government has failed to hand over suspects to the ICC for 
prosecution, and has failed domestically to act against the perpetrators of 
international crimes 
• The independent judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber have accepted that there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence presented thus far to proceed with an 
investigation against President al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; and in light of the Appeals Chamber’s most recent decision in respect 
of the correct standard for genocide, will have to consider the same question anew 
in respect of genocide.   
 
It is noteworthy that when the Darfur Commission recommended that the Security 
Council refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC “to protect the civilians of Darfur and 
end the rampant impunity currently prevailing there”,524 the Commission endorsed the 
ICC as the “only credible way of bringing alleged perpetrators to justice”.525  That 
assessment remains true today, given the abject failure by Sudan to act against the 
perpetrators itself. 
It is furthermore important to recall that in advocating the referral of the 
situation in Darfur by the Security Council, the Commission pointed out that the 
situation in Darfur meets the requirement of Chapter VII, in that it constitutes a ‘threat 
to peace and security’ as was acknowledged by the Security Council in its resolutions 
1556 and 1564. Furthermore, the Commission also took note of the Security 
Council’s emphasis in these resolutions of the “need to put a stop to impunity in 
Darfur, for the end of such impunity would contribute to restoring security in the 
region”.526 
                                                 
524 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Geneva, 25 January 2005 para. 
569. 
525 Ibid para. 573. 
526 Ibid para. 590. 
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But most importantly, Sudan has had an opening since February 2005 to 
demonstrate its willingness to act against perpetrators of violence and thereby not 
only to contribute towards peace, but also to oust the ICC’s involvement under the 
principle of complementarity.  It has – to use the words of the African Union – had 
every opportunity to give effect to an “harmonized approach to justice and peace”.  
It is by now well known that the ICC is expected to act in what is described as 
a “complementary” relationship with states.  The Preamble to the Rome Statute says 
that the Court’s jurisdiction will be complementary to that of national jurisdiction.  
The principle is that national courts should be the first to act.  It is only if a State is 
“unwilling or unable” to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed by 
its nationals or on its territory that the Court is then seized with jurisdiction.527  To 
enforce this principle of complementarity, Article 18 of the Rome Statute requires that 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must notify all states parties and 
states with jurisdiction over a particular case, before beginning an investigation by the 
International Criminal Court,528 and cannot begin an investigation on his own 
initiative without first receiving the approval of a Chamber of three judges.529 Vitally 
important in respect of Sudan’s conduct is that at this stage of the proceedings, it is 
open to states to insist that they will investigate allegations against their own nationals 
themselves: the International Criminal Court would then be obliged to suspend its 
investigation.530 If the alleged perpetrator’s state investigates the matter and then 
refuses to initiate a prosecution, the International Criminal Court may only proceed if 
it concludes that that decision of the state not to prosecute was motivated purely by a 
desire to shield the individual concerned.531  The thrust of the principle of 
complementarity is that the system effectively creates a presumption in favour of 
action at the level of states. 
What about states – like Sudan – that are not party to the Statute?  Article 17, 
which sets out the complementarity regime, provides that the ICC must defer to the 
investigation or prosecution of a “State which has jurisdiction over” the case.  We 
have seen above that it is open to Sudan to frustrate the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction 
by insisting that it is willing and able to prosecute the offenders allegedly guilty of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur region.  And we have also seen 
that the ICC Prosecutor, pursuant to the referral and in terms of Article 53(1) of the 
Rome Statute, has gathered and assessed relevant information in order to determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into the crimes 
committed in Sudan.  Article 53(1) of the Statute enunciates three considerations that 
inform his decision regarding whether or not to initiate an investigation: these relate 
to whether a crime has been or is being committed within the Court’s jurisdiction; 
whether complementarity precludes admissibility, and; whether or not the interests of 
justice militate against initiating an investigation.532  
 
                                                 
527 Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute. 
528 Article 18(1) of the Rome Statute. 
529 Article 15 the Rome Statute. 
530 Article 18(2) the Rome Statute. 
531 Article 17(2)(a) the Rome Statute. 
532 Article 53(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Rome Statute respectively. 
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The Prosecutor has been clear: “In making this assessment the OTP will 
respect any independent and impartial proceedings that meet the standards required by 
the Rome Statute.”533  The short point is that to date Sudan has provided no evidence 
that any of its domestic proceedings are worthy of such respect. 
Accordingly, the deferral of the ICC’s focus on Sudan must be assessed in the 
following light.   
First, any suggestion that the ICC’s involvement of the ICC should be 
displaced in favour of domestic prosecutions must take account of the fact that Sudan 
has to date been both unwilling and unable to prosecute those guilty of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.  Thus, it cannot plausibly be the case that a deferral will 
serve the interests of justice, at least insofar as those interests might have been 
secured by domestic prosecutions in Sudan.   
Secondly, it must be acknowledged that the Darfur crisis came before the ICC 
for the right reason.  That is because – as the Security Council recognised – the 
human rights violations involved demanded an international prosecutorial response in 
the interests of peace and justice.  It should only be removed from the ICC for the 
right reason.  In the absence of compelling reasons to show that the peace process in 
Sudan is a credible one and that the ICC’s focus on Darfur will undermine that 
process, the ICC’s involvement remains the only plausible means by which to secure 
both the interests of peace and justice.   
Thirdly, because it is apparent that Sudan has at least since February 2005 
(when the Commission presented its report to the Security Council) defiantly failed to 
take any meaningful steps to combat the impunity that has followed massive and 
ongoing crimes in Sudan, it has manifestly failed to contribute towards the restoration 
of security in the region. And it must be questionable what commitment the 
Government has towards peace.  Given the Sudanese government’s long-standing 
failure to show a worthy commitment towards security and peace, it is difficult to 
understand why it should be given the benefit of the doubt through a deferral of the 
ICC’s investigation.  
In these circumstances any consideration of calls to suspend the ICC’s 
involvement in Sudan raises the question: deferral to what? There is little evidence of 
a credible peace process in Sudan and less evidence of Sudan’s commitment to ending 
impunity for international crimes either by cooperating with the ICC or domestically 
prosecuting offenders. A deferral of the ICC’s focus on Sudan would at present be a 
deferral in favour of very little.  That is not to say that the situation might not change 
in Sudan, or that a good case cannot be made out for peace over justice in other 
situations on the continent.  It is only to say that on the available evidence at this time 
there appears to be little to upset the Rome Statute’s presumption in favour of 
prosecution in Sudan.  
 
ii)  Respecting the process in making calls for peace 
 
Having properly assessed the evidence for and against the ICC’s involvement in any 
given situation, should African states or the AU remain concerned about a prosecution 
or investigation by the ICC there are mechanisms internal to the Rome Statute which 
provide a means for appropriately raising those concerns.   
                                                 
533 Ibid 4. 
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It was pointed out above that the Rome Statute itself envisages that 
investigations and prosecutions by or before the ICC may in certain circumstances be 
deferred: by a legal assessment of the Prosecutor during the investigation or 
prosecution stage; or by the political intervention of the Security Council. The two 
situations that are relevant, and which arise in respect of Sudan, flow from Article 53 
and Article 16 of the Rome Statute.  
Article 53 of the Rome statute provides that the Prosecutor may decline to 
initiate an investigation or proceed with a prosecution if that would “serve the 
interests of justice.” The question then is what would qualify as a basis for declining 
to initiate an investigation “in the interests of justice.” The term “interests of justice” 
is not defined in the Statute.  What is clear is that it is an exceptional basis on which a 
decision not to investigate may be made. Indeed, the wording of article 53(1)(c) 
suggests that gravity and the interests of victims would tend to favour prosecution. 
Consequently, the OTP has indicated that there is a presumption in favour of 
prosecution where the criteria stipulated in article 53(1)(c) and 53 (2)(c) have been 
met.534 The OTP’s policy paper on the interests of justice emphasises that the criteria 
for the exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion in relation to this issue “will naturally 
be guided by the objects and purposes of the Statute – namely the prevention of 
serious crimes of concern to the international community through ending impunity”.   
That being said, it is open to a State or the suspect to argue that the Prosecutor 
should reach such a decision where the individual is participating in a justice process 
other than a traditional criminal prosecution.  So one could imagine the Prosecutor 
declining to prosecute if the suspect was subject to alternative accountability 
mechanisms (one thinks of something like the South African amnesty process which 
provided some level of accountability or an alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
like the gacaca process in Rwanda).535  While such an interpretation is certainly 
plausible, these are still early years before the ICC and without a track record it is not 
possible to predict with any accuracy whether such an interpretation would be 
adopted by the Prosecutor and approved by the Court. Central to this determination 
would be whether the alternative mechanism adopted by the country provides justice.  
Accordingly, the first appropriate process for (African) states to claim that 
investigations or prosecutions are not in the interests of justice is through invocation 
of article 53 of the Rome Statute. 
The second way in which investigations and prosecutions by or before the ICC 
may be deferred is through article 16. As we have already seen, under article 16 the 
Security Council can use its Chapter VII power to stop an investigation or prosecution 
for a year at a time.   However, for that to occur requires, as we have seen, the 
approval of nine of the members of the Council and the lack of a contrary vote by the 
five permanent members.  In those circumstances one can appreciate that the power of 
deferral – at a political level – will probably be seldom used and the independence of 
the judicial activity of the Court will be effectively guaranteed.536 
                                                 
534 This position is outlined in the OTP’s policy paper on the interests of justice (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/otp/otp_docs.html (accessed 22 May 2009)). 
535 See Ronald Slye, “Immunities and Amnesties”, in Max du Plessis (ed) African Guide to 
International Criminal Justice (2008) Institute for Security Studies 181.  And note that Human Rights 
Watch has argued in a policy paper that the phrase “interests of justice” should be interpreted narrowly, 
and should not be used to decline an investigation or prosecution in the face of a national amnesty, 
truth commission, or other alternative justice system or process of reconciliation.  Human Rights 
Watch, “The Meaning of ‘The Interests of Justice’ in Article 53 of the Rome Statute” (June 2005).   
536 Condorelli and Villalpando supra note 396 646. 
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No doubt there are political criticisms that might be levelled at the Security 
Council being empowered to make such a decision, given its skewed institutional 
make-up.  That concern will be dealt with further below.  For now, it is enough to 
point out that the Chapter VII (UN Charter) legal criteria will in any event have to be 
met.  It must be stressed that when the SC referred the matter to the ICC, the Council 
(on the recommendation of the independent experts in the Darfur Commission) found 
that the situation in Darfur constituted a threat to international peace and security.  
The same criteria will be applied by the Council in making any deferral decision; that 
is, there will have to have been a fundamental change in Sudan such that the situation 
there no longer constitutes a threat to international peace and security, or that 
continuing the ICC process is a greater threat to peace and security that deferring.537 
Put differently, in respect of Sudan the question is whether deferral is required 
because of the Security Council’s Chapter VII duty to act in the interests of peace and 
security – in other words whether not deferring could be characterised as a threat to 
the peace or a breach of the peace.  There are clearly situations where the decision not 
to defer to, for instance, a credible domestic peace process might affect international 
peace.  
Thus, the second appropriate process for (African) states to call for deferral of 
a prosecution is through convincing the Security Council that such a deferral is in the 
interests of justice and peace.    
In this regard it is to be noted that the report of the AU High-Level Panel on 
Darfur (the Mbeki Panel Report), issued in November 2009, lays out concrete 
proposals for achieving both justice and peace in the region. The report stresses the 
need for prosecutions of those responsible for the worst abuses committed in 
Darfur—including through the creation of a hybrid court to try international crimes. 
The panel’s work was given serious consideration by the UN Security Council on 21 
December 2010. It must be stressed that the Mbeki Panel took no position on the 
proposed hybrid court’s relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
Panel made it clear that it was incumbent on Sudan to demonstrate that it was acting 
domestically in a concerted and effective manner to deal with the perpetrators of 
crimes.   
                                                 
537 See Godfrey Musila “Beyond the al-Bashir arrest warrant” (2009) June/July The African 25. 
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CHAPTER 7:  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS – AN UNEVEN LANDSCAPE AND THE 




In the background in the preceding chapters (and increasingly now in the forefront of 
international political discourse around the ICC, certainly within the AU), is the fact 
that international criminal justice is subject to the uneven and imbalanced landscape 
of global politics. For Africa, a key concern in this regard is the relationship between 
the UN Security Council and the ICC, specifically the Council's powers of referral 
and deferral under the Rome Statute (Articles 13 and 16). The skewed institutional 
power of the Security Council creates an environment in which it is more likely that 
action will be taken against accused from weaker states than those from powerful 
states, or those protected by powerful states. Thus the perception is that by referring 
the Darfur situation to the ICC but not acting in relation to, for instance, Israel, the 
Council – through certain influential members – is guilty of double-standards.539 
This imbalance fuels concerns that international criminal justice mechanisms 
threaten state sovereignty. This also applies to the ICC which, although being a treaty 
body, is still subject to the Chapter VII referral and deferral powers of the Security 
Council discussed thus far. And although the Rome Statute restricts the jurisdictional 
reach of the ICC (thereby making investigations in Iraq and Gaza difficult), these 
structural limitations in the architecture of international criminal justice are far less 
acknowledged in the face of Security Council power to refer and defer situations to 
the ICC. 
The primacy of this issue for Africa is clear from several developments, some 
of which have already been touched on above. First, the flood of criticism about the 
ICC's work on the continent came after the Prosecutor's announcement in June 2008 
that he would be seeking an indictment for President al-Bashir of Sudan following the 
Security Council’s 1593 referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC.  These decisions 
not only brought to the fore the inherent defects within the Council – defects which 
for a long time African and other states have complained about – but the controversy 
was heightened because Sudan is not a state party to the ICC, yet non-state parties on 
the UNSC (most notably the United States) voted for or refrained from vetoing the 
referral (and have the power to refuse deferral). 
The second indication of how the UN Security Council’s role deepens 
concerns about the ICC is contained in the decisions and recommendations of African 
                                                 
538 A portion of the following chapter (further below, under the heading of South Africa and the future 
of international criminal justice) has already been published in the African Security Review.  The 
section on Kenya has been published in the South African Journal of Criminal Justice.  The remainder 
of the chapter is drawn from the article referred to in chapter 5 above and which will be submitted for 
publication as The Law and Politics of Referrals and Deferrals under Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.    
539 See further Charles Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law” (2009) 9 International 
Criminal Law Review 495. 
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states parties and the AU during 2009. For instance, the decision of the 3 July AU 
Summit in Sirte to withhold cooperation with the ICC in respect of the arrest of al-
Bashir was framed in response to the Security Council’s lack of consideration of the 
AU's request for a deferral.  
At meetings of states parties called by the AU in June and November 2009, 
the problematic role of the Council was one of the few issues around which there was 
consensus. The role of the Security Council was the main concern at the AU Experts 
Meeting (3-5 November 2009) with the subsequent AU Ministerial Meeting (6 
November 2009) recommending that Article 16 of the Rome Statute be amended to 
allow the UN General Assembly (under the Cold War “Uniting for Peace” resolution) 
to “exercise such power in cases where the Security Council has failed to take a 
decision within a specified time frame...”. The reasoning was that the General 
Assembly is more representative of the world community than the Council. 
Although the 8th ICC Assembly of States Parties did not adopt the proposal to 
include the AU's recommendation regarding Article 16 on the agenda of the Review 
Conference, the issue remains up for discussion in a stocktaking exercise at the 
Kampala Review Conference in May/June 2010 and will be formally debated at the 
9th Meeting of the Assembly of States Parties in November 2010. That the AU will 
be pushing the issue is apparent from the AU Summit Decision in January 2010,540 in 
which the Assembly inter alia took note  
 
“of the Report of the Ministerial Preparatory Meeting on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 6 
November 2009 in conformity with the Sirte Decision, to prepare for the 
Review Conference of States Parties scheduled for Kampala, Uganda in May-
June 2010” 
 
and endorsed the recommendations contained therein, and in particular the following: 
“I) Proposal for amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute; II) Proposal for 
retention of Article 13 as is”.   
 
In that document the AU Assembly welcomed  
 
“the submission by the Republic of South Africa, on behalf of the African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC of a proposal which consisted of an 
amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute in order to allow the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly to defer cases for one (1) year in cases where 
the UN Security Council would have failed to take a decision within a specified 
time frame”,  
 
and underscored “the need for African States Parties to speak with one voice to ensure 
that the interests of Africa are safeguarded”. 
 
The Assembly further in that document expressed its “deep regret” at the fact that: 
 
                                                 
540 Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) DOC. Assembly/AU/8/(XIV), arising from the 14th Ordinary 
Session of the AU Assembly from 31 January to 2 February 2010. 
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“the request by the African Union to the UN Security Council to defer the 
proceedings initiated against President Bashir of The Sudan in accordance 
with Article 16 of the Rome Statute of ICC on deferral of cases by the UN 
Security Council, has not been acted upon, and in this regard, REITERATES 
its request to the UN Security Council”. 
 
The (South) African proposal for amendment of Article 16 
 
At the second Ministerial Meeting took place on 6 November 2009, prior to the 8th 
ICC ASP in The Hague, Ministers from African countries – both state parties and 
non-state parties to the Rome Statute – adopted seven recommendations to guide their 
position at the 8th Assembly of States Parties and the Review Conference in Kampala 
in May/June 2010. The recommendations that emerged from that Ministerial Meeting 
are nothing if not ambitious, addressing some of the most vexing questions being 
asked regarding the ICC, and international criminal justice generally (such as the 
peace versus justice question, Article 27 and 98 conflict, the role of the Security 
Council, and the question of determining an act of aggression for the purposes of 
prosecution under the Statute).541 The AU Recommendations give some much-needed 
substance to what has – at least in the way its been represented in the media and 
academia – a rhetoric-driven response from Africa to the Bashir indictment. Although 
certain Recommendations are inspired by Bashir, they stand independent of the 
matter. Furthermore, from an academic perspective, to the extent that the AU has 
failed to articulate its objections to the ICC in a coherent manner in recent times, the 
current Recommendations give much-needed substance to its longstanding objections. 
For our purposes, Recommendation 3542 stands out.  It reads as follows: 
 
“Recommendation 3: Deferral of Cases: Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute granting power to the UN Security Council to 
defer cases for one (1) year should be amended to allow the General Assembly 
of the United Nations to exercise such power in cases where the Security 
Council has failed to take a decision within a specified time frame, in 
conformity with UN General Assembly Resolution 377(v)/1950 known as 
‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, as reflected in Annex A.” 
 
At the 8th ASP Session in November 2009 South Africa presented the proposal: 
arguing that Article 16 be amended to allow for the UN General Assembly to defer 
cases at the ICC in the event that the Security Council fails to act. Although the 
proposal was greeted with hostility by most states, and has received very little media 
                                                 
541  For the full list of Recommendations see: Recommendations of the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 6 November 2009, Addis Ababa 
Min/ICC/Legal/Rpt. (II). Recommendation 3 – regarding the ICC deferral procedure – was endorsed 
by the AU in February 2010 – CITE.  
542  Recommendation 3: Deferral of Cases: Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute granting power to the UN Security Council to defer cases for one (1) 
year should be amended to allow the General Assembly of the United Nations to exercise such power 
in cases where the Security Council has failed to take a decision within a specified time frame, in 
conformity with UN General Assembly Resolution 377(v)/1950 known as “Uniting for Peace 
Resolution”, as reflected in Annex A. 
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coverage in the aftermath of the ASP, the issue remains on the agenda for the next 
ASP Session in March 2010 – the all-important precursor to the Court’s first Review 
Conference in Kampala in mid-2010. South Africa’s Article 16 amendment – a joint 
position of African State Parties – is the upshot of the spirited yet ultimately 
unsuccessful attempts by African states to cajole the Security Council into exercising 
its power of deferral in favour of Bashir.  
The Recommendation amending Article reads as follows: 
 
“Article 16:  Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution 
 
i) No investigation or  prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions. 
ii) A State with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court may request the 
UN Security Council to defer a matter before the Court as provided for in 
(i) above.  
iii) Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state 
concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting 
Party may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security 
Council’s responsibility under para 1 consistent with Resolution 377(v) of 
the UN General Assembly.” 
 
We have seen previously that the role of the Security Council in the operation of the 
Court has been contentious from the outset – with calls for both an expansion and 
limitation of this role. In this regard it is useful to remind those advocating for the 
amendment – and in effect reduction – of the Security Council’s powers, that article 
16 as it ultimately appeared in the Rome Statute was already a compromise that 
significantly reduced the power of the SC. The original International Law 
Commission draft prohibited the Court from prosecuting a case “being dealt with by 
the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides”.543  
Undoubtedly, there are flaws in the proposal. The primary difficulty with the 
proposal is one of authority – as article 16 relies on the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII mandate as the guardian of international peace and security. The amendment 
attempts to overcome this problem by relying on the divisive Uniting for Peace 
resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1950 to break a deadlock over the 
Korean War. This resolution purports to establish a secondary responsibility in the 
General Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security in the event 
of Security Council inaction.  
Furthermore, even sympathetic countries are unlikely to support employing 
the defunct Uniting for Peace resolution in this legally questionable manner. There are 
very compelling pragmatic arguments for keeping the politics of the General 
Assembly out of ICC proceedings: indeed, the proposal appears to replace one form 
of politics (within the Security Council) with an arguably more divisive form of 
politics (within the General Assembly).  Either way, the proposal appears to increase 
the chances for politicizing the work of the Court, rather than diminishing it. 
                                                 
543 Bill Schabas, W. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd ed (2007) 167.  
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Until article 16 is amended – respecting the current legal regime 
 
A point worth stressing is that while the Rome Statute is what it is, with article 16 in 
its current (unamended) form, there remain a number of voluntarily agreed-upon legal 
obligations upon states parties.  Thus, while African states are entitled to insist that 
the ICC be cautious of interfering in conflict situations and of undermining peace 
processes, certainly the 30 African states parties to the Rome Statute have a treaty 
duty to: 
 
• accept that there is ordinarily a presumption in the Rome Statute in favour of 
prosecution; 
• make calls for deferral of investigations and/or prosecution on the basis of a 
proper assessment of the publicly available evidence; 
• make calls for deferrals by respecting the internal processes of the Rome Statute 
to which they are a party. 
 
Until such time as the Rome Statute is amended, it is incumbent upon states parties to 
the ICC to utilise one of two Rome Statute processes in making any calls for deferral: 
the first is by claiming under article 53 of the Statute that investigations or 
prosecutions are not in the interests of justice; the second is through convincing the 
Security Council that such a deferral is in the interests of justice and peace under 
article 16 of the Statute.   
And it is obviously at a more general level incumbent on these states parties to 
encourage the African Union to respect those processes, given its own commitment in 
its Constitutive Act to combating impunity for international crimes, and because a 
majority of the AU’s members are treaty members of the Rome Statute.  Accordingly, 
the following recommendations might thus be made:  
In the first place, our earlier discussion of complementarity demonstrates that 
African States Parties should stress that Sudan has the ability to frustrate the ICC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction by insisting that it is willing and able to prosecute the 
offenders allegedly guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur 
region.  Article 17 of the Rome Statute permits Sudan to engage directly with the 
Court.  It permits a state that is a subject of proceedings before the ICC to raise an 
objection to the effect that it is willing and able to prosecute crimes that would 
otherwise be investigated by the ICC.  Only Sudan has standing to make these 
arguments.  Engaging the ICC has its merits: it allows Sudan to make the arguments 
that it and the African Union at its behest have been making in political fora before an 
institution which really matters, and which has the power (and the duty) to respond.544 
It should be stressed by African states parties that it is up to Sudan to take appropriate 
domestic measures and to convince the ICC of its ability and willingness to prosecute 
the international crimes which are in issue.  And by corollary, it should be stressed by 
African states parties that if Sudan is unable to convince the ICC that it is so enabled, 
then the ICC remains appropriately seized with the case.  
In the second place, African States Parties and the AU as their regional body 
should be encouraged to engage critically with the ICC – and with appropriate respect 
for the provisions of the Rome Statute – regarding deferral claims.  For instance, the 
                                                 
544 See Musila supra note 538 25. 
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appeal hearings concerning the arrest warrant for President al-Bashir are one means 
by which the concerns might be raised by Sudan, and other African States or even the 
AU, with reliance on article 53 of the Rome Statute. In cases where it is considered 
that prosecutions would be prejudicial to the peace and security of States or the region 
as a whole, African States should continue to invoke article 16 of the ICC Statute to 
push for a deferral by the UN Security Council of proceedings initiated against 
President al-Bashir in conformity with previous decisions of the Peace and Security 
Council and the Assembly of the Union.  However, such calls should not be made 
blindly. As states parties to the Rome Statute and with a proper appreciation of the 
Rome Statute’s provisions, it will be incumbent on states parties to make out a case 
for the deferral.  In that regard it will be for the states parties to show that it is not in 
the interests of justice for the ICC to continue with an investigation or a prosecution.  
And naturally, to make out that case it will be for African states parties to first insist 
from Sudan that it demonstrates a fundamental change on the ground such that the 
situation there no longer constitutes a threat to international peace and security, or that 
continuing the ICC process is a greater threat to peace and security than deferring.  
In the third place, therefore, states parties to the Statute should insist that the 
African Union call upon Sudan to provide convincing evidence to the AU that there is 
no longer a threat to international peace and security.  In this regard, the AU should 
be requested to urgently require Sudan to make that case to the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Personalities headed by former President Mbeki.  
In the fourth place, to the extent that African states are dissatisfied with the 
Prosecutor’s current policy in respect of prosecutions, they should be encouraged to 
call for a revision of this prosecutorial policy. In that regard states should call for a 
Working Group to be established on the Prosecutor’s Prosecution Policy.  That 
Working Group might consider the following options as tentative suggestions by 
African states parties:  a revision of the Rome Statute to include the addition of other 
factors that the Prosecutor should consider when exercising his discretion not to 
investigate or prosecute, in the interests of justice, under article 53 of the Statute; or 
the adoption by the Assembly of States Parties of Guidelines which the Prosecutor 
should take into account in exercising these functions.  In order for such a Working 
Group to be apprised of African concerns about the peace/justice debate in 
relationship to the ICC’s work on the continent, African states parties should be 
encouraged to prepare as soon as possible a policy paper suggesting a broader set of 
circumstances in which investigation or prosecution would not be in the interests of 
justice under the Rome Statute. 
 
A need for increased and deeper dialogue 
 
As recent events make plain, concerns about the role of the UNSC are unlikely to 
diminish in importance for African leaders and governments, especially in light of the 
recommendations of the AU Panel on Darfur. Moreover, as long as these concerns 
remain unattended, they could deter African states from ratifying the Rome Statute, 
thus undermining the quest for universality. What exactly Africa wants on this issue is 
however unclear, considering that most African states parties appeared not to support 
the tabling of the AU’s Article 16 recommendation at the 8th ASP. This (in)action 
shows the necessity of dialogue and consensus building among African states parties 
(within and outside the forum of the AU) on the issue. 
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That dialogue should proceed on the basis of a proper understanding of the 
law and with an appreciation of the possibilities and impossibilities (at least currently) 
regarding Security Council reform.   
The first point worth noting is that notwithstanding the problems with the 
Security Councils’ composition, its role within the scheme of the Rome Statute was 
foreseen and voluntarily agreed to by 30 African states parties who have ratified the 
statute, and by all the states that were at Rome and who played a role in drafting the 
Statute in 1998.  
Secondly, it also does not help that African critics appear ready to conflate 
their (justified) criticism of the Security Council’s politics and composition with 
(unjustified) attacks against the ICC for investigations that proceed from a Security 
Council referral. It needs to be stressed that the ICC is not responsible for the Sudan 
referral coming to it – but now that the referral has been made it has a legal duty to act 
independently under the Rome Statute to respond thereto.  No doubt Israeli, US, or 
the abuses of other states call for an international response.  But to attack the ICC for 
the failure of the Security Council to secure investigations is to choose the wrong 
whipping boy.   And to denounce the justified referral of the Sudan crisis to the ICC 
for investigation is an unfortunate failure by African leaders to recognize that rarest of 
examples: the Security Council overcoming its own institutional and political 
deficiencies to the benefit of African victims of massive human rights violations. 
That leads to the third point, which is that referral by the UN Security Council 
is a crucial element of the ICC’s ability to ensure justice for serious crimes no matter 
where they are committed: Security Council referrals allow crimes committed on the 
territory of non-states parties to come under the ICC’s jurisdiction. At the same time, 
following a Security Council referral, the ICC prosecutor is obliged by the Rome 
Statute to make an independent determination as to whether to proceed with an 
investigation (which determination is subject to oversight by Judges in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber). 
These points notwithstanding, the power of the Council to refer matters to the 
Court with the concomitant power to decide on deferral of matters under article 16 of 
the Rome Statute remains a real issue.  The controversial nature of the Council’s 
relationship with the ICC arises as we have seen from the inherent defects within the 
Council, defects which for a long time African and other states have complained 
about.  But the controversy is heightened in respect of the ICC and Sudan, since 
Sudan is not a state party to the Court, yet non-state parties on the Council voted for 
the referral (and have the power to refuse deferral). Accordingly, the following points 
may be made.  
 
1)  Security Council deferrals under article 16 of the Rome Statute should be 
avoided if possible, and if utilised then only in exceptional circumstances 
where the gravity of the offences and the impunity afforded to perpetrators 
necessitates an international prosecutorial response. The credibility of the ICC 
as a judicial institution demands that the ICC be protected from external 
influence and deferrals allow a political body to impose decisions on the ICC. 
Deferrals also increase the possibility that prosecutions will not take place, as 
the Sudan situation disquietingly demonstrates.  
 
2) As stated in the SADC principles, “while recognizing the role of the 
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security[,] the 
independence and operations of the Court and its judicial functions must not 
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be unduly prejudice[d] by political considerations.” This same principle 
should apply to other political bodies, including the African Union, to preserve 
and promote the ICC’s independence. Irrespective of a position on the 
appropriateness of Security Council deferrals, regional decisions on deferrals 
should not be a basis for withholding cooperation with the court. This would 
undercut the ICC’s real or perceived ability to operate independently and 
impartially carry out its functions by making the court dependent on decisions 
of political bodies that it does not control.  Furthermore, states parties have an 
international treaty obligation under the Rome Statute to cooperate with the 
ICC, and decisions by regional bodies such as the AU that undermine the duty 
of cooperation place such states in an invidious position.  
 
3)  While regional decisions on deferrals, especially in cases involving senior 
officials, risk allowing outside forces to interfere with the court’s judicial 
work, other types of “regional input,” however, can be valuable to fairly and 
effectively ensuring justice for serious crimes. One key area is promoting 
greater ratification of the ICC’s Rome Statute. Comprehensive ratification is 
the best way to ensure that the ICC can prosecute serious crimes in all parts of 
the world and promote the more even application of the law. African ICC 
states parties should call for the AU to develop a plan to promote widespread 
ratification of the Rome Statute within and beyond Africa. 
 
4) A further key area for “regional input” relates to cooperation with the ICC.  
As the court lacks a police force to enforce its judicial orders, the ICC is 
reliant on cooperation by states and intergovernmental institutions. African 
ICC states parties should call for the AU to facilitate greater cooperation 
between the AU and the ICC through the recently established ICC-AU Liaison 
Office in Addis Ababa and the conclusion of an agreement between the AU 
and the ICC on cooperation.  These are two measures, which have been taken 
by the United Nations with positive results.  African ICC states parties should 
also call for the AU to extend an invitation to the ICC to sessions of the AU 
Assembly. This can help promote more effective cooperation, but also 
understanding and discussion of concerns between the AU and the ICC. 
 
Finally, any discussion about the Security Council’s involvement in referring or 
deferring cases for investigation by the ICC will require creative thinking.  It is thus 
recommended that a proposal be made that the Working Group at the Review 
Conference consider the power of the UN Security Council under the Rome Statute to 
refer cases to the ICC and to defer cases for one year. That Working Group might be 
tasked with considering the following tentative proposals: 
 
1) whether there are mechanisms available or amendments that may be 
proposed that would strengthen the relationship between the Security Council 
and the African Union, by, for example, ensuring that any referral or deferral 
in respect of a continental situation be done with prior consultation with the 
African Union's Peace and Security Council or other suitable AU body. 
 
2) whether there are mechanisms available or amendments that may be 
proposed that would ensure that any referral or deferral decision of the 
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Security Council be subject to review and/or confirmation by an independent 
body (such as the ICJ or the ICC) or by the Assembly of States Parties. 
 
 
Kenya and the ICC545 
 
The world’s first permanent international criminal court (the International Criminal 
Court or ICC), whilst seated in The Hague, has thus far demonstrated a deep 
investment in Africa. Still in its infancy, the ICC’s first cases are all on the continent. 
Three countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa (the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda) were the first to refer “situations” in 
their respective territories to the ICC Prosecutor for investigations and possible 
prosecutions.546 Cote d’Ivoire, in West Africa, subsequently made history by 
becoming the first non-party to lodge a declaration accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction.547 
Most recently, another East African nation, Kenya, indicated that it too wished to 
refer a situation to the Court (although, as we shall see, the ICC Prosecutor instead 
chose to seek authorization from the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for his first proprio 
motu (of his own accord) investigation of a situation).548    
Before Kenya, Sudan was the last and most controversial African situation to 
come within the Prosecutor’s sights. Unlike the other African situations which had 
come to the Court by way of so-called “self-referrals”, it was the UN Security 
Council, acting under its Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter, that referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.  
The Kenyan situation is the focus of this note.549  The situation arises from the 
violence that followed Kenya’s flawed 2007 general election that left over 1000 
people dead, caused around 400,000 to flee their homes, and brought Kenya to the 
brink of civil war. Leaders of both parties agreed to set up the Commission to 
Investigate the Post-Election Violence (the Waki commission, after its chairman, 
Justice Philip Waki). They also established an independent review committee to look 
at the flaws in the election (headed by retired South African Constitutional Court 
Judge Johan Kriegler), and a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission to help heal 
historical grievances dating from well before the 2007 general elections.  The Waki 
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commission recommended wide-ranging reforms of the police as well as the creation 
of a special tribunal for Kenya, independent of the judiciary, anchored in a 
constitutional amendment and staffed by both Kenyan and international judges and 
prosecutors. In the event no special tribunal was established, the Waki commission 
recommended that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan – who had chaired the 
negotiations that led to the current coalition government – hand over a sealed 
envelope containing the names of suspects to the ICC. Annan handed over the 
envelope and other materials from the Waki commission to the ICC prosecutor in July 
2009.  
After months of inaction by Kenya’s authorities on national prosecutions for 
those responsible for the election violence, the ICC prosecutor sought permission, in 
November 2009, from a pre-trial chamber of three ICC judges to proceed with an 
investigation.550 This in itself was historic: the Kenyan investigation is the first 
investigation by the Court following the prosecutor’s use of his proprio motu powers 
under article 15 of the Rome Statute. The power in article 15 permits the Prosecutor 
to open an investigation on his own initiative on the basis of information indicating 
the commission of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. The granting to the 
Prosecutor of a proprio motu power to initiate investigations was one of the most 
debated issues during the negotiations of the Rome Statute. In the end, the drafters of 
the Statute determined that in order for the Prosecutor to exercise this power, the 
alleged crimes must have been committed by nationals of a State Party or have taken 
place in the territory of a State Party – the preconditions set out in terms of Article 12 
of the Rome Statute.551 For Kenya the ICC was thus a potential forum by which the 
perpetrators of the violence might be held accountable. That is because Kenya ratified 
the Rome Statute on 15 March, 2005 becoming a State Party on 1 June 2005.  
Having sought permission to proceed with his investigation, the Prosecutor’s 
request activated a decision by the Presidency of ICC assigning the situation in the 
Republic of Kenya to Pre-Trial Chamber II composed of Judges Ekaterina 
Trendafilova, Hans-Peter Kaul and Cuno Tarfusser. That assignment occurred 
because under the Rome Statute, if the Prosecutor intends to commence an 
investigation proprio motu into a situation, he must first obtain authorization from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. Thus, on 26 November 2009 the Prosecutor filed his 
request for authorization together with 39 appended annexes running to 
approximately 1,500 pages. 
The Prosecutor’s request was approved on 31 March 2010 in a majority 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC.552 The decision too is historic, paving 
the way for the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya. Essentially, the ICC judges have given the 
Prosecutor the benefit of the doubt and authorized him to conduct official 
investigations into crimes against humanity believed to have been committed in 
Kenya.  Kenyan hopes for an end to impunity now rest with Prosecutor Ocampo. The 
Prosecutor’s task is not without its difficulties.   To succeed in his efforts he will need 
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to rely on the cooperation of a de facto divided Kenyan Government, he will have to 
ensure that witnesses remain protected, and he will have to prosecute his case while at 
the same time navigating the commencement of the 2012 elections in Kenya. 
The majority found that upon examination of the available information, 
bearing in mind the nature of the proceedings under article 15 of the Statute, and in 
particular the low threshold applicable at this stage, the information provided by the 
Prosecutor established a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity were 
committed on Kenyan territory. The majority moreover found that all criteria for the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction were satisfied, to the standard of proof applicable 
at this stage. 
 
The majority therefore granted the Prosecutor’s request, and allowed him to 
commence an investigation covering alleged crimes against humanity committed 
during the events that took place between 1 June 2005 (the date of the Statute’s entry 
into force for the Republic of Kenya) and 26 November 2009 (the date of the filing of 
the Prosecutor’s Request). 
One of the most interesting aspects of the judgment related to the nature of the 
crimes.  The murder, rapes and looting perpetrated during the election violence were 
clearly prohibited under Kenyan domestic law, but did they amount to “crimes against 
humanity” for the purposes of the Rome Statue of the ICC (such that they were crimes 
of concern to the international community)?  A crime against humanity is made up of 
an underlying actus reus (murder, rape, torture, enslavement, are common examples) 
directed against a civilian population, but it triggers international concern on account 
of other features, including its widespread or systematic commission.  Furthermore, 
article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that for a crime to constitute a “crime 
against humanity”, it must be made “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organisational policy”.  To the majority, a crime against humanity may be committed 
by groups that are not States or even “State-like”, so long as the violence is 
“organised”.  According to the majority, the question to be considered is whether the 
organised group has “the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human 
rights.”553 In determining whether a group has such capability, the majority 
considered the following factors to be important:554   
 
(i)    Whether the group is under a responsible command, or has an established 
hierarchy; 
(ii)   Whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population; 
(iii)    Whether the group exercises control over part of the territory of a State; 
(iv)   Whether the group has criminal activities against the civilian population as a 
primary purpose; 
(v)    Whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a 
civilian population; and 
(vi)     Whether the group is part of a larger group which fulfils some or all of the 
above criteria. 
 
While the majority held that there was no evidence of a policy on the part of the 
Government of Kenya to attack a civilian population, it was nonetheless satisfied that 
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554 See majority decision, para. 93. 
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there is a reasonable basis for concluding that crimes against humanity have been 
committed, because the violence was planned, directed and organised by “various 
groups, including local leaders, businessmen and politicians.”555 
The minority judge, Judge Kaul, dissented on this point.  Judge Kaul was not 
satisfied that the Prosecutor had presented sufficient evidence of a State or 
organisational policy to commit an attack on a civilian population.  Conscious of the 
need to maintain a clear demarcation between domestic crimes and crimes against 
humanity, Judge Kaul held that evidence of violence being organised is not in itself 
sufficient for the violence to amount to a crime against humanity.  Judge Kaul found 
that, whilst the English text of the Rome Statute suggested that the violence merely be 
“organised”, the equally-authoritative French, Spanish and Arabic texts required that 
the policy of violence be adopted by an “organisation”.556  To Judge Kaul an 
“organisation” may be a private entity or a non-state actor, but given that the 
fundamental rationale of crimes against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the 
Statute was to protect the international community against the extremely grave threat 
emanating from such policies, Judge Kaul concluded that it had to be adopted either 
by a State or at the policy-making level of a State-like organization.  Whilst Judge 
Kaul accepted that the post-electoral violence may have been organised and planned 
in advance, in his view there was no “organisation” that had implemented a policy to 
attack a civilian population. Hence, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul felt unable to authorise the 
commencement of an investigation in the Republic of Kenya. 
The majority view, which flows from a generous interpretation of the Rome 
Statute’s provisions, is one which enlarges the scope for human rights protection 
through the means of international criminal justice mechanisms like the ICC.  Such a 
generous approach to the evidence on organizational capacity – as opposed to the 
minority’s re(strict)ive interpretation – does not appear inappropriate at the 
preliminary phase where the Prosecutor of the ICC is asking the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
authorize the very first phase of an investigation into alleged ICC crimes.   
In any event, to the extent that Judge Kaul was concerned to draw clear lines 
between domestic crimes that ought to have remained the preserve of Kenyan 
domestic law and crimes against humanity that triggered international concern, there 
are other aspects of the Rome Statute which arguably could better do that work.  
Under the Rome Statute, even where all the jurisdictional requirements have been met 
for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, the case in question must meet an additional 
threshold of gravity before the Prosecutor can intervene. This criterion is most clearly 
expressed in Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. According to this provision, the 
Court is bound to find a case inadmissible where it is “not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court”.  
Indeed, it is the gravity criterion in the Rome Statute that requires one to 
acknowledge the inherent differences between domestic and international 
prosecutions. For instance, Louis Arbour, who was then the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, noted in a statement to the 
December 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court that there is a major difference between international and 
domestic prosecution.  It lies in the unfettered discretion of the prosecutor.  In a 
domestic context, there is an assumption that all crimes that go beyond the trivial or 
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de minimis range are to be prosecuted.  But, before an international tribunal, 
particularly one based on complementarity,  
 
“the discretion to prosecute is considerably larger, and the criteria upon which 
such Prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised are ill-defined, and complex.  In my 
experience, based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real 
challenge posed to a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints the 
appropriate ones for international intervention, rather than to weed out weak or 
frivolous ones”.557 
 
One of the ways in which the drafters of the Rome Statute purported to assist the ICC 
Prosecutor to choose from many complaints the appropriate ones for international 
intervention by the ICC was by means of the gravity criterion.  That the Prosecutor 
requires this trigger mechanism is made clear by the breadth and depth of complaints 
that the Prosecutor has received. For example, in its first three years of operation 
alone, the Office of the Prosecutor received nearly 2000 communications from 
individuals or groups in more than 100 countries.  One can thus appreciate the 
manifest difference between the ICC prosecutor’s decisions on investigation and 
prosecution from those that a domestic prosecutor might have to make, the place for 
the gravity criterion within the Rome Statute, and the concomitant constraints placed 
on the Prosecutor.   
In the Kenya decision, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated that 
because “all crimes that fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court are 
serious … the reference to the insufficiency of gravity is actually an additional 
safeguard, which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting and trying 
peripheral cases.”558  
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the gravity of a situation must be 
assessed according to the modus operandi of the crimes, and that in this regard “it is 
not the number of victims that matter but rather the existence of some aggravating or 
qualitative factors attached to the commission of the crimes, which makes it 
grave.”559  The Pre-Trial Chamber listed the following factors that that may be taken 
into account in assessing gravity: 
 
(i)    The scale of the alleged crimes (including assessment of geographical and 
temporal intensity); 
(ii)   The nature of the crimes allegedly committed; 
(iii)    The manner in which the crimes were committed; and 
(iv)   The impact of the crimes and the harm caused to victims and their families. 
 
In respect of the Kenyan post-electoral violence, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s majority 
concluded that the threshold of gravity was satisfied on account of the large number 
of crimes, the brutality of the crimes, and the trauma that these crimes caused to 
victims. 
In the result, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation 
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into the alleged crimes against humanity committed as part of Kenya’s post-electoral 
violence.  
The Court’s decision to authorize the investigation has been long awaited and 
is now rightfully welcomed by victims of the violence.  Kofi Annan, who was 
instrumental in demanding accountability in Kenya (and who in late 2008 handed the 
Prosecutor a list of persons considered to be most responsible for the crimes 
committed), is one of many who have welcomed the Court’s move.  
It is significant that the Prosecutor, in presenting his case for authorization to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, argued that the crimes in Kenya met the gravity criterion in 
the Rome Statute.  The Pre-Trial Chamber’s summary of the evidence makes for 
uneasy reading – the barbarity of the crimes and the depravity of the offenders 
suggest that the ICC will indeed be dealing with a class of violations in Kenya that 
ought to be of the gravest concern to humanity. 
That being said, it is notable that the Kenyan situation brings the Court’s 
African focus into even starker relief. There have been calls for the Court to spread its 
attention beyond Africa, and criticisms abound that the Court is unhealthily 
preoccupied with this continent.  No doubt, alive to these concerns, in a press 
conference immediately after the ICC confirmed his request for an investigation, the 
Prosecutor reminded Kenyans that he was pursuing justice for them.  He stressed in 
discussing the ICC that “this Court is their Court.”560 
It is nevertheless imperative that the ICC be encouraged to exercise its 
jurisdiction beyond Africa, where the evidence justifies such action.  Africa – and 
indeed the world – wants and needs a Court that is committed to pursuing cases across 
the globe.  While the ICC may (for now) be a Court for Kenyans, and the horrendous 
crimes committed in that country are sufficiently grave to justify the Court’s 
intervention, there are other victims of massive atrocities that deserve the Court’s 
assistance.  One such situation – which is not in Africa – is in respect of Gaza.  
In this regard it may be recalled that the Palestine National Authority 
submitted a declaration in February 2009 to the effect that it now recognizes the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in relation to any crimes committed on 
its territory since 2002.  The Prosecutor of the ICC has been requested to consider the 
declaration by the Palestinian Authority to allow the ICC to investigate war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed on Palestinian territory during Israel’s attack 
on Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. The Rome Statute allows a state not party to the 
statute to declare that it accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC for international crimes 
committed within its territory.  Significantly, the Palestine declaration would allow 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by both Palestinians and 
Israelis on Palestinian territory.  The Rome Statute fails to define a state, and it is now 
been left to the ICC itself to make such a determination.  Over 100 states have 
recognized a “State of Palestine”, and it is a member of the Arab League. Moreover, 
the Palestinian National Authority has diplomatic relations with many states and 
observer status at the United Nations. As John Dugard has argued, it is not necessary 
for the ICC prosecutor to decide that Palestine is a state for all purposes, but only for 
the purpose of the ICC.561 In so deciding, the Prosecutor should be urged to adopt an 
expansive approach that gives effect to the main purpose of the ICC.   
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It is notable that the 15 September 2009 Goldstone Report by a fact-finding 
mission (led by former Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa) organized by the 
Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council called on both sides to thoroughly 
investigate the allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The probes 
should be “independent and in conformity with international standards” and establish 
a committee of human rights experts to monitor any such proceedings in Israel and 
the Palestinian territories.  If either Israel or the Palestinians fail to do so, then the 15-
nation Security Council has been called upon to refer the situation in Gaza to the 
prosecutor of the ICC. 
To date, the ICC Prosecutor has failed to decide on the request by Palestine for 
an investigation.  And to date, the Security Council has failed to refer the situation in 
Gaza to the prosecutor of the ICC.  While the Security Council’s inaction against 
Israel is expected because of the problematic and skewed politics of that body, the 
indecision by the Office of the Prosecutor to decide on the Palestinian request is 
disappointing. A decision by the ICC to investigate whether crimes were committed 
in Gaza, in the course of Israel’s offensive in Operation Cast Lead, would give the 
ICC an opportunity to show that it is not infected by a double standard and that it is 
willing to take action against international crimes committed outside Africa.  If 
Kenyan victims deserve the Court, then so do those who suffered in Gaza. 
 
Conclusions for Africa and the African Union 
 
The ICC is far from a perfect institution and it is vital that its policies and practice 
improve over time. Nevertheless, the ICC remains the most important check against 
unbridled impunity. This is especially with regard to more politically sensitive cases, 
which can be difficult to address before domestic courts, such as when heads of state 
or senior leaders are implicated in the commission of atrocities.  
Rejection of impunity is a core element of the AU’s Constitutive Act. Moreover, 
justice is crucial to establishing rule of law and sustainable peace on the continent.  
Beyond the issues identified in this paper, it remains important for African ICC states 
parties to affirm their support for the ICC by underscoring: 
 
• The ICC’s important role in ensuring justice for serious crimes for African 
victims; 
 
• The ICC’s function as a crucial court of last resort when national justice systems 
are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute; 
 
• States parties’ commitment to press for wider ratification of the Rome Statute; and 
 





The Future of African International Criminal Justice – Civil Society, 
Complementarity and South Africa’s critical position562 
 
 
In this section of the thesis I conclude by discussing the important example of work 
done within (South) Africa by civil society to promote and entrench the ideal of 
international criminal justice.  I do so drawing on the insights gained from working as 
a senior consultant on the International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP) at the 
Institute for Security Studies, a programme launched in February 2008. I was 
fortunate to be a founding member of ICAP, and I think the work it has done in its 
short existence demonstrates the foundational work that civil society can and must do 
in shaping and leading efforts to promote international criminal justice and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), including through research and awareness raising, 
advocacy, technical assistance and training, and supporting domestic and regional 
legal interventions on questions of international criminal justice. 
 
My discussion of such civil society work takes place against the backdrop of South 
Africa’s increasingly up-and-down relationship with the ICC.  
 
South Africa’s early support for the idea of a permanent international criminal court is 
well known.  In particular, its influence at Rome in 1998 where the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) statute was drafted has been chronicled widely and admired 
deservedly. It was thus to be expected that South Africa would become a party to the 
Court’s statute and scheme.  On 17 July 1998 South Africa signed and ratified the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”), thereby becoming 
the 23rd State Party. In order to give effect to its complementarity obligations under 
the Rome Statute, South Africa passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 2002 (“ICC Act”).  The passing of the ICC Act 
was momentous:  prior to the ICC Act, South Africa had no municipal legislation on 
the subject of war crimes or crimes against humanity, and no domestic prosecutions 
of international crimes had taken place in South Africa. South Africa was the first 
state in Africa to implement the Rome Statute’s provisions into its domestic law – and 
to date it is one of only three African states to have done so.  It has moreover created 
a dedicated unit – the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit, headed by Advocate Anton 
Ackermann – to tackle the crimes outlawed under the statute, being genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.    
 
And lawyers and civil society members have sought to utilise the ICC Act.  Cases 
have been filed in South Africa in terms of the Act in recent times, perhaps the most 
high profile being a request for the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to act 
against Zimbabweans accused of torturing MDC members during the last election 
period, and more recently a dossier submitted to the NPA calling for the investigation 
of South Africans and others who are suspected of involvement in war crimes during 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.  The cases are ongoing and have not (yet) resulted in 
litigation or prosecutions. 
                                                 
562 This portion of the chapter has already been published as “The Future of International Criminal 
Justice – Civil Society, Complementarity and the Case of South Africa” (2010) 19(4) African Security 
Review 2154; and a revised version was published in “Recent cases and developments: South Africa 
and the International Criminal Court” (2009) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 441. 
 165 
 
South Africa’s support for the ICC tracks a broader commitment by African states to 
combat impunity on the continent for crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide.  Indeed, the history of the ICC’s creation and the serious and engaged 
involvement of African states in that history demonstrate the ICC to be a Court 
created in part by Africans and ultimately for the benefit of African victims of serious 
crimes.  The high ideals and hard work that marked African states’ participation in 
bringing the ICC to life in Rome should not too easily be forgotten.  Thus,  
 
“[c]ontrary to the view that the ICC was shoved down the throats of unwilling 
Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome and who had no 
alternative but to follow their Western Masters under threat of withholding of 
economic aid if they did not follow”,  
 
a closer inspection of  
 
“the historical developments leading up to the establishment of the court portray 
an international will of which Africa was a part, to enforce humanitarian norms 
and to bring to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community”.563   
 
Looking back then, the picture that emerges is a Court created with extensive 
and deep involvement of African nations – a Court in reality created by Africans, in 
concert with other nations of the world who came together at Rome. 
Certainly, recent events have brought South Africa’s relationship with the ICC 
into critical focus.  The flashpoint is principally a decision by the ICC on 4 March 
2009 to issue an international arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan 
for grave crimes committed by his government’s officers and soldiers.  That warrant 
was issued after the Security Council of the United Nations in 2005 decided to refer 
the crimes committed in Sudan to the ICC for investigation and possible prosecution. 
More broadly, the strong stand in support of the ICC that characterized 
(South) Africa’s earlier position on international criminal justice is less evident today.  
This change in position tracks a broader “push-back” against the ICC on the 
continent.  Aside from the pique expressed by African states against the ICC’s pursuit 
of justice in respect of al-Bashir, it is not possible to identify with precision the 
reasons for this apparent change of heart.  However, the complaints that have been 
expressed with most clarity and conviction within Africa include the suggestion that 
the ICC is a hegemonic tool of western powers which is targeting or discriminating 
against Africans because its first cases flow from this continent.  There is also the 
suggestion that the ICC’s focus only on Africa is undermining rather than assisting 
African efforts to solve its problems.  This complaint is often expressed in terms of 
the referral of the Sudan situation by the Security Council to the ICC for investigation 
– and amounts to a criticism that the Court’s work is undermining peace efforts or 
conflict resolution processes.  That is one reason why African states through the 
African Union have accordingly called on the Security Council to defer the ICC’s 
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investigation into President al-Bashir by invoking article 16 of the Rome Statute 
(which allows for a suspension of prosecution or investigation for a period of up to 12 
months). A related objection is that the Security Council (with its skewed institutional 
power) while entitled to send cases to the ICC, has made itself guilty of a double 
standard since it has done so in respect of Sudan but has not done so in relation to, for 
instance, Gaza or Iraq.  Yet another objection is that the Court has deigned to proceed 
against a sitting head of state (President al-Bashir) of a country (Sudan) that is not 
party to the Rome Statute.  The complaint essentially implicates questions about head 
of state immunity under customary international law and the extent to which the 
Rome Statute’s provisions which strip that immunity can be made applicable to 
President al-Bashir.  
These complaints are not the subject of this section.  The point for now is that 
it is not altogether clear how South Africa positions itself in respect of these 
complaints against the ICC, partly because South Africa’s recent position on the ICC 
has not been a model of clarity. If anything, the picture that emerges is that South 
Africa is at least sympathetic towards these complaints.   
Reports emerged that during May 2009 South Africa had invited President al-
Bashir – by then wanted by the ICC – to President Zuma’s inauguration.  If he were to 
arrive the country faced an embarrassing situation that threatened to undermine the 
jubilation of inauguration day.564  On the eve of the inauguration the Government 
clarified that although the Sudanese government was invited, President al-Bashir was 
not. Al-Bashir chose not to visit South Africa at that time.  Then July was dominated 
by the news that South Africa joined ranks with others at an AU meeting in Sirte, 
Libya, to support a 3 July AU resolution (apparently driven by President Gaddafi) 
calling on its members to defy the international arrest warrant issued by the ICC for 
al-Bashir.  Confusingly, just shy of a month before that South Africa’s Justice 
Minister at a different AU meeting on 8 and 9 June in Addis Ababa had joined with 
other African states to affirm a deep commitment to the Court. 
The Sirte resolution of the AU on 3 July – stressing that Member States would 
not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of African indicted personalities – was 
quickly condemned as a betrayal of Africa's commitment to end impunity for human 
rights atrocities, and an international treaty violation. Only Botswana publicly 
distanced itself from the AU move, and in a letter dated 8 July 2009 to the ICC 
assured the Court that “as a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Botswana will 
fully abide with its treaty obligations and will support the International Criminal 
Court in its endeavours to implement the provisions of the Rome Statute”.565  
South Africa eventually clarified its position after directed criticism from civil 
society (which is discussed further below).   The Government issued a response which 
purported to clarify that it was committed to its legal obligations in relation to the 
possible arrest of President al-Bashir.  On 31 July 2009 Dr Ntsaluba of Foreign 
Affairs explained as follows at a Press Conference:566 
 
                                                 
564 See Max du Plessis and Nicole Fritz, New Diplomatic Fiasco Looms, Business Day, 2 May 2009. 
565 Letter dated 8 July 2009 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the 
Republic of Botswana to Justice Sany-Hyun Song, President of the International Criminal Court. 
566 Notes following the briefing of Department International Relations and Co-operation’s Director-
General, Ayanda Ntsaluba, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=3378&tid=3523. 
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“South Africa is the (sic) State Party of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and is therefore obliged to cooperate with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
(Article 86), and hence also in the execution of arrest warrants. It is worth 
noting that Article 87(7) of the Statute provides that, when a State Party fails 
to comply with a request to cooperate, the Court may make a finding to that 
effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, or in the case of a 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referral to the UNSC. 
 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that the official capacity as Head of 
State or Government of an accused provides no exemption from criminal 
responsibility. Furthermore, Section 4(1) of the South African Implementation 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act also ousts the 
applicability of other domestic laws in respect of an accused, with the result 
that the immunity from prosecution that President El Bashir would normally 
have enjoyed in terms of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, 2001 
(Act No. 37 of 2001), is not be applicable.” 
 
Remarkably, at that press conference it was disclosed that an international arrest 
warrant for al-Bashir “has been received” (presumably from the ICC) and “endorsed 
by a [South African] magistrate”.  Dr Ntsaluba explained that “[t]his means that if 
President El Bashir (sic) arrives on South African territory, he will be liable for 
arrest”.  
What the foregoing demonstrates is that certainly at an international level, 
South Africa’s position on the ICC has been confused and confusing. In a thoughtful 
article published in the Business Day567 Chris Gevers has explained that what 
emerged clearly from the al-Bashir indictment in the first place is the need for a 
coherent and coordinated policy on international criminal justice within Government. 
The nature of these matters being such that numerous state departments are involved, 
coordination across government is essential. Nothing is to be gained from the 
equivocation that characterised South Africa’s handling of the AU resolution and al-
Bashir’s indictment by the ICC. After some firm nudging, by South African civil 
society in particular, the Government ultimately did the right thing by honouring our 
treaty obligations and acknowledging the legal effect they have in the domestic 
sphere. However, by the time South Africa corrected its position it had already missed 
an opportunity to show leadership (Botswana had long since been heralded – correctly 
– as Africa’s principled voice on the issue); and South Africa had needlessly suffered 
the political cost of being portrayed as siding with al-Bashir and against the ICC; and 
of placing old-style OAU solidarity politics above the rights of African victims.  
Secondly, and related to this, is what Gevers describes as the danger of aiming 
for short-term diplomatic solutions in response to such developments. South Africa 
lies at the centre of too many political dichotomies, and is pulled in too many 
directions, to properly anticipate the long-term effect of decisions based on immediate 
political cost. The al-Bashir matter has seen South Africa originally siding not only 
with African states, but also with various Arab states that had condemned the ICC 
indictment. Its revised, or clarified position – affirming its legal duty to arrest al-
Bashir if he visited here – will not have sat well with the League of Arab States. At 
the same time, the request filed by NGOs in August 2009 requesting the South 
                                                 
567 “SA must tighten policies on international criminal justice”, 20 August 2009. 
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African authorities under the ICC Act to investigate South African and other nationals 
implicated in crimes committed during Israel’s military offensive in Gaza during 
Operation Cast Lead will sit better within Arab capitals.  At the same time, any action 
thereon by the SA government is likely to draw the ire of Israel. Given these 
conflicting political allegiances, and the already embarrassing correction Government 
was forced to make in respect of the al-Bashir arrest warrant, South Africa could do 
worse than to err on the side of principle and open commitment to its stated legal 
obligations. 
Whether the public position adopted by the Government at this 31 July 2009 
media briefing was a reversal of the position it had adopted in supporting the 3 July 
2009 AU decision remains unclear.  It should nevertheless be heralded as a welcome 
(if not overdue) clarification of South Africa’s commitment to its treaty and domestic 
legal obligations. 
In respect of Al-Bashir the central obligation flows from the Rome Statute’s 
principle of complementarity. For South Africa, it may further be noted, this 
commitment in relation to international crimes goes beyond treaty ratification and is 
domestically reflected in South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002. The ICC Act provides that there is an 
obligation to investigate and prosecute.  The preamble speaks of South Africa’s 
commitment to  
 
“bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law 
of the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its 
international obligations to do so when the Republic became party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, or in the event of the national 
prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do so, in line 
with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in the Statute, in the 
International Criminal Court, created by and functioning in terms of the said 
Statute”.   
 
Read as a whole there can be no doubt that in terms of the Act, South Africa’s 
Parliament favours the prosecution of international crimes, either by cooperating with 
the ICC in relation to suspects the Court is investigating, or if needs be by domestic 
prosecution in South Africa.568 
However, while (or because) the Government’s position regarding the ICC has 
not at times been altogether clear, the role of civil society has become increasingly 
important in nudging the Government towards greater clarity and the fulfilment of its 
cooperation duties and the effective prosecution of international criminals, sometimes 
                                                 
568 The first object of the Act recorded in section 3(a) is to create a framework to ensure that the Rome 
Statute is effectively implemented in South Africa. The second object of the Act recorded in section 
3(b), is to ensure that anything done in terms of the ICC Act, conforms with South Africa’s obligations 
under the Rome Statute, including its obligation to cooperate internationally with the ICC and to 
prosecute domestically the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Another object of the Act recorded 
in s 3(d), is to enable the National Prosecuting Authority to prosecute and the High Courts to adjudicate 
in cases against people accused of having committed crimes against humanity, both inside South Africa 
and beyond its borders. Once a person suspected of international crimes has been arrested, the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions is obliged in terms of section 5(3), when he considers whether to 
institute such a prosecution, to: “give recognition to the obligation that the Republic, in the first 
instance and in line with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in article 1 of the Statute, 
has jurisdiction and the responsibility to prosecute persons accused of having committed a crime”. 
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if necessary through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  Arising from the 
discussion above, three examples suffice: 
 
 
First: the threat by civil society to seek a court mandamus for the arrest of Al-Bashir 
 
 
After the press reported in early May 2009 that the South African Government had 
apparently invited President al-Bashir to the inauguration of Jacob Zuma as South 
Africa’s new president on 9 May 2009, civil society in South Africa responded 
swiftly.  In the first instance, a media release was issued by a number of influential 
civil society organisations on 8 May 2009.  That media release read as follows: 
 
“PRESS RELEASE (Thursday, 7 May 2009) 
 
The Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa (Idasa), and Open Society Institute (OSI) note with concern a 
report (Business Day, "Sudan dilemma for Zuma's inauguration", 6 May 2009) 
that South Africa's government spokesman Themba Maseko confirmed that 
Sudanese President al-Bashir has been invited, along with other heads of state, 
to president-elect Jacob Zuma's inauguration this coming Saturday.  These 
organisations further note the statement by Director-General Ntsaluba at a 
media briefing on 7 May apparently confirming that President al-Bashir will 
not be attending, while not denying that he had been invited. 
SALC, Idasa, and OSI recall that South Africa is a party to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and thus has an obligation to assist 
the ICC in effecting the arrest warrant issued for al-Bashir by the ICC in 
March of this year. In addition to its legal obligations in this matter, South 
Africa played an important leadership role in the development of the Rome 
Statute and thus the establishment of the ICC. South Africa is also one of only 
three states on the continent to have domesticated the Rome Statute’s 
provisions into South African law:  a significant step which demonstrates the 
country’s commitment to taking action on matters of international criminal 
justice. 
Specifically, South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (section 8 (2)) holds that were 
President al-Bashir to be present on the territory of South Africa, and the 
International Criminal Court were to request his arrest, the Director-General of 
the Department of Justice “must immediately on receipt of that request, 
forward the request and accompanying documents to a magistrate, who must 
endorse the warrant of arrest for execution in any part of the Republic”. 
SALC, Idasa, and OSI thus concur with the South African government's 
stance that if al-Bashir were to enter or be present in South Africa he would be 
subject to immediate arrest and welcome the Director-General's confirmation 
that he will not be attending.   
In the event that President al-Bashir does for whatever reason choose to 
attend, SALC has requested Advocates Anton Katz and Max du Plessis to 
represent them in the event that al-Bashir arrives for President Zuma's 
inauguration and there is a failure by the relevant South African officials to 
take action in compliance with South Africa's international obligations. In 
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particular SALC intends to approach the appropriate court for the necessary 
relief to assist South Africa in complying with its obligations under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
SALC, Idasa, and OSI reiterate that States that have ratified the Rome Statute 
cannot be seen to be shielding persons who are alleged to be guilty of serious 
crimes against humanity and war crimes and who are sought for arrest and 
prosecution by the ICC.”  
  
As it turned out, President al-Bashir did not attend, and the threatened court 
application was not necessary.  But it is noteworthy that the civil society organisations 
concerned took the proactive step of briefing barristers to prepare court application 
papers in the event that al-Bashir did arrive and the South African government failed 




“1. Declaring the application to be a matter of urgency and dispensing 
insofar as is necessary in terms of Rule 6(12) with the usual forms and 
service provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court; 
 
2. Declaring the conduct of the Respondents, to the extent that they have 
failed to take steps to arrest and/or detain the President of the Republic 
of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and invalid; 
 
3. Compelling the Respondents forthwith to take all reasonable steps to 
arrest the President of the Republic of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir without a warrant in terms of section 40(1)(k) of the CPA and 
detain him, pending a formal request for his surrender from the 




4. Compelling the Respondents forthwith to take all reasonable steps to 
provisionally arrest President Bashir in terms of the Implementation of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002; 
 
5. Compelling the Respondents who oppose the application to pay costs 
jointly and severally, such costs to include the costs of two counsel 
…”. 
 
One may surmise whether the public forewarning of this civil society-led litigation 
played a part in the Government’s clarified (or reversed) position regarding its legal 
obligations to arrest President al-Bashir.   
 
Second: the mobilisation by civil society to ensure a turn-around of the South African 
Government’s earlier siding with the AU decision on non-cooperation 
 
Because of its support for the AU’s July Sirte resolution South Africa was quickly 
singled out for severe criticism both at home and abroad. One example of the 
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criticism is a statement of 15 July 2009 signed by several South African civil society 
organisations and many concerned individuals calling upon President Jacob Zuma to 
honour South Africa’s treaty obligations by cooperating with the International 
Criminal Court in relation to the warrant of arrest issued for President Omar al-Bashir 
of The Sudan.  ICAP, together with other civil society organisations, formulated the 
statement and canvassed signatures from high-profile personalities in support – 
including individuals of international stature such as Judge Richard Goldstone and 
Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu.  Virtually all of South Africa’s leading human 
rights organisations, including the South African Human Rights Commission, united 
around the call for South Africa’s government to respect its own law and Constitution 
and to disassociate itself from the AU decision to refuse cooperation with the ICC.569 
  The General Council of the Bar of South Africa issued its own strongly 
worded statement on the same day (GCB Circular No 111/09, 15 July 2009), in which 
it summed up the legal position as follows: 
 
“The issue of whether or not President Al-Bashir will be subject to arrest and 
surrender in South Africa should he enter the country, is determined by 
reference to our laws, including the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC Act and our Constitution.   
 
The political considerations that underlie the AU’s concern with the conduct 
of the ICC and the UN Security Council in relation to Africa should not 
impede our authorities from performing their express legal obligations under 
our law should President Al-Bashir enter South Africa.   
 
Chapter 4 of our Implementation of the Rome Statute Act obliges our Central 
Authority, on receipt of a request from the ICC to enforce a warrant of arrest 
issued by that Court, with necessary accompanying documents, to approach a 
Magistrate who must endorse the ICC’s warrant of arrest for execution where 
the accused is within our borders.” 
 
                                                 
569 The South African based organisations that endorsed the statement are: Aids Consortium, Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies (CALS), Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Pretoria University, Centre 
for Justice and Crime Prevention Centre for the Study of Violence & Reconciliation (CSVR), Human 
Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA), International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 
International Crime in Africa Programme, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Khulumani Support 
Group, Legal Resources Centre (LRC), Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), Open Society Foundation 
of SA (OSF-SA), Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA), Sonke Gender Justice Network, 
South African History Archive (SAHA), South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), and 
Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC).  
Prominent South Africans who endorsed the statement include: The Most Reverend Desmond 
Mpilo Tutu, former Chairperson of the TRC, Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; former judge of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Advocate Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza SC, former Commissioner on 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur appointed pursuant to UN Resolution 1564, 
Professor Kader Asmal, Former Minister and Honorary Professor UCT and UWC, Professor Hugh 
Corder, Professor of Public law, UCT, Yasmin Sooka, former TRC Commissioner, Professor John 
Dugard, Centre for Human Rights, Pretoria University, Jody Kollapen, Chairperson of the South 
African Human Rights Commission, and Professor Karthy Govender, Commissioner of the South 
African Human Rights Commission and Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu Natal. 
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It is clear that Government was stung by this public condemnation of its conduct.  
And reports indicate that its reversed (or clarified) position was as a direct result of 
the swift movement by civil society organisations within South Africa to call 
Government to account and to remind it of its complementarity obligations as a matter 
of domestic and international law.  Thus, on 31 July 2009, Government publicly 
stated that it was committed to the Rome Statute and would arrest President al-Bashir 
if he arrived in South Africa – and as if to dispel any further doubts, disclosed that an 
arrest warrant had been issued for him by senior magistrate. 
Of some significance is that thereafter the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development in South Africa requested assistance from ICAP to draft 
a position paper dealing with recent developments on the continent relating to 
international criminal justice, and in which various recommendations were made for 
the Department to consider adopting in the run up to the Rome Statute Review 
Conference scheduled for May/June 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. 
It might also be mentioned that in addition a continent-wide statement was 
produced by African civil society groups and championed by ICAP in partnership 
with amongst others Human Rights Watch and the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice.  That partnership has produced a statement condemning the AU’s 
3 July 2009 Sirte decision and calling on African states parties to reaffirm their 
commitment to the Rome Statute.  The statement has to date been signed by over 164 
civil society organisations in Africa and the full text of the statement (which is hosted 
on the Human Rights Watch website570) reads as follows: 
 
“African Civil Society Urges African States Parties to the Rome Statute to 
Reaffirm Their Commitment to the ICC 
 
JULY 30, 2009  
 
Africa: Reaffirm Support for International Criminal Court 
On 3 July 2009 the African Union (AU) agreed that its members should 
withhold cooperation from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the arrest 
and surrender of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. The court issued its 
arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on 4 March 2009 for alleged war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. 
 
The AU's decision threatens to block justice for victims of the worst crimes 
committed on the continent. It is inconsistent with article 4 of the AU's 
constitutive act that rejects impunity, as well as the treaty obligations of the 30 
African governments that ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. The decision 
also undermines the consensus reached by African ICC States Parties at a 
meeting in Addis Ababa in June 2009. 
 
Recognizing our obligation to help protect human rights and uphold the rule of 
law, we, the undersigned civil society organizations, appeal to African ICC 
States Parties to reaffirm their support for the ICC and their commitment to 
abide by their obligations under the Rome Statute, particularly in relation to 
the arrest and transfer of the President of Sudan to the ICC. 
 
                                                 
570 See http://www.hrw.org/node/84759 (accessed 5 August 2010). 
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The ICC was created to bring accountability for the most serious crimes of 
international concern: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
African governments, together with civil society, played an active role in 
establishing the court and African governments were among the founding 
ratifiers of the Rome Statute. 
 
A majority of African countries are now Parties to the ICC: Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic 
of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia. In ratifying the Rome Statute, these states signaled their 
dedication to cooperate with the ICC to defend the rights of victims and to 
ensure that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes known to humankind, 
whoever they might be, are brought to justice. 
 
In Addis Ababa in June, those states underscored their continued support for 
the court. Proposals to consider making recommendations in relation to 
possible withdrawal from the ICC or withholding cooperation from the court 
failed to win a consensus. 
 
The decision adopted at the AU summit just three weeks later is a backward 
step. The basis provided by the AU for withholding cooperation with the ICC 
is the UN Security Council's lack of response to the AU's request for a deferral 
of the ICC's case against President al-Bashir. Consistent with States Parties' 
obligations under the Rome Statute, this is a matter to direct to the Security 
Council and does not warrant withholding cooperation from the ICC. 
 
Following the AU summit, the governments of Botswana and Uganda issued 
statements reiterating their commitment to cooperating with the ICC. These 
statements are important. 
 
Civil society across the continent has expressed concern about the AU 
decision. Ensuring that the determined steps to end impunity on our continent 
are not undermined requires a collective effort by all Africans. Instead of 
retreating from important achievements to date, we look to our governments to 
remain steadfast in their support for justice for victims of the worst crimes, 
including by reaffirming their commitment to cooperate with the ICC.”  
 
 
It may be noted that President al-Bashir was scheduled to visit two African states 
parties towards the end of 2009 (Uganda and Nigeria), but ultimately – and hopefully 
in part on account of the civil society action described above – the indicted head of 
state chose to change his travel itinerary. 
 
Third: the use of South Africa’s domestic ICC Act by civil society 
 
Another important initiative in Southern Africa is the use by civil society of South 
Africa’s domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute (The Implementation of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 – the ICC Act).  
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The first meaningful invocation of South Africa’s ICC Act was on 18 March 2008, 
when the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) submitted a dossier to South 
Africa's National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), calling on it to investigate, with a 
view to prosecuting, senior Zimbabwean police officials who, it maintains, have 
committed crimes against humanity by systematically using torture against those they 
believed to oppose the Zanu-PF-led government.  The dossier was submitted two 
weeks before the March 29 Zimbabwe elections. The dossier contains a legal opinion 
and detailed evidence relating in particular to the torture of opposition activists which 
occurred subsequent to a police raid on 28 March 2007 on Harvest House in Harare – 
the headquarters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It also contains 
documentation relating to other separate clusters of the systematic use of torture on 
the part of Zimbabwean police. 
But for South Africa’s ICC Act, this initiative could not have been undertaken. 
It gives effect to South Africa’s complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute, 
but it arguably does more than that. In the Act’s scope and ambition – for instance, in 
its enactment of a form of conditional universal jurisdiction – it goes beyond what 
was strictly required by the terms of the Rome Statute, demonstrating South Africa’s 
then commitment to and leadership in respect of the larger international criminal 
justice project. 
  Prior to the ICC Act, South Africa had no municipal legislation on the subject 
of war crimes or crimes against humanity, and no domestic prosecutions of 
international crimes had taken place in South Africa. Under the ICC Act, a structure is 
created for national prosecution of crimes in the Rome Statute. In other words, the 
ICC Act allows for the prosecution of crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes before a South African Court. 
Of importance in relation to offences committed in Zimbabwe is that the Act 
allows for the prosecution of an individual who commits a core crime and who does 
not have a close and substantial connection with South Africa at the time of offence.  
Put otherwise, it is possible under the ICC Act – provided that there is sufficient 
evidence – to initiate a prosecution against the persons responsible for torture and 
other crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe after 1 July 2002. 
Following SALC’s submission to the NPA, there have been several further 
communications: at the request of the NPA, the advocates acting for SALC 
addressing the NPA on the requirement of gravity, as set out in the Rome Statute; and, 
again at the NPA’s request, SALC undertaking to assist them in the conduct of their 
investigation by making witnesses and additional evidence available. However, 
recently the NPA has explained that they do not intend initiating an investigation 
and/or prosecution of those senior Zimbabwean officials whom SALC alleges to be 
responsible for crimes against humanity. That decision appears to be on the basis that 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) has decided not to initiate an investigation.  
In the circumstances, SALC is now intending to seek an application for judicial 
review of the authorities’ decision.  Such a court review will be a further example of 
civil society pressure being brought to bear on Government authorities to comply with 
their treaty obligations and the principle of complementarity. 
The second example of the ICC’s Act invocation by civil society is more 
recent. A team of lawyers, led by Professor John Dugard SC, was briefed to compile a 
dossier presented to the National Prosecuting Authority and the Directorate for 
Priority Crimes Investigation in South Africa on 3 August 2009. 571  The dossier – 
                                                 
571 The two NGOs in question are the Palestinian Solidarity Alliance and the Media Review Network. 
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submitted in terms of the ICC Act – requests the South African Government to 
investigate and if appropriate prosecute in South Africa foreign nationals and South 
Africans allegedly involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity during 
Operation Cast Lead.   In parallel with the request made to the South African 
authorities, the complainants handed the dossier over to the International Criminal 
Court’s Prosecutor in early September 2009.  Newsweek magazine has recently 
reported an interview with the Prosecutor of the ICC who has expressed the view that 
one of the individuals cited in the docket -  Lt. Col. David Benjamin, a reserve officer 
in the Israeli military – may be a basis for the ICC to launch an enquiry. According to 
Newsweek, the ICC Prosecutor “believes he has all the authority he needs to launch 
an inquiry: Benjamin holds dual citizenship in both Israel and South Africa, and the 
latter has signed the ICC's charter, bringing Benjamin into the court's orbit.”572 
These are two early examples, and in both cases developments are ongoing.  
The first striking feature of these examples is that but for the work of civil society it is 
not clear that the ICC Act would have been invoked by the Government or its 
prosecution agencies. Certainly it has taken the work of civil society for cases to be 
brought to the relevant authorities; and Government has not “self-initiated” cases in 
accordance with its statutory and treaty obligations. Accordingly, these examples for 
present purposes demonstrate the willingness and ability of civil society actors to 
utilize the provisions of South Africa’s domestic incorporation legislation to request 
and if necessary compel the South African authorities to act in conformity with their 
international treaty obligations to investigate and if appropriate prosecute individuals 
accused of international crimes. 
 
Whether it is an arrest warrant for al-Bashir issued by the ICC, or requests by local 
NGOs for South Africa to investigate international crimes, it is clear that the demands 
of international criminal justice unfold within a politically charged context.   
From these three examples I conclude with three lessons. 
The first lesson is that it vital to push for domestic implementation legislation.  
The drive to ratify the Rome Statute must be backed up by energetic calls for 
implementation laws to be put in place.  The problem too often is that international 
criminal justice – and the directed obligations of the Rome Statute – may be seen by 
Parliamentarians and justice officials as exotic, external, and ethereal.  By 
domesticating the Rome Statute these obligations are brought home; and the sense of 
disconnect or at least distance between the goals of international criminal justice and 
that of the State is removed.  In this way it becomes more difficult for Governments 
and their officials to wriggle or writhe their way away from their treaty obligations, 
not least of all because the failure by Governments to act under their own domestic 
law may more easily be attacked as a “rule of law issue”.  Accordingly, in my view 
renewed energy should be directed at convincing all States Parties – which in Africa 
would include 30 African parties to the ICC – to adopt legislation incorporating the 
obligations and ideals of the Rome Statute directly into domestic law. 
The second lesson is that domestic legislation may more easily and less 
controversially allow for universal jurisdiction as a complement to the work of 
international criminal tribunals.  This obviously requires the in-tandem capacitation of 
independent and specialised domestic prosecutors and investigators who are 
                                                 
572 See Dan Ephron, “ICC Prosecutor may charge Israeli with War Crimes”, available at  
http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/wealthofnations/archive/2009/09/21/icc-prosecutor-may-charge-
israeli-with-war-crimes.aspx (accessed 5 August 2010). 
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experienced enough to handle the complexities and bold enough to withstand the 
political controversies of pursuing cases against individuals accused of the world’s 
worst crimes.  South Africa is a case in point, at least on the African continent.  It is 
only because of South Africa’s implementation legislation (the ICC Act) that there is 
now a specialised prosecutorial unit in the form of the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit.  
I would suggest that such domestic units are an important future component of 
international criminal justice – both under the principle of complementarity in terms 
of the Rome Statute, but also as units that may in appropriate cases exercise universal 
jurisdiction where empowered to do so. 
A third lesson, in my view, is that progressively phrased domestic legislation 
and specialised prosecutorial and investigatory units are not enough.  There must be 
political will in support of this work.  And here lies a vital role for civil society.  
Perhaps the most vital contribution that may be made by civil society is to vigilantly 
remind Governments, Government officials and regional bodies (including the 
African Union) that the ICC not the preserve of states or powerful political leaders – 
to be used or ignored as befits political will (or the lack thereof).  Rather, that 
communities and individuals have an important stake in the ICC and its project of 
international criminal justice – that they are ultimately the most important stake- and-
shareholders of a project aimed at ensuring that impunity does not follow the 
commission of serious international crimes.  
As this thesis has attempted to show, a vital ingredient (in South Africa – and, 
it is predicted, elsewhere) for the success of international criminal justice, will be the 
strength and advocacy of civil society actors in demanding action from law 
enforcement authorities in the incorporation and operationalisation of a state’s (or 
continent’s) commitment to international criminal justice.  What is abundantly clear is 
that Africa is where international criminal justice – a relatively new phenomenon – is 
taking stride.  And South Africa, through a combination of its progressive ICC Act 
and its leading role on a continent whose regional body has shown a resistance to the 
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